

**Evaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars:
A Comparison of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations**

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Abstract

Legitimacy, impartiality, and technical expertise and are often thought to be key components of United Nations peace operations, ones that enable the UN to “get the job done” and that non-UN interventions lack. Based on an ecological model of peacebuilding, however, we expect there to be no inherent difference between the effectiveness of UN and non-UN operations. Using a comprehensive dataset on peacebuilding, we establish a robust empirical result: non-UN peace operations have no statistically significant effect on successful peacebuilding while UN operations have a large positive effect. We find some evidence that non-UN peace operations complement UN operations in peacebuilding efforts and that non-UN operations undertaken by militarily “advanced” countries may be more successful at preventing the recurrence of war. We discuss candidate explanations of these results in light of the ecological model and propose an agenda for further research on the design of peacekeeping operations.

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Introduction

As the prevalence of civil war around the world peaked in the mid-1990s, the international community responded by increasing the number of peacekeeping operations that were sent to end those wars and prevent their recurrence. Both the number and scope of peacekeeping operations expanded drastically since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations took the lead in those efforts, but other regional organizations and individual countries also engaged in peacekeeping activities. The UN has had some spectacular failures in Somalia and Rwanda, but also some impressive successes, in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and elsewhere. The record of non-UN peacekeeping is less well-known. Have peacekeeping operations by organizations other than the UN had the same overall success rate of UN peace operations? This is the question that we address in this chapter. The evidence that we present suggest that the UN has been much more successful in peacekeeping than other organizations. We analyze that evidence and suggest some possible explanations for this empirical fact.

United Nations officials and advocates see the UN's legitimacy as one of its key virtues. The UN "premium" of international legitimacy as an impartial mediator is often seen as a critical component of UN peacemaking and peacekeeping.¹ Legitimacy is distinct from the organization's resources and technical capabilities and derives from its commitment to maintain peace and order in accordance with the rules of the UN Charter. Thus the UN's legitimacy is not necessarily a characteristic of other actors engaged in peacekeeping (individual countries or regional organizations), even if those actors have the capabilities to engage in peacekeeping. These assertions, evident in journalistic accounts, case studies of UN peacekeeping, and speeches by diplomats and UN officials, skirt key policy questions. Why might UN operations be more likely to achieve good peacebuilding results than non-UN operations? Are the mechanisms behind UN success fundamentally unavailable to non-UN operations? We address this question in this chapter, by suggesting some possible explanations. These explanations do not resolve the debate. Rather, they highlight the fact that we do not yet know why there is a difference in the relative effectiveness of UN and non-UN peacekeeping and point the way to more research that could resolve this puzzle.

The literature on peace operations has provided several, often conflicting perspectives on the effectiveness of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Several studies describe potential advantages and disadvantages of UN and non-UN approaches to peacekeeping (see, e.g., Diehl 1993) and case studies offer detailed accounts of the histories of particular operations (see, e.g., Durch 1996). But a theoretical account of the differences between the two types of UN missions is in short supply. There are also only a few empirical analyses of the differences between UN and non-UN missions. Here, the results authors have presented are not consistent. Heldt and Wallenstein (2005) have observed that UN peace operations appear to be more successful than non-UN operations because the former, while succeeding at the same rate as the later, tend to be deployed in more difficult conflict environments. Yet, Heldt (2004) is cited in the same study, arguing that, controlling for the degree of mission difficulty, UN and non-UN operations

¹ Bellamy and Williams 2005, see also United Nations 2005.

appear not to differ in their rate of success. Fortna's (2004) analysis finds that peace missions (UN and non-UN missions combined) have had a positive effect on continued peace, but this result is driven by the effects of UN missions.

We compare the effects of UN and non-UN peace operations by building on Doyle and Sambanis' (2000, 2006) ecological model of peacebuilding. According to the model, there are three main dimensions to the peacebuilding "space" after civil war. Levels of war-related hostility, pre- and post-war levels of local capacities, and available international capacities interact to deliver specific post-conflict outcomes. The higher the levels of hostility, and the lower the local and international capacities, the lower will be the probability of a successful transition to peace. The main measure of international capacities in the Doyle and Sambanis model is UN peacekeeping. UN operations are successful if they respond to the type of coordination or cooperation problem facing parties to the conflict. In other words, not all types of peace operations work all the time. Their empirical analysis has shown that UN peace operations have a robust large and statistically significant positive effect on the probability of peacebuilding success and that this effect is larger in the short run. All types of UN mandates can have a positive effect, though consent-based operations make the larger difference. A central conclusion of this work that we bring to our analysis is that an operation affects peacebuilding success through its interaction with the characteristics of the conflict.

All types of peace operations should, in principle, have a positive effect if they offer sufficient international capacities to counteract the negative effects of hostility and to compensate for deficiencies in local capacities. Thus, on the basis of Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), our prior is that non-UN operations are no less likely to have a positive effect on peacebuilding as UN-operations themselves. This is grounded in the more theoretical literature on external or "third party" intervention in conflict that analyzes intervention in conflict abstractly in contrast to the vast majority of the literature on peace operations as such. We provide support for this prior by offering an overview of the conventional wisdom on the differences between UN and non-UN peace operations. Here, we indicate that perceived differences between the two types in fact vary across both UN and non-UN operations such that the two may not necessarily be understood as natural categories. Note that in contrast to the literature on peace operations as such, more theoretically oriented studies of external, or "third party" intervention in conflict, whether formal or empirical apparently proceed based on this assumption. Historical evidence on pre-UN peace operations also supports this claim (see Heldt and Wallenstein 2005).

We test our hypothesis about the effectiveness of non-UN operations empirically using data from Doyle and Sambanis (2006). We find that the data do not support our hypothesis and that non-UN operations have no significant effect on peacebuilding success, in contrast to UN operations, which have a large significant positive effect. This result is robust across multiple models employing different operationalizations of the dependent variable, different controls, and different econometric assumptions. We find support for the idea that the presence of a non-UN peace operation in the same conflict

may complement the effectiveness of a multidimensional UN operation.² We postulate several possible explanations for the result that non-UN operations have no significant effect on peacebuilding success and we explore the differences between the outcomes of UN and non-UN peace operations as a way to analyze the determinants of the composition of a peace operation.

Literature Review

The perceived differences between UN and non-UN peace operations are many. Non-UN operations, which could range from efforts by regional organizations, multi-national undertakings, or potentially even intervention by a single state, are thought to be subject to problems of impartiality, bias, logistics, vulnerability to domestic politics, and lack of financial, technical and coercive resources (see Diehl 1993 for an excellent summary of these concerns in the case of regional and multi-national operations and also Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004). Interestingly enough, the reverse of all of these problems have also been noted as potential advantages of non-UN operations, as are some additional characteristics: the potential for operational stability in contrast to regularly reviewed and renewed UN mandates and greater local and external support based on the ability to incorporate stakeholders (see Diehl 1993). These often directly contradictory advantages and disadvantages lead us to conclude that both UN and non-UN operations vary in their avoidance of the problems listed above and their provision of the services hypothesized as needed to build peace. The logic is that falsification of purported regularities in the differences between UN and non-UN peace operations implies that variation in the characteristics of peace operations exists, regardless of their source.

Yet while a large body of literature treats external intervention in conflict, a category to which peace operations undoubtedly belong, abstractly and analyzes its characteristics and effects as varying in ways that are not inherent to a particular actor (for examples see Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996, 2000, 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Siquiera 2003; and Smith and Stam 2003), we feel obliged to falsify one additional set of claims about differences between UN and non-UN operations. Non-UN operations are held to lack the special kind of “moral authority” the UN confers on it undertaking (Dorn 1998) or requiring accountability to the UN itself (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004). Some may also see them as lacking the unique legitimacy of UN operations (Bellamy and Williams 2005). Such analyses allude to the existence of something like a UN “brand” that enhances peace operations by its essence, not characteristics (we could call this the primordialist theory of peacekeeping!). Thus, Diehl (2000: 357) concludes that:

“A best-case scenario would be a peacekeeping operation organized by the United Nations, with full support of the major powers and put in place following a comprehensive peace agreement between two states. Both protagonists would be strongly supportive of the operation as would any regional actors. The peacekeeping operation might be assigned monitoring

² See the results of our Models 2.1, 2.9 and 2.10.

functions and be located along a narrow international border in a sparsely populated area that would make detection of military and other movements easy, while not offering opportunities for the peacekeepers themselves to come under fire.”

Such claims of the existence and operational benefits of UN legitimacy are made regularly and forcefully not just by UN officials but in debates on foreign affairs, and are not exclusive to discussions of peace operations but appear more generally even in the literature on international institutions.³ In addition to our skepticism of treating differences between UN and non-UN operations as innate purely on logical grounds, increased scrutiny of intra-state operations undertaken by the UN particularly from the early 1990s onward, but also during the Cold War (e.g. ONUC in the Congo), provides evidence that legitimacy, however defined, varies from one UN operation to the next. On a general level, depending on the context, individuals may believe the UN’s actions to be part of a U.S.-sponsored, or at least Western-sponsored, project, implying lack of legitimacy (see Paris 2002 for a discussion of understanding the UN in this light). On a more micro-level, allegations of misconduct also taint the UN.⁴ The UN still retains substantial credibility as an impartial mediator, but even impartial UN missions can have effects that some of the parties to an intra-state conflict can consider to be biased.⁵ Hence the legitimacy of UN intervention may not always be a constant and it may not always explain why UN missions seem to be more effective than non-UN missions.

