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Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor, Department of Economics

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Essentially Stable Matchings

Essentially Stable Matchings

Troyan P, Delacretaz, Kloosterman. Essentially Stable Matchings. 2018.

tdk_essential_stability.pdf455.62 KB

Last updated on 11/26/2020

Contact

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904
troyan@virginia.edu

Recent Publications

Troyan P, Morrill T. Obvious Manipulations. 2018.

obvious_manipulations.pdf384.21 KB
Troyan P, Delacretaz, Kloosterman. Essentially Stable Matchings. 2018.

tdk_essential_stability.pdf455.62 KB
Pycia M, Troyan P. Obvious dominance and random priority. 2018.

kloosterman_troyan_information.pdf891.23 KB
Kloosterman A, Troyan P. School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance. 2017.
Fragiadakis D, Troyan P. Improving matching under hard distributional constraints. Theoretical Economics. 2017;12(2):863–908.

distributional_constraints.pdf496.11 KB
Troyan P. Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. Journal of Economic Theory. 2017;170:319–345.

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