Essentially Stable Matchings | Peter Troyan

Troyan P, Delacretaz, Kloosterman. Essentially Stable Matchings. 2018.

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Last updated on 11/26/2020

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Recent Publications

Troyan P, Morrill T. Obvious Manipulations. 2018.
Troyan P, Delacretaz, Kloosterman. Essentially Stable Matchings. 2018.
Pycia M, Troyan P. Obvious dominance and random priority. 2018.
Kloosterman A, Troyan P. School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance. 2017.
Fragiadakis D, Troyan P. Improving matching under hard distributional constraints. Theoretical Economics. 2017;12(2):863–908.
Troyan P. Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. Journal of Economic Theory. 2017;170:319–345.