Relevant to the debate about the merits of UN and non-UN peace operations is the pre-UN history of peace interventions. Heldt and Wallenstein (2005) describe two instances of peace operations under the auspices of the League of Nations. In the first, following the Versailles Treaty, the League administered the Saar region of Germany and deployed police there, while the French controlled security. For a 1935 referendum on the status of the region, which occurred peacefully, the League deployed a 3,300 strong force of British, Italian, Dutch and Swedish troops for the period December 1934 to February 1935 as Germany would not accept that the referendum be held with the French security role. In the second, the League assisted in the verification of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Spanish Civil War, which totaled 110,000 to 130,000, by organizing an observer mission of 12 members, known as the International Military Commission. Finally, Held and Wallenstein (2005) note the peacekeeping use of Swedish and Norwegian troops in Schleswig between 1849 and 1850 following a war

³ See Barnett (1997) and Claude (1966).

⁴ See, for example, complaints about sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in Burundi, Congo, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone (Washington Post, March 13, 2005), and complaints about organizational malfeasance at headquarters during the Rwandan genocide (Gourevitch 1998).

⁵ A good example is given by several UN missions where a consent-based mandate was eventually transformed into an enforcement mandate due to the parties’ lack of cooperation which often stemmed from the parties’ realization that the UN would be an obstacle to their aims (if the UN maintains the status quo in a situation where one of the parties believes that it can change the status quo through the use of force, then it follows that the UN’s impact is not “impartial” in the ordinary sense of the term since it benefits the parties that are more committed to the peace). There are also other examples where the UN’s motives for intervening are doubted by one or more of the parties (see accounts of Patrice Lumumba’s accusations that ONUC was acting on behalf of the CIA).

between Denmark and Germany. They explain that the peacekeepers were “tasked to maintain law and order...until a peace agreement could be established,” which indeed occurred in July 1850, and was followed by their withdrawal. These examples, in disparate settings and geopolitical contexts, further illustrate that it need not be the case that the UN endows peace operations with something that other actors are fundamentally unable to provide.⁶

Our Argument

Based on an ecological model of peacebuilding we argue that the effect of peace operations should not differ across organizations, controlling for the relevant elements of these operations. The specifics of an operation and how well it is matched to the characteristics of the conflict should affect peacebuilding success. To develop this line of argument further, we specify the characteristics of conflict to which peace operations should respond in order to facilitate peacebuilding.

The resolution of conflict is characterized by coordination and cooperation problems, with some conflicts reflecting entirely one or the other, and others reflecting a mix of the two, either simultaneously or in sequences. Coordination problems have a payoff structure that gives the parties no incentives to unilaterally move out of equilibrium, once they reach equilibrium.⁷ It is well-established that the best strategy to resolve coordination problems is information-provision and improvement of the level of communication between the parties.⁸ Communication gives the parties the ability to form common conjectures about the likely outcomes of their actions. Without the ability to communicate, they will not choose the most efficient outcome.

In a game of pure coordination, both parties want to pursue compatible strategies). But if neither knows the rules or what the other party prefers, they will be tempted to experiment, to try one and then the other of the strategies, and this of course can be costly. Coordination can be readily achieved by credible information on rules, payoffs, and the parties’ compliance with the rules or stated preferences. Once the rule is known or the other parties’ preferences are clear, coordination can be achieved. UN monitors or observers can assist such communication and help the parties coordinate to an efficient outcome.

One formulation of a coordination problem is the “assurance” game. The classic story (as told by the 18th century French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau) is a stag hunt in which catching the stag depends on all the hunters cooperating. But if a rabbit suddenly appears, some of the hunters may be tempted to defect in order to catch the rabbit which, though less desirable than the hunter’s share of the deer, can be caught (in

⁶ A test of the proposition that UN operations are more effective because they carry greater legitimacy is difficult because we cannot measure the legitimacy of the intervening party directly. A conceivable test of this proposition would be to consider legitimacy as the residual category. We would then need to be able to capture all other differences between UN and non-UN operations. If a difference in the efficacy of UN and non-UN operations persists, we might then be able to attribute it to legitimacy.

⁷ See Morrow 1994 and Kreps 1990 for a precise definition of coordination and collaboration games.

⁸ For a summary see Keohane and Axelrod 1986.

this story) by one hunter on his own. If all chase the rabbit, they divide the rabbit. Here, if players A and B can choose between strategies of cooperation and defection, we get a payoff structure such as the following: mutual cooperation yields a payoff of (4, 4) for players A and B, respectively, as each gets a share of the deer. When A cooperates and B defects A gets 0 and B gets 3 (the rabbit) and correspondingly when A defects and B cooperates, A gets 3 and B, 0. When both defect each gets 2 (the share of the rabbit). In this case, peacekeeping needs to be more involved than in the previous coordination game. In both cases communication should be sufficient, but the temptation to defect out of fear that another hunter will do so first (even though this is rational for neither) requires more active facilitation and continual reassurance. Information alone may not be enough; the peacekeepers may need to provide regular reports on each party's compliance, and so reduce the costs of communication between the parties and allow them to coordinate their strategies.⁹ The more the peacekeepers need to increase the costs of non-cooperation, the more we move from a coordination game to a game of cooperation.

In the more complicated framework of actual peace processes, many parties that have a "will" to coordinate lack the "way." Coordination is promoted when parties receive assistance in capacity building, demobilizing armies and transforming themselves from military factions to coherent political parties. Such assistance permits them to act rationally according to their preferences, rather than incoherently.

By contrast, cooperation problems create incentives to renege on agreements, particularly if the parties discount the benefits of long-term cooperation in favor of short-run gain. In one-shot games of cooperation the parties will try to trick their adversaries into cooperating while they renege on their promises. A well-known example is the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two accomplices in police custody are offered a chance to "rat" on their partner. The first to rat gets off and the "sucker" receives a very heavy sentence. If neither rats, both receive light sentences (based on circumstantial evidence); and, if both rat, both receive sentences (but less than the sucker's penalty). Even though they would be better off trusting each other by keeping silent, the temptation to get off and the fear of being the sucker make cooperation extremely difficult.

Cooperation problems are much more difficult to solve. How can cooperation failure (defection) be avoided? In the classic Prisoner's Dilemma one-shot game, we always end up at double defection (both rat) unless there is some external enforcement mechanism. Conditions of repeated play (iteration) may produce cooperation in infinite-horizon games even without external enforcement, but not if there is a visible end to the game.¹⁰ Short-term defection from agreements may even be possible from iterated games if one of the parties discounts the future severely. Strong third party involvement would

⁹ Regional powers can play this role, if organized by an impartial party with broad legitimacy. See Doyle, Johnstone and Orr (1997) for a discussion of the role played by the "Friends of the Secretary-General" in the El Salvador negotiations.

¹⁰ By contrast, even in finite, yet multiple-iteration games, if the timing of the game's end is not known, players can be expected to play as if they were engaged in an infinite horizon game. But if the endgame is visible, then finite game strategies will be used.

be necessary to support effective cooperation, unless the parties' agreements are self-enforcing. However, self-enforcement of peace agreements in internal conflicts may be impossible for at least three reasons.

First, many conflicts are characterized by power asymmetry, which implies that the costs of cooperating while other parties are defecting may be extremely large for the weaker party. In internal conflicts, a settlement implies that the rebels would need to disarm, making themselves vulnerable to an attack by the state, even if the state can later renege on the agreement. Walter (1997) argues that this is the "critical barrier" to negotiated settlement in civil wars. The potential for time-inconsistent behavior by the state makes the settlement non-credible.

Second, internal conflicts –especially of the ethnic variety— can escalate to the point where one or more of the groups are eliminated, forcibly displaced, or weakened to the point of not having any bargaining leverage. This seems to have been the strategy of the *genocidaires* in Rwanda, and of the Serbs in the Bosnian war. This also implies that the potential gains from short-term defection for the stronger party could be infinite if such defection could eliminate the weaker party from future bargaining. Thus, the usual long-term benefits to cooperation in iterated play need not be greater than short-term gains from defection.

Third, in computer-simulated results of iterated prisoner's dilemma games (where the solutions from iterated play come from), players have access to strategies that cannot be replicated in real life. For example, tit-for-tat punishment strategies of permanent exclusion of one of the parties may be feasible in a simulated environment, but are not realistic in actual civil wars. Parties that defect from peace agreements cannot be permanently excluded from further negotiation, so reciprocal punishment strategies against defection are implausible.¹¹ This should increase the discounting of expected future costs of short-term violations by parties who can expect to be included in future negotiations regardless of their previous behavior.

Given these enforcement problems, strong peacekeeping is necessary in internal conflicts resembling cooperation problems to increase the parties' costs from non-cooperation, or reduce the costs of exploitation, or increase the benefits from cooperation – and ideally all three at once. Can peacekeeping have such an impact? And if so, how? The literature suggests that peacekeepers can change the costs and benefits of cooperation by virtue of the legitimacy of their UN mandate, which induces the parties to cooperate; by their ability to focus international attention on non-cooperative parties and condemn transgressions; by their monitoring of and reporting on the parties' compliance with agreements; and by their function as a trip-wire that would force aggressors to go through the UN troops to change the military status quo.

¹¹ As an impartial third party, the UN cannot formally exclude parties from negotiations. The inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the negotiations leading to the Paris Accords over the Cambodian civil war is a case in point. Moreover, exclusion of parties from the terms of the settlement can generate grievances that lead to renewed fighting.

