When humans perceive the environment, angular units of visual information must be transformed into units appropriate for the specification of such parameters of surface layout as extent, size, and orientation. Our embodied approach to perception proposes that these scaling units derive from the body. For example, hand size is relevant for scaling the size of a strawberry, whereas an extent across a meadow is scaled by the amount of walking required to traverse it. In his article, Firestone (2013, this issue) argued that our approach is wrong; in fact, he argued that it must be wrong. This reply to Firestone’s critique is organized into three parts, which address the following questions: (a) What is the fundamental question motivating our approach? (b) How does our approach answer this question? (c) How can we address Firestone’s arguments against our approach? A point-by-point critique of Firestone’s arguments is presented. Three conclusions are drawn: (a) Most of Firestone’s arguments reflect a misunderstanding of our approach, (b) none of his arguments are the fatal flaws in our approach that he believes them to be, and (c) there are good reasons to believe that perception—just like any other biological function—is a phenotypic expression.

Survival for any organism, including people, is a matter of resource management. To ensure survival, people necessarily budget their resources. Spatial perceptions contribute to resource budgeting by scaling the environment to an individual’s available resources. Effective budgeting requires setting a balance of income and expenditures around some baseline value. For social resources, this baseline assumes that the individuals are embedded in their social network. A review of the literature supports the proposal that our visual perceptions vary based on the implicit budgeting of physical and social resources, where social resources, as they fluctuate relative to a baseline, can directly alter our visual perceptions.

Influences on the perception of affordances (i.e., opportunities for actions) have been primarily studied by manipulating the functional morphology of the body. However, affordances are not just determined by the functional morphology of the perceiver, but also by the physiological state of the perceiver. States of anxiety have been shown to lead to marked changes in individuals’ physiological state and their behaviour. To assess the influence of emotional state on affordance perception, the perception of action capabilities in near space was examined after participants completed an anxiety-provoking task. Anxiety was induced immediately prior to tasks that assessed participants' perceived reaching ability in Experiment 1, grasping ability in Experiment 2, and the ability to pass their hands through apertures in Experiment 3. Results indicated that those participants who experienced changes in anxiety underestimated their reaching, grasping, and passing ability compared to non-anxious participants. In other words, anxious participants were more conservative in their estimations of their action capabilities. These results suggest that anxiety influences the perception for affordances in near space and are consistent with the notion that anxiety induces withdrawal behaviours.

Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) have known impairments in social and motor skills. Identifying putative underlying mechanisms of these impairments could lead to improved understanding of the etiology of core social/communicative deficits in ASDs, and identification of novel intervention targets. The ability to perceptually integrate one's physical capacities with one's environment (affordance perception) may be such a mechanism. This ability has been theorized to be impaired in ASDs, but this question has never been directly tested. Crucially, affordance perception has shown to be amenable to learning; thus, if it is implicated in deficits in ASDs, it may be a valuable unexplored intervention target. The present study compared affordance perception in adolescents and adults with ASDs to typically developing (TD) controls. Two groups of individuals (adolescents and adults) with ASDs and age‐matched TD controls completed well‐established action capability estimation tasks (reachability, graspability, and aperture passability). Their caregivers completed a measure of their lifetime social/communicative deficits. Compared with controls, individuals with ASDs showed unprecedented gross impairments in relating information about their bodies' action capabilities to visual information specifying the environment. The magnitude of these deficits strongly predicted the magnitude of social/communicative impairments in individuals with ASDs. Thus, social/communicative impairments in ASDs may derive, at least in part, from deficits in basic perceptual–motor processes (e.g. action capability estimation). Such deficits may impair the ability to maintain and calibrate the relationship between oneself and one's social and physical environments, and present fruitful, novel, and unexplored target for intervention. 

According to the embodied approach to visual perception, individuals scale the environment to their bodies. This approach highlights the central role of the body for immediate, situated action. The present experiments addressed whether body scaling—specifically, eye-height scaling—occurs in memory when action is not immediate. Participants viewed standard targets that were either the same height as, taller than, or shorter than themselves. Participants then viewed a comparison target and judged whether the comparison was taller or shorter than the standard target. Participants were most accurate when the standard target height matched their own heights, taking into account postural changes. Participants were biased to underestimate standard target height, in general, and to push standard target height away from their own heights. These results are consistent with the literature on eye-height scaling in visual perception and suggest that body scaling is not only a useful metric for perception and action, but is also preserved in memory.

