INHALTSVERZEICHNIS DES II. HEFTES

I. Aufsätze

II. Rezensionen

(Fortsetzung 3. Umschlagseite)

Das *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* erscheint jährlich in drei Heften. Der Umfang des ganzen Jahrganges beträgt 320 Seiten. Der Jahrgang kostet 74,– DM (bzw. $ 46.25 $-price is subject to change without further notice). Die Abnahme des ersten Heftes verpflichtet zur Abnahme des ganzen Jahrganges.

Anschrift der Redaktionen: **Achtung:** Neue **deutsche** Redaktion:

Prof. Dr. K.-H. Ilting, Universität des Saarlandes, Fachrichtung 5.1 Philosophie, 6600 Saarbrücken

Prof. Dr. Charles H. Kahn, Dept. of Philosophy CN, University of Pennsylvania, 305 Logan Hall, Philadelphia 19174

Manuskripte und auf den Inhalt der Zeitschrift bezügliche Mitteilungen aus den **USA** und **Kanada** werden an die dafür zuständige Redaktion in **Philadelphia,** aus **allen übrigen Ländern** an die Redaktion in **Saarbrücken** erbeten.

Herausgeber und Verleger ersuchen dringend darum, die Manuskripte in Maschinenschrift einseitig beschrieben und in druckfertigem Zustand einzusenden. Für unverlangt eingehende Manuskripte, deren Rücksendung im Falle der Ablehnung erwünscht wird, ist das erforderliche Rückporto beizulegen.
Die Mitarbeiter erhalten von ihren Beiträgen 50 Sonderdrucke mit den Seitenzahlen der Zeitschrift kostenlos; die Verfasser von Rezensionen erhalten 10 kostenlose Sonderdrucke. Weitere Sonderdrucke können gegen Bezahlung bezogen werden, wenn sie rechtzeitig vor dem Druck des Heftes bestellt werden. Alle Bestellungen und sonstige Anfragen, die Sonderdrucke betreffen, sind unmittelbar an den Verlag zu richten.

Es wird gebeten, von unverlangter Einsendung von Besprechungsexemplaren abzusehen.

Distributors for USA and Canada:
Walter de Gruyter Inc.
New York · Berlin
200 Saw Mill River Road
Hawsthorne, N.Y. 10532
Price per year US $ 46.25

Distributors for Japan:
Maruzen Company, Ltd.
Subscription Department
6 Tori-Nichome
Nihonbashi, Tokyo/Japan

($-price is subject to change without further notice)

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft
Printed in Germany

ISSN 0003-9101
Archiv-Nr. 3 10 900289 7
Satz und Druck: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 30
Bindearbeiten: Berliner Buchbindekunst Thomas Fuhrmann KG, Berlin 36

Diesem Heft liegen zwei Prospekte des Verlages Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, bei. Wir bitten um Beachtung.

Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the *Protagoras**

by George Klosko (West Lafayette, Indiana)

The problem of Plato's deliberate use of fallacies is one that has been obscured rather than clarified by many modern interpreters. In considering the possibility that Plato intentionally puts fallacious arguments into the mouth of his Socrates, too often scholars allow moralistic considerations to influence their judgments[1]. And so, from the outset, we must insist that the argument that "Plato would never show the righteous Socrates resorting to low verbal trickery" is at best ahistorical, and the question of intentional fallacy, like all other questions in Platonic scholarship, must be settled upon the basis of the evidence alone.

The argument of this paper is an attempt to establish one particular literary convention according to which Plato uses intentional fallacies. The thesis that will be pursued here is that a number of the dialogues make strong allusions to eristic disputation, and that these allusions must be borne in mind in interpreting these works. Eristic disputation, of course, involves the use of fallacious arguments as one of its common features[2]; and so the argument of this paper is, briefly, that certain dialogues depict Socrates engaged in more or less formal eristic competition with various sophists and that, in these contexts, not only Socrates' opponents but Socrates himself is depicted as using fallacious arguments without compunction.

* I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Mr. Kevin McTighe and Professors Charles H. Kahn and Richard Patterton for their valuable criticisms and suggestions.

