Within sovereign states citizenship is arguably the most important political marker of in- and outsiders. As a result, questions about who gets to reap the benefits of citizenship often result in distributional conflict. This conflict becomes inflamed when a country goes through a period of significant inward migration. Given that citizenship is so important and so contentious, from where do the rules governing its acquisition come? Our starting point is the acknowledgment that migrants are mobile labor. From this perspective, countries in which elites benefit from an increased supply of productive labor—that is, those with high land/labor ratios—will be more likely to adopt policies that attract migrants, such as easier naturalization rules, including birthright citizenship. We illustrate the plausibility of our argument with some statistical evidence and suggest some avenues to further explore this crucial question.

The revelation of the NSA spying scandal by Edward Snowden has been prophesised by academics from various backgrounds as a game changer in international politics. The Snowden files are also likely to have ramifications for transatlantic relations between the European Union and United States. This paper examines the effect of the revelations on the NSA as leading to changes in how the EU formulates its foreign policy vis-à-vis the U.S. It focuses on how the Snowden files affected agenda-setting in the EU foreign policy cycle. It draws on previous work by Princen on agenda-setting strategies, addressing acts of mobilising supporters, arousing interest, building capacity and claiming authority. The responses from the various institutions and the use of these four strategies are analysed and compared through a document analysis spanning the entirety of the period after the revelations of the Snowden files. This paper comes to the conclusion that all of the three main decision making bodies - the European Parliament, European Commission and the Council of the European Union - have been involved in gaining attention for a possible transatlantic response. However, unlike the Commission or Parliament, the Council has actively opposed any attempt at building capacity or claiming authority. This practice could be seen as ‘business as usual’ for the Council, as it often prefers to keep sensitive foreign policy issues off the European agenda, favouring individual action by the member states.