Despite widespread economic liberalization, corruption in developing countries is pervasive and growing. We argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization draws multinational companies into corrupt and unfamiliar contexts, creating ripe targets for bureaucratic corruption. This corruption reflects motives of both bureaucrats and the politicians whom they serve, and politicians' capacity to shape bureaucrats' incentives. We exploit India's 2005 FDI liberalization, estimating its effects on multiple observable implications of bureaucratic corruption by district-level officers of the Indian Administrative Service. Our findings are consistent with state legislators abusing bureaucratic transfers to extract a share of bureaucratic corruption rents. In FDI-exposed districts, corruption-prone officers were more likely to be transferred and appointed the chief district bureaucrat, the single most lucrative post for  corruption. After liberalization, majority-foreign-owned firms were more likely to report demands for informal payments. Leveraging close state legislative elections in FDI-exposed districts, we find abnormal asset growth among only those winners with influence over transfers. We find no evidence that legislators used transfers to prevent corruption or maximize economic spillovers from FDI. Our findings help explain growing corruption in liberalized economies and suggest a novel motive for politicians to attract FDI.