[1] Cf. G. Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the *Protagoras*", in *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, 1973), p. 223 and n. 5; cf. the remarks of R. K. Sprague, *Plato's Use of Fallacy* (London, 1962), p. 81; also cf. below, n. 38.

[2] Language used in a number of the dialogues – and in various works of Aristotle as well – suggests that there is little or no distinction between informal contentious argument and more or less formal eristic competition, in regard to the routine use of fallacious arguments. Rather, the important distinction seems to be between arguing 'dialectically' (διαλεγόμενος) and arguing 'contentiously' (ἀγωνιζόμενος). See the following passages: *Tht* 167e–168a (esp. 167e4–5), 164cd; *Meno* 75cd; *Rep* 454a, 539c; *Tim* 88a; *Phlb* 17a; Aristotle's *Topics* 159a26–32, 161a23–24; *SE* 182b33–35. Many more passages, especially from Aristotle, could be cited here to confirm this general distinction.

0003-9101/79/0612-0001$2.00

At least three dialogues could be construed as depicting encounters of this kind, the *Protagoras,* the *Hippias Minor,* and, of course, the *Euthydemus*[3], though limitations of space demand that we concentrate upon the *Protagoras* alone. First (in Section I) it will be seen that certain features of the *Protagoras* virtually demand that it be read as depicting some form of organized eristic competition. When this point is established – and it will require only a brief resume of the evidence to demonstrate its plausibility – it will be seen to go a long way towards clearing up fundamental problems in the interpretation of this puzzling dialogue. It will be seen (in Section II) that an entire series of arguments used by Socrates, which at first sight appear to be fallacious but which many modern scholars have attempted to construe as valid, will indeed be seen to contain fallacies. And the argument of this paper is that these must be interpreted as intentional fallacies used in an eristic context.

I

There is strong evidence that the discussion in the *Protagoras* is meant to be read as a (more or less formal) eristic debate[4]. The most striking clue to this effect is Protagoras' reaction to Socrates' attempt to force him to curtail the length of his answers:

> Socrates, he said, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech (ἀγῶνα λόγων), and if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks (335 a).

This passage alone offers strong evidence as to how Protagoras is depicted as perceiving the discussion in which he is involved[5]. But there is additional evidence in the dialogue, less telling but explicit in regard to what others present at the discussion believe they are witnessing.

[3] In Diogenes Laertius 3.49–51, we are given what appears to be one traditional classification of the dialogues, and these three works, along with the *Gorgias* and the *Hippias Major,* are classified as *agonistikos.*

[4] Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie's final assessment of the *Protagoras,* in *A History of Greek Philosophy,* Vol. IV (Cambridge, 1975), 235. Cf. A. Croiset: "la discussion ... est ici conduite avec une rigueur et une précision remarquables, et [on] ne peut guère imaginer un plus vigoureux effort dialectique." [*Platon, Protagoras,* Vol. III, Part I, Budé éd. (Paris, 1923), p. 12]; also cf. Gagarin, *TAPA,* 1969.

[5] See the next note.

First, we should note that the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras is from the start taken to be a spectator sport (317 de), and this attitude is maintained throughout the dialogue (see esp. 335 d, 348 b). When the debate eventually breaks down over the question of the procedures according to which it should be conducted, Hippias, for one, is disturbed that the company "should quarrel with each other like low churls," and his suggestion is that Protagoras and Socrates should "come to terms arranged, as it were, under our arbitration" (337 e). He wants them to choose "an umpire or supervisor or chairman" to keep watch over the length of the speeches (338 ab)[6].

Socrates also seems to see himself as engaged in some form of contest. When Protagoras, attempting to sidetrack the *logos* into the realm of poetry, delivers what appears to be a set-piece on a poem by Simonides and is greeted with "clamorous approval", Socrates' reaction is as follows:

> ... at first I felt as though I had been struck by a skillful boxer, and was quite blind and dizzy with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause (339 e).

And then – "in order to gain time for considering the poet's meaning" (339 e) – Socrates turns to Prodicus with words of entreaty, taken from Homer: "Dear brother, let us both together stay this warrior's might" (340 a).