One of the reasons we (the authors) enjoy going to live college basketball games is to watch the antics of the student section. We love watching the students’ creativity in trying to pump up the home team and distract the visiting team, especially during free throws. Such escapades made us question whether manipulating what athletes see can influence their subsequent performance.

Perception is clearly important for performance. For instance, when athletes look directly at a target without moving their eyes around—a pattern known as the quiet eye—they are more successful in making free throws, putting, and performing a variety of other tasks (e.g., Vickers, 1996, 2007). The quiet eye might lead to more successful performance by focusing attention on targets, and helping athletes to ignore distractors. Additionally, the quiet eye might change the way targets look. Targets presented in the fovea look bigger than those in the periphery (Newsome, 1972), so the quiet eye might lead athletes to perceive targets as bigger.

Misperceiving a target as bigger could influence performance in one of three ways. It could disrupt performance because the observer might aim for a location that does not correspond with the target. In this case, the misperception would result in worse performance. However, actions and explicit perceptions may not be influenced by illusions to the same degree (Goodale & Milner, 1992). That is, there may be dissociations between perceptions and visually guided actions such that illusions, which fool conscious perception, do not influence subsequent actions (e.g., Ganel, Tanzer, & Goodale, 2008). In this case, misperceiving a target as bigger would not affect performance. A final alternative is that misperceiving a target as bigger could enhance performance. Bigger targets feel as if they should be easier to hit, so people may feel more confident when aiming for a bigger target. Given that increased confidence improves performance (e.g., Woodman & Hardy, 2003), a perceptually bigger target may also lead to enhanced performance. Here, we report an experiment in which we tested these possibilities.

People have a lifetime of experience in which to calibrate their self-produced locomotion with the resultant optical flow. Contrary to walking across the ground, however, walking on a treadmill produces minimal optical flow, and consequentially, a perceptual-motor aftereffect results. We demonstrate that the magnitude of this perceptual-motor aftereffect—measured by forward drift while attempting to march in-place following treadmill walking—decreases as experience walking on a treadmill is acquired over time. Experience with treadmill walking enables walking in this context to become sufficiently distinguished from walking in other contexts. Consequently, two distinct perceptual-motor calibration states are maintained, each linked to the context in which walking occurs. Experience with treadmill walking maintains perceptual-motor calibration accuracy in both walking contexts, despite changes to the relationship between perception and action.

Many amateur athletes believe that using a professional athlete's equipment can improve their performance. Such equipment can be said to be affected with positive contagion, which refers to the belief of transference of beneficial properties between animate persons/objects to previously neutral objects. In this experiment, positive contagion was induced by telling participants in one group that a putter previously belonged to a professional golfer. The effect of positive contagion was examined for perception and performance in a golf putting task. Individuals who believed they were using the professional golfer's putter perceived the size of the golf hole to be larger than golfers without such a belief and also had better performance, sinking more putts. These results provide empirical support for anecdotes, which allege that using objects with positive contagion can improve performance, and further suggest perception can be modulated by positive contagion.

An embodied approach to the perception of spatial layout contends that the body is used as a ‘perceptual ruler’ with which individuals scale the perceived environmental layout. In support of this notion, previous research has shown that the perceived size of objects can be influenced by changes in the apparent size of hand. The size – weight illusion is a well known phenomenon, which occurs when people lift two objects of equal weight but differing sizes and perceive that the larger object feels lighter. Therefore, if apparent hand size influences perceived object size, it should also influence the object's perceived weight. In this study, we investigated this possibility by using perceived weight as a measure and found that changes in the apparent size of the hand influence objects' perceived weight.

Durgin et al. (2010) argued that the apparent accuracy of the palmboard measure of geographical slant is accidental and reflects limitations in wrist flexion that reduce palmboard adjustments by just the right amount given the perceptual overestimations upon which they are based. This account is inconsistent with findings that verbal reports and palmboard adjustments are dissociable. In addition to previous evidence found for such dissociation, Durgin et al. also found verbal/palmboard dissociations in Experiment 2. Experiments 1 and 3 of Durgin et al. lacked verbal reports and instead compared palmboard adjustments to free-hand estimates in the context of small wooden surfaces. These experiments are not relevant to the issue of verbal/palmboard dissociability. Across studies, the accuracy of Durgin et al.'s palmboard implementation is far less than that found by others (Feresin & Agostini, 2007). The design of Durgin et al.'s Experiment 5 misrepresented the experimental conditions of Creem and Proffitt (1998), and consequently, the findings of this study have no bearing on the issue at hand.