Ultimate success, however, may depend less on changing incentives for existing parties within their preferences and more on transforming preferences – and even the parties themselves – and thus turning a cooperation problem into a coordination problem. The institution-building aspects of peacebuilding can be thought of as a revolutionary transformation in which voters and politicians replace soldiers and generals; armies become political parties; and war economies, peace economies. Reconciliation, when achieved, is a label for these changed preferences and capacities. To be sure, the difficulty of a transformative strategy cannot be overestimated. Most post-war societies look a great deal like they did prior to the war. However, if, for example, those who have committed the worst war crimes can be prosecuted, locked up and thus removed from power, the prospects for peace rise. The various factions can begin to individualize rather than collectivize their distrust and hostility. At minimum, the worst individuals are no longer in control.¹²

Therefore, even where enforcement is used at the outset, the peace must eventually become self-sustaining and consent must be won if the peace enforcers are ever to exit and have their work remain complete. As consensual peace agreements can rapidly erode, forcing peace enforcers to adjust to the strategies of “spoilers,” their success or lack of success in doing so tends to be decisive in whether a sustainable peace follows.

These structural differences between cooperation and coordination problems imply that different peacekeeping strategies should be used in each case. Strong intervention strategies, such as multidimensional peacekeeping or enforcement with considerable international authority, are needed to resolve cooperation problems, whereas weaker peacekeeping strategies, such as monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, are sufficient to resolve coordination problems. Weak peacekeeping has no enforcement or deterrence function. Stronger peacekeeping through multidimensional operations can increase the costs of non-cooperation for the parties and provide positive inducements by helping rebuild the country and restructure institutions so that they can support the peace. Enforcement may be necessary to resolve the toughest cooperation problems.¹³ Not all civil war transitions are plagued by cooperation problems. Some wars resemble coordination problems, whereas frequently both types of problems occur, in which case intervention strategies must be carefully combined or sequenced (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Figure 1 illustrates how peacebuilding strategies can be matched successfully with different types of conflict.

In our empirical analysis, we will consider if UN and non-UN peace operations match the right mandate to the right peacebuilding ecology. Peacebuilding success would depend on the assignment of the right mandate to each case. Thus, if we find systematic differences between the UN and other organizations in the design of

¹² See Bass (2000); and for the difficulties, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003/04).

¹³ Strong peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement. Strong peacekeeping can only deter or punish occasional violations. If the violations are systematic and large-scale, a no-consent enforcement operation might be necessary.

appropriate mandates, this could be a source of difference in the success rates of peace missions from these different organizations.

Insert Figure 1 here

Data

The dataset used is from Doyle and Sambanis (2006). It covers all peace processes after civil war from 1945 until the end of 1999,¹⁴ coding 145 civil wars in that period. Wars that were ongoing as of December 31, 1999 and/or wars in which there had been no significant peace process prior to that point were dropped.¹⁵ If a peace process started and failed immediately, a failure of the peace was coded in the first month of the peace process.¹⁶ Rules for coding the start and end of a civil war, including criteria used to separate civil wars from other forms of political violence and to distinguish bouts of civil war in the same country are reproduced from Doyle and Sambanis (2006) in Appendix 1, where we also provide a list of civil wars and peace operations.¹⁷

Dependent Variable

We analyze peacebuilding using several measures. The main dependent variables are *sovereign* and *participatory* peace two years after the end of the war. These are coded as combinations of four intermediate variables.

Sovereign peace is attained when there is no war recurrence, no residual violence, and no divided sovereignty. The resumption of a civil war in the country is coded (*Warend*), with a suffix added to indicate the time period at which this outcome is evaluated. *Warend2* is coded 1 if civil war has not re-started after 2 years and 0 otherwise.¹⁸ The variable *No Residual Violence (Noviol)* codes lower-level, or residual, violence after the war, referring to what other datasets call intermediate armed conflict - about 200 deaths per year¹⁹ - and the presence of mass violations of human rights, such as politicide, genocide, widespread extra-judicial killings, torture, and mass-level imprisonments of the political opposition. If there is no evidence of these events two years after the end of the war, then *Noviol*=1, otherwise it equals 0. The suffix again indicates the time period of evaluating outcomes (*Noviol2* refers to residual violence two

¹⁴ One civil war in the dataset started in 1944, but all peace processes started after 1945.

¹⁵ In a few cases, a war was ongoing in 1999, but a serious peace effort had taken place earlier (and obviously failed). Those cases are included but the analysis is robust to dropping them as well.

¹⁶ These are cases where a military victory fails to end the war (e.g. Afghanistan in 1992). Or, they are cases where the UN intervenes to end the fighting, but fails (e.g., Angola; Sierra Leone; Somalia). We do not include any peace processes that started after 12/31/1999 and this causes us to lose a few UN missions (e.g. UNAMA in Afghanistan; MONUC in the DRC; UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone).

¹⁷ Sambanis (2004) contains an extensive discussion of the definition of civil war used in these data.

¹⁸ Details on the coding of war resumption are given for each country in the online supplement to Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and in comments inserted in their dataset.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Gleditsch, et al. (2001).

years after the war's end). Finally, the government's ability to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country's territory is a component of peacebuilding. If state sovereignty is undivided, then *Sovereign* = 1. If there is *de facto* or *de jure* partition or regional autonomy that obstructs government control of an area of the country, then this criterion is not satisfied and *Sovereign*=0. Thus, sovereign peace two years after the war (*pbs2lr3*) is coded 1 if *Warend2* = 1, *Noviol2* = 1, and *Sovereign* = 1; and 0 otherwise.

Participatory peace adds a measure of political openness to sovereign peace, based on the country's polity score two years after the end of the war (*pol2*). This is the difference of the regime's democratic and autocratic characteristics.²⁰ The variable ranges from 0 (extreme autocracy) to 20 (maximum democracy).²¹ The cutoff point used is a low score of 3 on that scale. Regimes that fall below this cutoff point are coded as participatory peace failures – we are effectively coding the “peaces of the grave” in completely authoritarian regimes as peacebuilding failures. All other regimes above this very low threshold are considered successes, if they also satisfy the sovereign peace criteria.

These coding rules imply that that several cases –those where the UN has not departed for at least two years before the end of December 1999—must be excluded from the analysis.²² PB outcomes are coded for 119 cases with non-missing data for any of the explanatory variables. There are 84 participatory peace failures (69.42%) and 37 successes (30.58%).²³ Achieving sovereign peace is easier, with 68 failures and 53 successes.²⁴

Explanatory Variables

The ecological model of peacebuilding posits that variables that determine success fall into three categories: level of hostility, local capabilities, and international capacities. Peace operations are the key measure of international capacities. We use all the controls from Doyle and Sambanis' core model (2006): For level of hostility, we control for the log of the number of deaths and displacements (*Logcost*),²⁵ the type of war

²⁰ This uses the Polity dataset (version 2000). For years in which Polity scores are missing (i.e. they indicate regime transition or war in the country), scores are interpolated. The “Polity2” series of the 2002 version of the database is already interpolated by the Polity database coders (Marshall and Jagers 2004).

²¹ This is computed as democracy (ranging from 0 to 10) plus 10 minus autocracy (also ranging from 0 to 10).

²² These are all cases where the UN has not yet failed by any of the criteria. So, dropping them from the analysis should make it harder to find significant effects for UN missions.

²³ Two of these cases are dropped due to missing data in our models, but can be included in other specifications if imputed values are used for some of the covariates.

²⁴ Using a five-year cutoff point, there would be 74 participatory peace failures and 35 successes; and 58 sovereign failures and 51 successes. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also code an alternative version of PBS, where all ambiguous cases are either dropped (if the criteria for coding a civil war may not be met) or re-coded as the opposite outcome (if the initial coding of PB outcome was questionable). For participatory peace two years after the war, the alternative version has 78 failures and 25 successes (for a total of 103 observations).

²⁵ Since there is a large variance in this variable, the natural log is used. Deaths and displacements are combined. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) provide comments and sources for the coding of each case in their

(ethno-religious or not) (*Wartype*),²⁶ the number of factions (*Factnum*), and whether a peace treaty was ever signed by the majority of the parties (*Treaty*).²⁷ For local capacities, we control for socio-economic development proxied by electricity consumption per capita (*idev1*)²⁸ and dependence on natural resources, proxied by primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (*isxp2*) or oil-dependence (*oil*). Finally, for international capacities, in addition to UN (and non-UN missions), we control for foreign economic assistance, proxied by the amount of net current transfers per capita to the balance of payments of the country (*transpop*).²⁹

We describe in more detail only the variables relating to UN and non-UN peace operations. The variables of interest are the presence and mandate of peace operations, which are a large portion of the international capacities in the model. Mandate proxies for the mission's strength, its technical and military capabilities, and the level of international commitment.³⁰ Coding reflects the types of missions:³¹ fact-finding and mediation (*mediate*);³² observer missions (*observe*); traditional peacekeeping (*tradpko*); multidimensional peacekeeping (*multipko*); and enforcement with or without transitional administration (*enforce*). A categorical variable (*unmandate*) captures the different mandate types. The binary indicator *unintrvn* identifies all cases of UN intervention while the categorical variable *unops* lumps together monitoring missions (observer and traditional peacekeeping operations) and the more intrusive missions (multidimensional, enforcement, and transitional administration). Combined multidimensional and enforcement are also grouped together into a variable labeled *strongUN* as strong missions should be more effective in difficult peacebuilding ecologies. The variable *PKO* combines all Chapter VI UN peacekeeping missions, excluding observer and enforcement missions and. Finally, the variable *Ch6* identifies all missions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (i.e. it excludes enforcement missions).³³ These

online supplement in the document labeled “Civil War coding” and as comments in the excel spreadsheet and single-record version of their dataset.