The dramatic movement of the dialogue as a whole clearly centers around a competition between Socrates and Protagoras. Protagoras, who (as we shall see) sets great store on his reputation as a master of question-and-answer debate, soon discovers that Socrates is his better at this game, and he resorts to numerous stratagems in order to escape the debate with his reputation intact. The result is a long wrangle over determining the procedures under which the debate is to be conducted (334 c–338 e), the outcome of which is an agreement under which Socrates and Protagoras are to alternate in the roles of questioner and answerer (338 de). Though "very unwilling", Protagoras is forced to go on (338 e), and it is to escape the toils of question-and-answer debate that he steers the discussion into the realm of poetry. But here too he is no match for Socrates; again he is forced to argue in brief questions and answers (348 c), and he is eventually refuted. Throughout the entire discussion, Protagoras has had one way out, but one he finds unacceptable. This alternative is put most clearly by Alcibiades:

> Now if Protagoras confesses himself inferior to Socrates in argumentation (διαλεχθῆναι), Socrates has no more to ask: but if he challenges him, let him discuss by question and answer; not spinning out a lecture on each question – beating off the arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating until most of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue (336 cd).

[6] C. C. W. Taylor rightly points out that this passage, along with *Prt* 335 a4–8 (and *Hp Mi* 363 c–364 a), provides evidence that "debating contests conducted according to agreed rules were part of the characteristic activity of sophists" (*Plato: Protagoras* [Oxford, 1976], on 335 a4–8).

The ending of the dialogue shows without a doubt that the participants have been engaged in a verbal contest, which Protagoras has lost. As Socrates drives home his final points, his opponent balks (360 d). Socrates must force him to answer the fatal questions (360 de), and eventually Protagoras gives in: "I see that you insist (φιλονικεῖν), Socrates, he said, that I must answer. So I'll oblige you . . . " (360 e; Taylor, tr.). The Sophist admits that he has been refuted, and before the dialogue ends, he makes a further contribution to Socrates' triumph. Though he refuses to continue the discussion, he dismisses his opponent with kind words: "I approve your zeal, Socrates", he says, "and the way you develop your arguments; for I think I am not ill-natured, and I am the last person on earth to be envious." (361 e). And he goes on to predict for Socrates a brilliant future in regard to *sophia* (361 e 4–5) – most likely as an eristic competitor[7].

Thorny problems are raised by an interpretation of the *Protagoras* such as that presented in this paper, but these we must avoid. Though it might seem necessary to give some good reason why Plato would write a dialogue depicting an eristic debate between Socrates and Protagoras, it should be borne in mind that the question *whether* Plato depicts Socrates in such a role is distinct from the question *why* he does so, and the argument of this paper must rest content with the assertion that Plato does so, regardless of his reasons. However, there are two points that seem to me to be central to a correct interpretation of the *Protagoras* and thus worth mentioning here.

First, it is clear that Plato means for the *Protagoras* to be read as some sort of attack upon Sophists in general and Protagoras in particular. This is seen in the overall structure of the work. As Grube argued in 1933, the dialogue as a whole must be understood in this fashion[8]; to mention only the most obvious example, the scene with Hippocrates that opens the work makes little sense on any other explanation. And it is in this context that the debate between Protagoras and Socrates should be understood.

Second, from what we know about the historical Protagoras, it is clear that he had a reputation as a formidable speaker, especially in question-and-answer debates. It is pointed out more than once that Protagoras claims supremacy in this art in addition to the more familiar Sophistic art of arguing in long speeches (329 b; 334 e–335 a; 335 b), and Plato's depiction of him in the *Protagoras* coincides with our other information about him. Though we know comparatively

[7] *Sophia* here most likely bears the same set of connotations as *sophos* in *Prt* 335 c 1 and *sophōteron* in *Hp Mi* 369 d 2, in both of which the *sophia* in question is ability in verbal contests.

