Troyan P, Morrill T. Obvious Manipulations. 2018.
Publications
2018
Troyan P, Delacretaz, Kloosterman. Essentially Stable Matchings. 2018.
Pycia M, Troyan P. Obvious dominance and random priority. 2018.
2017
Kloosterman A, Troyan P. School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance. 2017.
Fragiadakis D, Troyan P. Improving matching under hard distributional constraints. Theoretical Economics. 2017;12(2):863–908.
Troyan P. Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. Journal of Economic Theory. 2017;170:319–345.
2016
Fragiadakis, Troyan P. Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies. 2016.
Troyan P. Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles. 2016.
Fragiadakis D, Iwasaki A, Troyan P, Ueda S, Yokoo M. Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas. AcM Transactions on Economics and computation. 2016;4(1):6.
2012
Troyan P. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. Games and Economic Behavior. 2012;75(2):936–947.