²⁶ See Sambanis (2002). There is not much documentation in the literature for the classification of wars into “ethnic” or “non-ethnic” varieties. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) use their own coding, based on a set of detailed notes on each conflict, to test the robustness of the original *Wartype* variable used in DS 2000.

²⁷ Doyle and Sambanis (2006) post supplementary information online, including a comparison of the coding of *Treaty* across several datasets for cases shared in common. The definition of *treaty* is different from DS2000. Where coding differs from the coding of other authors, they provide a summary explanation, including a description of the case and excerpts from the actual treaty text.

²⁸ This measure is highly correlated with income: 77.67% with Fearon and Laitin's (2003) income series (*gdpn*) and 79.78% with the income series (*acplvs*) in Przeworski et al (2000).

²⁹ This variable is sometimes measured several years away from the war's start or end. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) used data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics to code this variable. See IMF (various years).

³⁰ Mandates should be correlated with numbers of troops and budgets for UN missions. Sometimes they are not, which indicates planning failure at the level of the Security Council.

³¹ *Unmandate* includes peacekeeping and enforcement mandates as well as serious efforts at peacemaking and mediation that are not followed up by a peacekeeping operation. The variable *untype* excludes cases of mediation.

³² These were cases of UN mediation or peacemaking without, however, a follow-up peacekeeping mission.

³³ There is little ambiguity about the coding of UN mandate types. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) discuss this issue in detail in their supplement. The results are robust to recoding several cases according to

different versions of the UN's involvement will allow us to develop a more nuanced argument about the conditions under which UN is likely to help build self-sustaining peace. UN mandates were coded based on a close reading of each operation's operational guidelines, status of forces agreements (where available), and a review of UN documents that indicated how much of the mandate was actually implemented.³⁴

Non-UN peace operations were coded using Heldt (2002) and supplemented in most cases with additional research. There are two versions of a non-UN peace operation variable. The first, *nonunops*, is coded exactly as the *unops* variable but for non-UN operations, thus distinguishing between strong and weak operations by grouping observer and traditional non-UN operations together and grouping multidimensional, enforcement, and transitional non-UN operations together. The second, *nonUN*, captures the presence of any non-UN operation. In order to deal with overlapping UN and non-UN operations, if bilateral or regional involvement took place in the context of a UN mandate, then we code a UN peace operation. But in some cases, both a UN mission and a separate third-party peace operation take place simultaneously and we code both in those cases.³⁵

Our data include 34 UN peace operations (13 observer missions, 8 traditional peacekeeping missions, 7 multidimensional peacekeeping missions, and 6 cases of enforcement or transitional administration) and 44 cases of non-UN peace operations (broken down into 15 observer missions; 12 traditional peacekeeping missions; and 17 peace enforcement or transitional administration missions).

The Effects of UN and non-UN Peace Operations Compared

We estimate the effects of peace operations using logistic regression. First, we examine participatory peace two years after the war (*pbs2s3r3*) as the measure of peacebuilding success. Table 1 presents our results.

Models 1.1 and 1.2 control for the effects of combined multidimensional and enforcement operations (*strongUN*). Here, none of the operationalizations of non-UN operations – whether presence (*nonUN*) or strength (observer and traditional operations versus multidimensional, enforcement, and transitional authority operations) – have a statistically significant effect on participatory peace two years after the war. Models 1.3 and 1.4 control for the presence of any UN operation (*unintrvn*). Again, no operationalization of non-UN operations has a statistically significant effect.

Insert Table 1 here

suggestions made by other scholar or in cases where Doyle and Sambanis (2006) thought the mandate was ambiguous, and are sometimes better.

³⁴ See the online supplement for Doyle and Sambanis (2006) for a list of supporting documents, including summaries of the mandate, list of functions actually performed by each mission, information on changes in mission mandate over time, and copies of relevant UN documents.

³⁵ The cases of non-UN third party peace operations and information on these missions (names, deployment dates, departure dates, and mandates) are given in the online supplement to Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

Next, we look at the different composites of the participatory peace definition. We begin by dropping the undivided sovereignty criterion (*pbs2s3_nosov*) and present these results in Table 2.

The substantive result of no statistically significant effect of non-UN operations from Table 1 does not change if we use a different concept and measure of peacebuilding success or if we change the model specification. But there appears to be an interaction effect between UN and non-UN peace operations. First, the coefficient on *strongUN* in Model 2.1 is larger than the coefficient on *strongUN* in Model 2.3 (at 2.74 compared to 2.35), the only difference between the two specifications being that model 2.3 does not control at all for non-UN operations, whereas model 2.1 controls for *nonunops*. Both *strongUN* coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Similarly a comparison between Model 2.1 and Model 2.7 indicates that when *strongUN* is controlled for the coefficient on *nonunops* is slightly more than 168% as large as when no controls for UN operations are in place, at 0.45 compared to 0.27, while its standard error decreases, from 0.31 to 0.31, an almost two percent reduction. Second, this effect appears to be particular to the relationship between non-UN operations and the category of multidimensional and enforcement UN operations. A comparison between Model 2.1 and Model 2.8 shows that the coefficient on *nonUN*, denoting the presence or absence of any kind of non-UN peace operation, in fact decreases once the *strongUN* control is added. Additionally, the point estimates of the non-UN operation coefficients change systematically from Models 1.3 and 1.4 to Models 2.5 and 2.6. Each of these models controls for the presence of UN operations only. However, Models 2.5 and 2.6 drop the undivided sovereignty requirement from the coding of the dependent variable while Models 1.3 and 1.4 include this. These results may suggest that non-UN operations act to freeze the situation on the ground rather than re-establishing undivided sovereignty in the country receiving the intervention.

Models 2.1-2.2 look at how changing the control for natural resources affects the results. Whether we control for the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP (*isxp2*), oil export dependence (*oil*), our results are unaffected. Model 2.3 drops the control for non-UN operations to establish a baseline with which to compare other results. Models 2.5 and 2.6 use any UN intervention as a control and consider both operationalizations of non-UN operations. Finally, Models 2.7 and 2.8 drop the controls for UN operations and just look at strong non-UN operations or the presence of any non-UN operation, but non-UN missions do not “soak up” the significance of UN missions in those regressions. Thus, any interaction between UN and non-UN missions runs in the direction of non-UN missions enhancing the effects of UN missions.

Insert Table 2 here

Next, we examine different components of participatory peace at the two-year evaluation point. We consider war recurrence (*warend2*) alone, and then war recurrence and residual violence (*warnviol2*). Table 3 presents our results.

Neither UN nor non-UN peace operations have a statistically significant effect if we look only at war recurrence (Models 3.1 and 3.2). Strong UN operations, however, have a positive statistically significant effect on no war recurrence and no residual violence (Models 3.3 and 3.4). Here, the effect of strong UN operations is significant at the 0.05 level with a single-tailed test in Model 3.3 and significant at the 0.05 level in Model 3.5. We return to this result when we look at war recurrence in the longer-term, using survival analysis methods that allow us to account for the right-censoring effect that is inherent in the coding of our dependent variable in the logit regressions.

Insert Table 3 here

Finally, we consider sovereign peace (*pbs2lr*) rather than any version of participatory peace. These results are presented as Table 4. Here, as in Tables 1 and 2 we see that strong UN operations have a positive, statistically significant effect on peacebuilding (here, sovereign peace). Non-UN operations, however operationalized, still do not have a statistically significant effect on the measure of peacebuilding.

Insert Table 4 here

Immediately of note considering all the results is that non-UN peace operations do not have the effect hypothesized in any of the short-run models. The coefficients of the three non-UN variables, across all specifications of the model, are not statistically significant. We have confirmed that non-UN missions are not significant using alternative estimation methods for the short run (propensity score matching and selection models) and they also apply to long-term models (survival models of the duration of the peace).

One complication is that it is often difficult to clearly distinguish partial military interventions by non-UN actors from peacekeeping interventions. In the case of UN intervention, the article of the Charter which authorizes those interventions allows us to make this classification and the rules of engagement as well as the mandate of the mission are often quite different if the UN mission is authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as compared to Chapter VI (no consent is required in the former). In non-UN missions, it is harder to make this distinction and this is consequential, since partial intervention may well have different effects than impartial intervention. Some (Regan 2002) have shown that partial military intervention prolongs the duration of civil war, for example. Sorting out those non-UN peace missions that had a clear enforcement mandate and could therefore more easily be confused with war-making rather than peacekeeping,

we found that the results on non-UN peace missions did not change and even consent-based non-UN peacekeeping did not have a significant impact on any of the ways that we used to code peacebuilding success.

Average numbers of deaths and displacements, levels of development, numbers of factions, net current transfers are roughly equal in cases of UN and non-UN peace missions as compared to the null category in each case; and non-UN missions are no more likely than UN missions to intervene in harder-to-resolve ethno-religious wars or in wars with more factions. So, it does not seem to be the case that the relative ineffectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping is because non-UN missions become involved in harder conflicts, with a lower *ex ante* probability of success.³⁶ Also, comparing mean values of the other covariates for strong peace missions only again does not reveal any systematic difference between UN and non-UN missions. For example, average levels of development and primary commodity export dependence are about the same in cases of UN and non-UN enforcement.³⁷ Some indicators of the levels of hostility point to a harder peacebuilding ecology in cases of non-UN enforcement. For example, deaths and displacements are somewhat higher for non-UN enforcement cases. But other hostility indicators point in the opposite direction: the number of factions, for example, is not significantly different in UN and non-UN cases; and UN enforcement has been used exclusively in ethno-religious wars, which are harder to resolve, while the same is not true for non-UN peace missions. Thus, in terms of our earlier theoretical discussion, summarized in Figure 1, it is not clear that the reason for the differential effectiveness of UN and non-UN missions is any major difference in assigning the right mandate to the right case. This comparison, however, is complicated by the fact that non-UN missions do not field multidimensional missions, so we are left with comparing enforcement missions here (and we could do the same for observer missions). But the fact that non-UN missions are missing this valuable combination of limited enforcement and civilian administration that we find in UN multidimensional missions can by itself help explain at least part of the difference in the relative effectiveness of UN and non-UN missions. Since that multidimensional mandate is judged to be necessary in some conditions – where local capacities are low and hostility is high, while a peace treaty forges some degree of local consent for international assistance— the fact that non-UN peace missions have not responded with such a multidimensional mandate can be considered a strategic failure that could explain at least partially the results that we have presented here.