[8] G. M. A. Grube, "The Structural Unity of the *Protagoras*", *CQ*, 27 (1933).

little about the history of eristic, it is clear that Protagoras was an important figure. According to Diogenes Laertius, he organized the first contests in debating. The doxographer's remarks are worth quoting here:

> [Protagoras] was the first . . . to institute contests in debating (λόγων ἀγῶνας), and to teach rival pleaders the tricks of their trade. Furthermore, in his dialectic he neglected the meaning in favor of verbal quibbling, and he was the father of the whole tribe of eristical disputants now so much in evidence; . . . He too first introduced the method of discussion which is called Socratic. Again, as we learn from Plato in the *Euthydemus*, he was the first to use in discussion the argument of Antisthenes which strives to prove that contradiction is impossible, and first to point out how to attack and refute any proposition laid down (9.52–53).

It should be noted that the evidence of Plato's other dialogues confirms Diogenes Laertius' assessment[9]. Thus it seems that Protagoras' reputation as a question-and-answer debater is one focus of Plato's attack upon him. Though, as we shall see, Protagoras is not unskilled in this respect, he is no match for Socrates, and the *Protagoras* is obviously meant to depict Socrates besting the Sophist at his own game.

II

The fallacies Socrates uses against Protagoras are of the most blatant and simple kind. To illustrate this I will run through the first argument (justice and holiness: 330 b 6–332 a 4) and the second argument (wisdom and temperance: 332 a 4–333 b 4), and the fourth argument (courage and wisdom: 349 e 1–351 b 2), with which there are severe problems, a bit more thoroughly[10]. The third argument (justice and temperance: 333 b 4–334 c 6) will not be discussed. Because it is abruptly broken off, all conclusions about it must remain highly uncertain[11]. As for the fifth argument (courage and wisdom: 351 b–360 e), through which Protagoras is finally refuted, though far from

[9] See *Euthd* 286 c; cf. *Sph* 232 de. Compare the account of H. Sidgwick, "The Sophists", *Journal of Philology*, 4 (1872).

[10] Fuller accounts of these arguments than reasons of space will allow here are found in Taylor, *Protagoras*. Numerous disagreements with his accounts will be pointed out throughout this section.

[11] See Adam's reconstruction of this argument (J. and A. M. Adam, *Platonis Protagoras* [Cambridge, 1921], p. 149); cf. P. Friedländer, *Plato*, 3 vols., H. Meyerhoff, tr. (Princeton, 1958–69), II, 20; Sprague, *op. cit.*, p. 27, n. 15.

perfect[12], this argument is developed with a great deal of care and accordingly appears to be far more serious philosophically than the earlier arguments. Though we cannot rule out the possibility that this argument contains intentional fallacies, there is little reason to believe that it does. Hence it will not be discussed here.

There is one other argument in the *Protagoras* that will not be discussed, though it is far from unimportant. Any scholar who wishes to defend the Socrates of the *Protagoras* against the charge of intentional fallacy is confronted with an extremely embarrassing four-or-so pages of text (343c6–347a5) in which, in interpreting the poem of Simonides, Socrates does very little but use fallacies – of the most outrageous kind[13]. In light of the fact that Socrates' exegesis here is generally recognized to be intentionally fallacious, it is not necessary to examine the argument itself[14]. But the fact that Socrates uses such tactics here is not without implications. In order to preserve their view that all Socrates' arguments in the *Protagoras* are to be taken seriously, scholars are forced to make a distinction between a serious philosophical discussion on the one hand and an 'interlude' in which Socrates argues 'whimsically' on the other[15]. This is not an impossible distinction to maintain, but the scholar who makes it is obligated to admit that he is making it and to present his grounds. In particular, it is necessary to explain just why Socrates is justified in using fallacies in some parts of the dialogue but not in others. It will not do at all to ignore the interlude completely and to treat the dialogue as an uninterrupted series of serious arguments[16]. One important advantage of the view of the dialogue presented here is that it makes such a distinction unnecessary. As Socrates bests Protagoras in short arguments, so, in the interlude, he bests him in long. It is puzzling that a widespread interpretation of the *Protagoras* views Socrates as using fallacies in the interlude "to outsophisticate the Sophists"[17], while relatively few scholars hold the obvious corollary of this view, that Socrates uses similar methods throughout the dialogue to accomplish similar results.

