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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261028T121500
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261028T133000
LOCATION:Gibson Hall 296
SUMMARY: THIS FOLLOWING EVENT IS POSTPONED. MORE INFORMATION TO COME  ---> 
  “Making Access Count: Local Representation in Indian Cities\,” Dr. Dy
 uti Saunik (Univ. of Virginia)
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED\, LIKELY UNTIL THE SPRING SEMESTER...MO
 RE INFORMATION WHEN WE HAVE IT.Dr. Dyuti Saunik (Univ. of Virginia)&nbsp\;
  &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;&nbsp\;“Making Access Count: Loc
 al Representation in Indian Cities”&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp
 \; &nbsp\; Gibson Hall 296&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; 
 12:15-1:30pm&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Lunch will be 
 servedAbstract:&nbsp\;Elected representatives are often held responsible f
 or outcomes whose delivery depends on appointed bureaucrats they do not di
 rectly control. In Indian cities\, citizens turn to municipal councilors f
 or help with roads\, drainage\, water\, welfare claims\, and other everyda
 y problems\, even though councilors lack direct authority over much of the
  bureaucracy responsible for addressing them. Drawing on 27 months of fiel
 dwork\, more than 450 interviews\, municipal council proceedings\, and a s
 urvey of 506 current and former councilors\, I examine how representatives
  pursue constituent demands under this mismatch between electoral responsi
 bility and administrative authority. I show that repeated dependence on th
 e same bureaucratic and political actors makes collaboration more attracti
 ve than sustained confrontation\, but that collaboration takes different f
 orms. Councilors with greater leverage\, the capacity to induce response b
 y making nonresponse costly\, are more likely to rely on discretionary\, a
 ctor-specific channels rather than standardized procedural routes. The fin
 dings show how representatives who hold the same office\, often in the sam
 e city and under the same electoral rules\, can nevertheless differ substa
 ntially in their strategic capacity to work through the state.Bio: Dyuti S
 aunik received his Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virgini
 a’s Department of Politics in 2026. His research examines representation
 \, local democracy\, and bureaucracy\, with a focus on India.&nbsp\;
DTSTAMP:20261009T031247Z
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