We should return, however, to our earlier discussion of a possible interaction effect between non-UN and UN operations (see discussion of Table 2). We looked more closely at that by separating non-UN missions in which advanced industrialized countries and/or countries with advanced militaries participated from and all others. “Advanced” country missions include missions with troops from the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and CIS countries. Twenty-five out of forty-four non-UN missions are from the group of “advanced” countries. If we replace our control for non-

³⁶ This is evident by comparing the results of equality of means tests for all the variables in the model, sorted by UN intervention and then by non-UN intervention.

³⁷ There are only a few cases to compare: the average (with 6 cases) for UN missions is .17 while for non-UN (17 cases) is .18. Electricity consumption per capita levels are also about the same (608 vs. 633 kwh).

UN missions with one that counts only those 25, we find no substantive change in the results with respect to participatory peace, which is not surprising because those missions typically focused on monitoring and/or enforcement and not on building capacities for self-sustaining peace (see Table 5, model 5.1). With respect to war recurrence alone, those missions are also non-significant (p-value is 0.105), but they are much more significant than UN missions and have double the coefficient (model 5.2).

When we turn to a longer-term analysis of war recurrence using survival models, we find that UN missions are in fact effective in preventing war recurrence (see Table 6, model 6.1) while non-UN missions are not (p-value = 0.11; model 6.2). But, when we add both together, they become much more significant both jointly and individually (model 6.3). The reason that non-UN missions seem to have no effect may well be because regional peacekeeping that is led by less developed countries has had a very poor performance record with about half of those missions ending in peacebuilding failure. By contrast, in three out of four non-UN missions from “advanced” states, the peace had not failed at the end of our analysis time. It is also the case that there was slightly higher chance that a UN mission with a substantial mandate (enforcement missions or peacekeeping) would be present in cases where the non-UN mission was fielded by advanced states, so the combined presence of UN and non-UN missions would have both expanded the technical capacity and enforcement potential of the mission and would have given a clear signal of international interest, which could help explain why success was more likely in those cases.

So we see more evidence in favor of a mutually reinforcing relationship between UN and non-UN missions, if those missions come from countries with the resources and technical capacities to keep the peace. The fact that the effects of non-UN missions are restricted to preventing a resumption of violence and do not extend to higher-order, participatory peace leads us to conclude that there should be a division of labor in peacebuilding missions, with the UN performing the capacity-building functions while enforcement and policing are delegated to missions from advanced countries.

Conclusion: An Empirical Result and a New Research Question

The sharp difference in the results for UN and non-UN missions is instructive and worth further study. Critics of non-UN operations might contend that they appear to be much more ineffective in lending support to peacebuilding if non-UN actors are the primary agents for two widely cited reasons: non-UN operations lack impartiality and do not have adequate resources or technical capabilities (training, organizational knowledge). We have not yet been able to determine why non-UN missions are less effective than UN missions, though our results that non-UN missions from advanced countries tend to do better than other non-UN regional peacekeeping would suggest that differences in the peacekeepers’ technical capacities, resources, and military training are part of the answer. (As was the case with our analysis in Tables 1-4, excluding the cases of non-UN enforcement and keeping only cases of consent-based non-UN peacekeeping did not change the results substantively.)

There are other candidate explanations that our data do not allow us to fully evaluate. One common conjecture is that non-UN missions do not benefit from the UN's legitimacy premium and suffer because they are not perceived as impartial and thus fail reassure the parties at critical junctures of the peace process. The key question remains, however, what the effect of controlling for perceived impartiality would be in our models. There have been non-UN missions that have been perceived at least as impartial as some UN missions, so if we were able to measure and control for this in our analysis, it is possible that the significance and magnitude of the effects of non-UN operations could increase. Controlling for perceived impartiality could also affect the significance and magnitude of the coefficients for UN operations. However, measuring perceived impartiality of a UN mission may be too difficult if not impossible.³⁸

Studies of the relative merits of UN and non-UN peace operations have been asking the wrong question. It is not whether UN and non-UN peace operations have different impacts empirically – our results show that they undoubtedly do – but why the composition of non-UN peace operations and their suitability to the task of peacebuilding differs in the aggregate from these characteristics of UN operations. Framing the debate between the two “types” of operations in this way is important from a theoretical and policy perspective. As we have argued in this chapter, the logic employed by proponents of innate differences between UN and non-UN peace operations is not clear. While there may well exist a legitimacy premium for UN missions, it is far from evident that this alone can account for the sharp differences that we have found. Rather than assume that the UN's legitimacy explains these differences, a better approach would be to isolate at a high level of detail those aspects of peace operations that are important for success and to ensure that whatever the originating organization or state, a peace operation possessed these characteristics.

Doyle and Sambanis' (2006) ecological model of peacebuilding provided the basis for our analysis in this chapter. We have argued that expanding that model to incorporate factors that explain the gap between UN and non-UN operations would enhance its explanatory power. By explaining why there are differences between UN and non-UN peace operations, we could learn more about what explains the UN's success at peacebuilding. This will have important implications for the peacebuilding literature more generally. Understanding that certain peace operations are more successful than others is a critical first step and this is the step that we have made in this chapter. Pursuing this line of research further promises to generate policy recommendations on how to design any type of peace operation for the maximum positive impact on peacebuilding. Still, indicating only how peace operations can be improved begs the question of why such change has not already occurred. A new challenge for analysts of

³⁸ For an interesting effort, see Heldt (2001), who coded whether the force commander of a UN operation was from the same ethnic group as the majority of the population in the war-affected country. The difficulty here would be to ascertain if the selection effect is overcome by coding the identity of the force commander. In some cases, such high-level assignments may be random, yet in others they may well reflect an assessment at headquarters of the likely effect of the force commander's identity on the prospects for successful discharge of the peacekeepers' mandate.

peacekeeping and policymakers is to grasp the political process by which peace operations are created and fielded. If not all peace operations have the characteristics that allow them to achieve peacebuilding success, we need to understand the origins of this deficiency.

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Figure 1: Matching Problem Type and Strategy Type

Peacebuilding Strategy

		Weak	Strong
<i>Conflict Type</i>	Cooperation	Ineffective/ Counter-Productive	Best
	Coordination	Best	Inefficient

Table 1: The Effect of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations on Participatory Peace

Logistic regression; reported are coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Explanatory Variables				
<u>Peace Operations</u>				
Strong UN	3.2456	3.4546	--	--
<i>(StrongUN)</i>	(1.1108)	(1.1755)	--	--
Any UN	--	--	2.1809	2.0856
<i>(Unintrvn)</i>	--	--	(0.6532)	(0.6570)
Strong non-UN mandate	0.1568	--	-0.3569	--
<i>(Nonunops)</i>	(0.4191)	--	(0.4066)	--
Any non-UN	--	0.6749	--	-0.4219
<i>(NonUN)</i>	--	(0.6904)	--	(0.6575)
<u>Level of Hostilities</u>				
Ethnic War	-1.5963	-1.5566	-1.6221	-1.6451
<i>(Wartype)</i>	(0.5132)	(0.5114)	(0.4934)	(0.4930)
Deaths & Displaced	-0.3201	-0.3150	-0.3405	-0.3468
Natural Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	(0.1338)	(0.1332)	(0.1453)	(0.1438)
Number of Factions	-0.6259	-0.6610	-0.5989	-0.5861
<i>(Factum)</i>	(0.2389)	(0.2539)	(0.2554)	(0.2553)
Signed Peace Treaty	1.5182	1.4326	1.6933	1.6835
<i>(Treaty)</i>	(0.7088)	(0.7030)	(0.7300)	(0.6900)
<u>Local Capacities</u>				
Electricity Consumption with Imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.0006	0.0006	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Iexp2</i>)	-7.8379	-7.9091	-7.6404	-7.8397
	(2.2256)	(2.2556)	(2.1070)	(2.1742)
<u>Other International Capacities</u>				
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	3.75e-06	3.57e-06	3.15e-06	3.03e-06
	(1.25e-06)	(1.26e-06)	(1.06e-06)	(1.07e-06)
Constant	5.3781	5.3388	5.5585	5.6150
	(1.5016)	(1.5153)	(1.6300)	(1.6145)
Observations:	119	119	119	119
Pseudo-R ²	33.68%	34.21%	32.98%	32.50%
Log-Likelihood:	-48.92	-48.53	-49.43	-49.79

Table 2: The Effect of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations on Participatory Peace without the Undivided Sovereignty Criterion

Logistic regression; reported are coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8
<u>Explanatory Variables</u>								
<u>Peace Operations</u>								
Multidim PKO and Enforce (<i>StrongUN</i>)	2.7395 (0.9457)	2.6299 (0.9398)	2.3487 (0.8667)	--	--	--	--	--
UN Enforcement (<i>Enforce</i>)	--	--	--	-0.9456 (0.8502)	--	--	--	--
Any UN intervention (<i>Unintrvn</i>)	--	--	--	--	1.9956 (0.6309)	1.9843 (0.6266)	--	--
Strong non-UN (<i>Nonunops</i>)	0.4542 (0.3059)	0.2702 (0.3444)	--	0.0622 (0.3550)	0.1353 (0.2978)	--	0.2698 (0.3119)	--
Any non-UN mission (<i>NonUN</i>)	--	--	--	--	--	0.4360 (0.7205)	--	0.6641 (0.7026)
<u>Level of Hostility</u>								
Ethnic War (<i>Wartype</i>)	-1.0374 (0.4752)	-0.9299 (0.4700)	-0.9678 (0.4650)	-0.8822 (0.4586)	-1.0627 (0.4644)	-1.0473 (0.4656)	-0.9873 (0.4604)	-0.9548 (0.4595)
Deaths & Displaced Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	-0.2525 (0.1066)	-0.2964 (0.1127)	-0.2234 (0.1087)	-0.2623 (0.1043)	-0.2684 (0.1140)	-0.2652 (0.1127)	0.2182 (0.0986)	-0.2111 (0.0987)
Number of Factions (<i>Factnum</i>)	-0.3622 (0.1880)	-0.3535 (0.1764)	<i>-0.3212</i> (0.1934)	<i>-0.1829</i> (0.1594)	<i>-0.3666</i> (0.2214)	<i>-0.3706</i> (0.2169)	<i>-0.1845</i> (0.1663)	<i>-0.1964</i> (0.1695)
Signed Peace Treaty (<i>Treaty</i>)	0.9159 (0.6355)	0.8572 (0.6568)	1.0263 (0.6454)	1.2471 (0.6189)	0.9754 (0.6468)	0.9443 (0.6621)	1.2922 (0.5977)	1.2445 (0.6211)
<u>Local Capacities</u>								
Electricity Cons. w/ imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.0011 (0.0003)	0.0014 (0.0004)	0.0012 (0.0003)	0.0013 (0.0003)	0.0010 (0.0003)	0.0009 (0.0003)	0.0010 (0.0003)	0.0010 (0.0003)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Isxp2</i>)	-4.6842 (1.9025)	--	-4.0516 (1.8604)	--	-4.5714 (1.9612)	-4.5817 (1.9226)	-4.7730 (1.8035)	-4.7171 (1.7189)
Oil export dependence (<i>Oil</i>)	--	-2.0626 (0.5180)	--	-2.1940 (0.5414)	--	--	--	--
<u>Other International Capacities</u>								
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	3.30e-06 (1.54e-06)	3.78e-06 (1.72e-06)	3.61e-06 (1.46e-06)	<i>3.47e-06</i> (1.82e-06)	2.70e-06 (1.37e-06)	<i>2.51e-06</i> (1.47e-06)	<i>2.94e-06</i> (1.59e-06)	<i>2.71e-06</i> (1.65e-06)

Constant	3.2961 (1.2370)	3.4191 (1.2685)	2.8671 (1.2667)	2.7216 (1.1553)	3.5229 (1.4178)	3.4774 (1.3984)	2.5802 (1.1185)	2.5073 (1.1043)
Observations:	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
Pseudo-R ²	27.45%	30.34%	25.75%	25.96%	28.15%	28.35%	22.49%	22.73%
Log-Likelihood:	-56.05	-53.82	-57.37	-57.20	-55.51	-55.36	-59.88	-59.70

Table 3: The Effect of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations on Components of Participatory Peace

Logistic regression; reported are coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

	Dependent Variable			
	<i>No War recurrence</i>		<i>No War recurrence or residual violence</i>	
	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4
<u>Explanatory Variables</u>				
<u>Peace Operations</u>				
Multidim PKO and Enforce (<i>StrongUN</i>)	1.1891 (1.1132)	1.3339 (1.1448)	<i>1.8791</i> (0.9934)	2.0805 (1.0534)
Strong non-UN (<i>Nonunops</i>)	-0.0500 (0.2324)	-- --	0.1619 (0.2366)	-- --
Any non-UN mission (<i>NonUN</i>)	-- --	0.2184 (0.5288)	-- --	0.7066 (0.5626)
<u>Level of Hostility</u>				
Ethnic War (<i>Wartype</i>)	-0.0941 (0.4623)	-0.0889 (0.4641)	-0.3143 (0.3691)	-0.2850 (0.3696)
Deaths & Displaced Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	-0.2303 (0.1343)	-0.2368 (0.1348)	-0.1289 (0.1044)	0.1311 (0.1027)
Number of Factions (<i>Factnum</i>)	-0.2400 (0.1308)	-0.2572 (0.1253)	-0.3542 (0.1395)	-0.3819 (0.1297)
Signed Peace Treaty (<i>Treaty</i>)	-0.7356 (0.5133)	-0.7879 (0.5074)	0.1241 (0.4930)	0.0318 (0.5071)
<u>Local Capacities</u>				
Electricity Cons. w/ imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.0007 (0.0004)	0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0007 (0.0003)	0.0006 (0.0003)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Iexp2</i>)	-2.6247 (1.2698)	-2.6752 (1.2884)	-2.6838 (1.7769)	-2.7680 (1.8438)
Oil export dependence (<i>Oil</i>)	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
<u>Other International Capacities</u>				
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	4.33e-06 (2.81e-06)	4.13e-06 (2.69e-06)	5.82e-06 (4.91e-05)	5.43e-06 (4.45e-06)
Constant	4.7218 (1.6954)	4.8116 (1.7033)	2.5196 (1.0952)	2.5815 (1.0806)
Observations:	119	119	119	119
Pseudo-R ²	18.79%	18.86%	17.05%	17.78%
Log-Likelihood:	-58.54	-58.49	-68.41	-67.82

Table 4: The Effect of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations on Sovereign Peace

Logistic regression; reported are coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

	4.1	4.2
Explanatory Variables		
<u>Peace Operations</u>		
Multidim PKO and Enforce <i>(StrongUN)</i>	2.1437 (1.0448)	2.3773 (1.0907)
Any UN <i>(Unintrvn)</i>	-- --	-- --
Strong non-UN <i>(Nonunops)</i>	-0.2149 (0.2908)	-- --
Any non-UN <i>(NonUN)</i>	-- --	0.1518 (0.5184)
<u>Level of Hostilities</u>		
Ethnic War <i>(Wartype)</i>	-0.8230 (0.4408)	-0.8245 (0.4439)
Deaths & Displaced Natural Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	-0.1751 (0.1071)	-0.1817 (0.1039)
Number of Factions <i>(Factnum)</i>	-0.5652 (0.1823)	-0.5884 (0.1807)
Signed Peace Treaty <i>(Treaty)</i>	0.7204 (0.5326)	0.6181 (0.5329)
<u>Local Capacities</u>		
Electricity Consumption with imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Isxp2</i>)	-4.5695 (2.9392)	-4.7591 (3.0470)
<u>Other International Capacities</u>		
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	4.57e-06 (2.14e-06)	4.29e-06 (2.17e-06)
Constant	4.1604 (1.1313)	4.2488 (1.1034)
Observations:	119	119
Pseudo-R ²	22.87%	22.55%
Log-Likelihood:	-63.07	-63.33

Table 5: Non-UN Operations Involving the Participation of Advanced Militaries and Peacebuilding

Logistic regression; reported are coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

Explanatory Variables	Participatory peace	War recurrence
	5.1	5.2
<u>Peace Operations</u>		
Any UN <i>(Unintrvn)</i>	1.8324 (0.7657)	0.7857 (0.6967)
Militarily Advanced non-UN <i>(nonUNdev)</i>	0.3878 (0.8725)	1.4785 (0.9122)
<u>Level of Hostilities</u>		
Ethnic War <i>(Wartype)</i>	-1.6237 (0.5454)	-0.1498 (0.4904)
Deaths & Displaced Natural Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	-0.3423 (0.1288)	-0.2754 (0.1207)
Number of Factions <i>(Factum)</i>	-0.5598 (0.2559)	<i>-0.2531</i> (0.1530)
Signed Peace Treaty <i>(Treaty)</i>	1.6460 (0.6391)	-0.6548 (0.5450)
<u>Local Capacities</u>		
Electricity Consumption with imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Isxp2</i>)	-7.8817 (3.0456)	-3.1213 (1.5620)
<u>Other International Capacities</u>		
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	2.72e-06 (1.82e-06)	3.64e-06 (2.75e-06)
Constant	5.4456 (1.6263)	5.2836 (1.5271)
Observations:	119	119
Pseudo-R ²	32.36%	20.57%
Log-Likelihood:	-49.89	-57.26

Table 6: Non-UN Operations Involving the Participation of Advanced Militaries and War Recurrence (Survival Model of Peace Duration)

Cox regression; reported are hazard ratios and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level; italics indicate significance at the 0.05 level with one-tailed test.

	6.1	6.2	6.3
<u>Peace Operations</u>			
Any UN	0.4746	--	0.4122
<i>(Unintrvn)</i>	(0.1527)	--	(0.1273)
Militarily Advanced non-UN	--	0.4127	0.3548
<i>(nonUNdev)</i>	--	(0.2277)	(0.1975)
<u>Level of Hostilities</u>			
Ethnic War	1.4318	1.3090	1.2702
<i>(Wartype)</i>	(0.3841)	(0.3262)	(0.3045)
Deaths & Displaced	<i>1.1111</i>	<i>1.1248</i>	<i>1.1362</i>
Natural Log (<i>Logcost</i>)	(0.0698)	(0.0735)	(0.0752)
Number of Factions	1.0808	1.0673	1.1135
<i>(Factnum)</i>	(0.0915)	(0.0943)	(0.0783)
Signed Peace Treaty	1.1596	0.9553	1.2377
<i>(Treaty)</i>	(0.3438)	(0.2170)	(0.2853)
<u>Local Capacities</u>			
Annual rate of growth of GDP	0.9602	0.9594	0.9566
<i>(gdpgrf1)</i>	(0.0111)	(0.0101)	(0.0112)
Electricity Consumption with imputation (<i>Idev1</i>)	0.9995	0.9996	0.9997
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Primary Commodity Exports/GDP (<i>Isxp2</i>)	4.9813	3.1924	5.2200
	(2.3920)	(1.2118)	(2.4227)
<u>Other International Capacities</u>			
Net Transfers per Capita (<i>Transpop</i>)	0.1000	0.1000	0.1000
	(1.00e-06)	(1.19e-06)	(1.21e-06)
Wald χ^2	68.91	69.29	70.68
Observations:	129	129	129
Log-Likelihood:	-270.72	-270.52	-268.06

Appendix 1

A. Coding Criteria for Civil Wars (from Doyle and Sambanis 2006)

An armed conflict is classified as a civil war if:

- a. The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system³⁹ with a population of 500,000 or greater.⁴⁰
- b. The parties are politically and militarily organized and they have publicly stated political objectives.⁴¹
- c. The government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant. If there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant.⁴²
- d. The main insurgent organization(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally. Additional external involvement and recruitment need not imply that the war is not intra-state.⁴³ Insurgent groups may operate from neighboring countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country.⁴⁴

³⁹ This includes states that are occupying foreign territories that are claiming independence (e.g. West Bank and Gaza in Israel and Western Sahara in Morocco). A strict application of this coding rule could drop those cases where the international community (through the United Nations) rejects the state's claims of sovereignty on the occupied territories.

⁴⁰ Countries could be included after their population reaches the 500,000 mark, or from the start of the period if population exceeds the 500,000 mark at some point in the country series. If a civil war occurs in a country with population below the threshold, we could include it and flag it as a marginal case. Cases of civil war close to the 500,000 mark are Cyprus in 1963 (578,000 population) and Djibouti in 1991 (450,000 population). Use of a per capita death threshold to code civil war would allow the population threshold to be relaxed.

⁴¹ This should apply to the majority of the parties in the conflict. This criterion distinguishes insurgent groups and political parties from criminal gangs and riotous mobs. But the distinction between criminal and political violence may fade in some countries (e.g. Colombia after 1993). "Terrorist" organizations would qualify as insurgent groups according to this coding rule, if they caused violence at the required levels for war (see other criteria). Noncombatant populations that are often victimized in civil wars are not considered a "party" to the war if they are not organized in a militia or other such form, able to apply violence in pursuit of their political objectives.

⁴² Extensive indirect support (monetary, organizational, or military) by the government to militias might also satisfy this criterion (an example is Kenya during the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley). However, in such cases it becomes harder to distinguish civil war from communal violence. In other cases, where the state has collapsed, it may not be possible to identify parties representing the state as all parties may be claiming the state and these conflicts will also be hard to distinguish from inter-communal violence (e.g. Somalia after 1991).

⁴³ Intra-state war can be taking place at the same time as inter-state war.

⁴⁴ This rule weeds out entirely inter-state conflicts with no local participation. The Bay of Pigs, for example, would be excluded as a civil war because the rebels did not have a base in Cuba prior to the invasion. Some cases stretch the limits of this definitional criterion: e.g. Rwanda in the late 1990s, where ex-FAR recruits with bases in the DRC engaged in incursions and border clashes against government army and civilians. If this is a civil war, then so is the conflict between Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Israel (assuming the other criteria are met).

- e. The start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500-1,000 deaths.⁴⁵ If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000.⁴⁶
- f. Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence at least at the minor or intermediate-level. There should be no three-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths.⁴⁷
- g. Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance. Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party. A substantial number of these deaths must occur in the first year of the war.⁴⁸ But if the violence becomes effectively one-sided, even if the aggregate effective resistance threshold of 100 deaths has already been met, the civil war must be coded as having ended and a politicicide or other form of one-sided violence must be coded as having started.⁴⁹
- h. A peace treaty that produces at least 6 months of peace marks an end to the war.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ This rule can be relaxed to a range of 100-1,000 since fighting might start late in the year (cf. Senegal or Peru). Given the lack of high-quality data to accurately code civil war onset, if no good estimate of deaths is available for the first year, onset can be coded at the first year of reported large-scale armed conflict provided that violence continues or escalates in the following years. Note that in the dataset, start/end month is also coded where possible. In some cases, coding rules can be used to identify the start month (e.g. in cases where the war causes 1,000 deaths in the first month of armed conflict). But in most cases, the month only indicates the start of major armed conflict or the signing of a peace agreement, which can give a point of reference for the start/end of the war, respectively.

⁴⁶ This rule also suggests when to code war termination if the 3-year average does not add up to 500. In such a case, the end of the war can be coded at the last year with more than 100 deaths unless one of the other rules applies (e.g. if there is a peace treaty that is followed by more than 6 months of peace).

⁴⁷ This criterion makes coding very difficult, as data on deaths throughout the duration of a conflict are hard to find. However, such a coding rule is necessary to prevent one from coding too many war starts in the same conflict or coding an ongoing civil war for years after the violence has ended. Three years is an arbitrary cutoff point, but is consistent with other thresholds found in the literature. Data notes (see online supplement to Doyle and Sambanis 2006) give several examples of cases where the coding of war termination has been determined by this criterion. A more lenient version would be a five-year threshold with fewer than 500 deaths.

⁴⁸ This criterion must be proportional to the war's intensity in the first years of the war. If the war's onset is coded the first year with only 100 deaths (as often happens in low-intensity conflicts), then it would not be possible to observe effective resistance in the first year of the war if effective resistance was defined as 100 deaths suffered by the state.

⁴⁹ This criterion distinguishes cases in which insurgent violence was limited to the outbreak of the war and, for the remainder of the conflict, the government engaged in one-sided violence. A hypothetical example is a case where insurgents inflicted 100 deaths on the government during the first week of fighting and then the government defeated the insurgents and engaged in pogroms and politicicide for several years with no or few deaths on the government's side. If it is not possible to apply this rule consistently to all cases (due to data limitations), then periods of politicicide at the start or end of the war should be combined with war periods. This implies that civil wars will often be observationally equivalent to coups that are followed by politicicide, or other such sequences of different forms of political violence.

⁵⁰ Treaties that do not stop the fighting are not considered (e.g. the Islamabad Accords of 1993 in Afghanistan's war; the December 1997 agreement among Somali clan leaders). If several insurgent groups are engaged in the war, the majority of groups must sign. This criterion is useful for the study of peace transitions, but may not be as important if researchers are interested in studying, e.g., civil war duration.

- i. A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime should mark the end of the war.⁵¹ Since civil war is understood as an armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war.⁵² If the government wins the war, a period of peace longer than 6 months must persist before we code a new war (see also criterion k).
- j. A ceasefire, truce, or simply an end to fighting mark the end of a civil war if they result in at least 2 years of peace.⁵³ The period of peace must be longer than what is required in the case of a peace agreement, as we do not have clear signals of the parties' intent to negotiate an agreement in the case of a truce/ceasefire.⁵⁴
- k. If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new war onset should be coded, subject to the same operational criteria.⁵⁵ If the same parties return to war over the same issues we generally code the continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria for coding a war end apply for the period before the resurgence of fighting.

Using these coding rules, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) code 145 civil war starts from 1944-1999 (2.08% of 6,966 non-missing observations in an annual frequency time-series cross-sectional dataset, covering 161 countries). Without coding new war onsets in countries with already ongoing civil wars, the number of civil wars is 119 (1.93% of 6,153 non-missing observations). Out of these cases, 20 may be called “ambiguous” – i.e. they may not meet one or more of the coding rules. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) consider these as sufficiently close to the concept of civil war so as to include them in the analysis.

⁵¹ Thus, in secessionist wars that are won by the rebels who establish a new state, if a war erupts immediately in the new state, a new war onset would be coded in the new state (an example is Croatia in 1992-1995), even if the violence is closely related to the preceding war. A continuation of the old conflict between the old parties could now count as an inter-state war, as in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea who fought a war in 1998-2000, after Eritrea's successful secession from Ethiopia in 1993.

⁵² This criterion allows researchers to study the stability of military victories. Analysis of the stability of civil war outcomes would be biased if an end to civil war through military victory was coded only when the victory was followed by a prolonged period of peace. This would bias the results in favor of finding a positive correlation between military outcomes and peace duration. This criterion is important to analyze war recurrence, but not necessarily war prevalence.

⁵³ Peace implies no battle-related deaths, or, in a lenient version of this criterion, fewer deaths than the lowest threshold of deaths used to code war onset—i.e. fewer than 100 deaths per year.

⁵⁴ These situations are different from those where there is no violence as a result of armies standing down without a ceasefire agreement, which would fall under criterion (f).

⁵⁵ These incompatibilities must be significantly different or the wars must be fought by different groups in different regions of the country. For example, three partially overlapping wars would be coded in Ethiopia (Tigrean, Eritrean, Oromo) from 1970s-90s. New issues alone should not be sufficient to code a new war, as there is no “issue-based” classification in the definition of civil war. Such a rule could be applied if civil wars were classified into categories – e.g. secessionist wars vs. revolutions over control of the state. In addition to having new issues, most parties must also be new before a new war onset can be coded.

B: Civil Wars Starting in 1945-1999 and Short-Run Peacebuilding Outcomes *

Country	War Start	War End	Sovereign Peace	Participatory Peace	Type of UN operation	Type of Non-UN Operation
Afghanistan	1978	1992	Failure	Failure	None	None
Afghanistan	1992	1996	Failure	Failure	None	None
Afghanistan	1996	2001	.	.	None	Enforcement
Algeria	1962	1963	Success	Failure	None	None
Algeria	1992	.	.	.	None	None
Angola	1975	1991	Failure	Failure	Observer mission	None
Angola	1992	1994	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	None
Angola	1997	2002	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	None
Angola	1994	1999	.	.	None	None
Argentina	1955	1955	Success	Success	None	None
Argentina	1975	1977	Failure	Failure	None	None
Azerbaijan	1991	1994	Failure	Failure	None	Observer mission
Bangladesh	1974	1997	Success	Success	None	None
Bolivia	1952	1952	Success	Success	None	None
Bosnia	1992	1995	.	.	Enforcement	Enforcement
Burundi	1965	1969	Failure	Failure	None	None
Burundi	1972	1972	Success	Failure	None	None
Burundi	1988	1988	Failure	Failure	None	None
Burundi	1991	.	.	.	None	Observer
Cambodia	1970	1975	Failure	Failure	None	None
Cambodia	1975	1991	Success	Success	Multidimensional PKO	None
Central African Republic	1996	1997	.	.	Multidimensional PKO	Traditional PKO
Chad	1965	1979	Failure	Failure	None	Traditional PKO
Chad	1980	1994	Failure	Failure	None	Traditional PKO
Chad	1994	1997	Success	Success	None	None
China	1946	1949	Failure	Failure	None	None
China	1947	1947	Success	Failure	None	None
China	1950	1951	Success	Failure	None	None
China	1956	1959	Success	Failure	None	None
China	1967	1968	Success	Failure	None	None
Colombia	1948	1966	Failure	Failure	None	None
Colombia	1978	.	Failure	Failure	None	None
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993	1997	Failure	Failure	None	None
Congo (Brazzaville)	1998	1999	.	.	None	None
Congo-Zaire	1960	1965	Failure	Failure	Enforcement	None
Congo-Zaire	1967	1967	Success	Failure	None	None
Congo-Zaire	1977	1978	Failure	Failure	None	None
Congo-Zaire	1996	1997	Failure	Failure	None	None

Congo-Zaire	1998	2001	.	.	Observer mission	Observer mission
Costa Rica	1948	1948	Success	Success	None	Observer mission
Croatia	1992	1995	Success	Success	Enforcement	Observer mission
Cuba	1958	1959	Failure	Failure	None	None
Cyprus	1963	1967	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	Traditional PKO
Cyprus	1974	1974	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	None
Djibouti	1991	1994	Success	Success	None	Traditional PKO
Dominican Republic	1965	1965	Success	Success	Observer mission	Traditional PKO
El Salvador	1979	1992	Success	Success	Multidimensional PKO	None
Egypt	1994	1997	Success	Success	None	None
Ethiopia	1974	1991	Success	Success	None	None
Ethiopia	1978	1991	Success	Success	None	None
Ethiopia	1976	1988	Failure	Failure	None	None
Georgia	1991	1992	Failure	Failure	None	Traditional PKO
Georgia	1992	1994	Failure	Failure	Observer mission	Enforcement
Greece	1944	1949	Success	Success	Observer mission	Traditional PKO
Guatemala	1966	1972	Failure	Failure	None	None
Guatemala	1978	1994	Success	Success	Multidimensional PKO	None
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1999	.	.	None	Traditional PKO
Haiti	1991	1995	.	.	Multidimensional PKO	Enforcement
India	1989	.	Failure	Failure	None	None
India	1984	1993	Success	Success	None	None
India	1989	.	.	.	None	None
India	1990	.	.	.	None	None
India	1946	1948	Success	Success	None	None
Indonesia	1950	1950	Failure	Failure	None	None
Indonesia	1953	1953	Failure	Failure	None	None
Indonesia	1956	1960	Failure	Failure	None	None
Indonesia	1976	1978	Failure	Failure	None	None
Indonesia	1975	1999	.	.	Enforcement	Enforcement
Indonesia	1990	1991	Failure	Failure	None	None
Indonesia	1999	2002	.	.	None	None
Iran	1978	1979	Failure	Failure	None	None
Iran	1979	1984	Failure	Failure	None	None
Iraq	1959	1959	Failure	Failure	None	None
Iraq	1961	1970	Success	Failure	None	None
Iraq	1974	1975	Failure	Failure	None	None
Iraq	1985	1996	Failure	Failure	None	Enforcement
Iraq	1991	1993	Failure	Failure	None	Enforcement
Israel	1987	1997	Success	Success	None	None
Israel	2000	.	.	.	None	None

Jordan	1970	1971	Success	Failure	None	Observer mission
Kenya	1963	1967	Success	Failure	None	None
Kenya	1991	1993	Failure	Failure	None	None
Korea	1948	1949	Success	Success	None	None
Laos	1960	1973	Failure	Failure	None	Observer mission
Lebanon	1958	1958	Success	Success	Observer mission	Traditional PKO
Lebanon	1975	1991	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	Enforcement
Liberia	1989	1990	Failure	Failure	None	Enforcement
Liberia	1992	1997	Failure	Failure	Observer mission	Enforcement
Liberia	1999	.	.	.	None	Enforcement
Mali	1990	1995	Success	Success	None	None
Moldova	1991	1992	Failure	Failure	None	Traditional PKO
Morocco/Western Sahara	1975	1991	Failure	Failure	Observer mission	None
Mozambique	1976	1992	Success	Success	Multidimensional PKO	None
Myanmar/Burma	1948	1951	Failure	Failure	None	None
Myanmar/Burma	1948	1988	Failure	Failure	None	None
Myanmar/Burma	1960	1995	Failure	Failure	None	None
Namibia	1973	1989	Success	Success	Multidimensional PKO	None
Nepal	1996	.	.	.	None	None
Nicaragua	1978	1979	Failure	Failure	None	None
Nicaragua	1981	1990	Success	Success	Observer mission	Observer mission
Nigeria	1967	1970	Success	Failure	None	None
Nigeria	1980	1985	Failure	Failure	None	None
Oman	1971	1975	Success	Failure	None	None
Pakistan	1971	1971	Success	Success	None	None
Pakistan	1973	1977	Failure	Failure	None	None
Pakistan	1994	1999	.	.	None	None
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	.	.	None	Traditional PKO
Paraguay	1947	1947	Success	Success	None	None
Peru	1980	1996	Failure	Failure	None	None
Philippines	1950	1952	Success	Success	None	None
Philippines	1972	1992	Failure	Failure	None	None
Philippines	1971	.	Failure	Failure	None	None
Russia	1994	1996	Failure	Failure	None	None
Russia	1999	.	.	.	None	None
Rwanda	1963	1964	Failure	Failure	None	None
Rwanda	1990	1993	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	Observer mission
Rwanda	1994	1994	Success	Success	Observer mission	Enforcement
Senegal	1989	1999	.	.	None	None
Sierra Leone	1991	1996	Failure	Failure	None	Enforcement
Sierra Leone	1997	2001	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	Enforcement

Somalia	1988	1991	Failure	Failure	None	None
Somalia	1991	.	Failure	Failure	Enforcement	None
South Africa	1976	1994	Success	Success	Observer mission	Observer mission
Sri Lanka	1971	1971	Success	Success	None	None
Sri Lanka	1983	2002	Failure	Failure	None	Enforcement
Sri Lanka	1987	1989	Success	Success	None	None
Sudan	1963	1972	Success	Failure	None	None
Sudan	1983	2002	Failure	Failure	None	Observer mission
Syria	1979	1982	Success	Failure	None	None
Tajikistan	1992	1997	.	.	Observer mission	Enforcement
Thailand	1966	1982	Success	Success	None	None
Turkey	1984	1999	.	.	None	None
Uganda	1966	1966	Success	Success	None	None
Uganda	1978	1979	Failure	Failure	None	None
Uganda	1981	1987	Failure	Failure	None	None
Uganda	1990	1992	Failure	Failure	None	None
Uganda	1995	.	.	.	None	None
United Kingdom	1971	1998	.	.	None	None
USSR	1944	1948	.	.	None	None
USSR	1944	1947	.	.	None	None
USSR	1944	1950	.	.	None	None
USSR	1944	1948	.	.	None	None
Vietnam	1960	1975	Success	Failure	None	Observer mission
Yemen Arab Republic	1948	1948	Success	Success	None	None
Yemen	1994	1994	Success	Success	None	Observer mission
Yemen Arab Republic	1962	1970	Success	Success	Observer mission	Observer mission
Yemen Peoples Rep.	1986	1986	Success	Failure	None	None
Yugoslavia	1991	1991	Failure	Failure	Traditional PKO	None
Yugoslavia	1998	1999	.	.	Enforcement	Enforcement
Zimbabwe	1972	1979	Failure	Failure	None	None
Zimbabwe	1983	1987	Success	Success	None	None

* Note: This list includes some cases that are not included in the analysis. Ongoing wars, for example, are excluded. The USSR wars are excluded due to missing data in several of our variables, and because they started before the start of our analysis period. There are some differences between our civil war list and some others in the literature.