The first argument is a clear example of the fallacy of passing off a contradictory as a contrary. It is certain that Plato knew that the argument is fallacious, for he has Protagoras object to it, thereby forcing Socrates to move on. In addition, in the *Symposium* (201e–202a), Plato gives a brief but incisive analysis of the contrary-contradictory fallacy, and the same fallacy is utilized in the *Euthydemus* (276b) in a perfectly transparent manner. Though the fallacy in the first argument is clear, in recent years commentators have been sidetracked by a serious red-herring, self-predication. Whether this argument contains "the star instance of Self-Predication in Plato"[18], or the very stuff of 'Pauline predication'[19], is the subject of much elevated discussion. My own view is similar to that of Friedländer, who calls the argument an "artificially constructed piece of nonsense"[20].

The argument itself (which is difficult to put into any formal notation) is as follows. Socrates begins by establishing two premises:

(1.a) Justice is just (330c1–d1)
(1.b) Holiness is holy (330d2–e2)

(1.a) is established through the use of the same contrary-contradictory fallacy that Socrates later uses to derive his conclusion. After securing Protagoras' admission that justice is a 'thing' (πρᾶγμα) (330c1–2), Socrates confronts him with a clear-cut, fallacious dichotomy: "... pray tell me this – the thing you named just now, justice, is that itself just or unjust (δίκαιον ... ἢ ἄδικον)?" (330c4–5). And Protagoras consents to (1.a) as the lesser of two evils (330c5–d1). (1.b) is established through a similar argument, making use of a similar, fallacious pair of alternatives (330d2–e2; esp. 330d6).

[12] See Vlastos, "Introduction" to *Plato's Protagoras,* Jowett's translation revised by M. Ostwald (Indianapolis, 1956), xxxix n. 48a (cited hereafter as 'Introduction'); and G. Santas, "Plato's *Protagoras* and Explanations of Weakness", rpt. in G. Vlastos, ed., *The Philosophy of Socrates* (Garden City, 1971), pp. 276–284.

[13] It should be noted that the theme of Socrates' interpretation of the poem is that: "There is no sort of sense, I imagine, in this insertion, unless we suppose that Simonides is addressing himself to the saying of Pittacus as a disputant (ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα)." (343d).

[14] See, for example, Adam, *op. cit.,* xxiv–xxv; W. Nestle, *Platon, Protagoras,* 7th ed. (Leipzig, 1931), p. 56; Croiset, *op. cit.,* p. 11; Taylor, *Protagoras,* esp. pp. 145–8. Cf. P. Shorey, who leaves this question more open (*What Plato Said* [Chicago, 1933], p. 128); and the view of W. Jaeger, *Paideia,* 3 vols., G. Highet, tr. (Oxford, 1939–45), II, 118 and 387 n. 57.

[15] For example, C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras,* pp. 145–146; A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work,* 6th ed. (Cleveland, 1956), pp. 251–257; Croiset, *op. cit.,* p. 18.

[16] For example, Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues."

[17] As argued by Grube, *CQ,* 1933, p. 203; A. E. Taylor, *Plato,* p. 256; Friedländer, *op. cit.,* II, 24–5; Adam, *op. cit.,* xxiv–xxv; C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras,* p. 145.

[18] Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*", rpt. in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics,* R. E. Allen, ed. (London, 1965), p. 240 (this essay cited hereafter "TMA").

[19] See Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues".

[20] Friedländer, *op. cit.,* II, 19.

(1.a) and (1.b) contain a more complicated fallacy as well, a 'category fallacy'. As Theodore De Laguna puts it: "justice and holiness are not moral agents; they cannot have virtues or vices."[21] This fallacy has been explained in many ways, the most controversial of which revolve around the highly complex, hotly disputed subject of self-predication. For reasons of space, this controversy cannot be discussed in this context, nor is this issue especially relevant here. I believe the self-predications in (1.a) and (1.b) can be explained in either of two ways, each of which is acceptable to scholars holding one of the two prevailing views on the development of Plato's thought as a whole. To scholars who believe that Plato had worked out the theory of Forms by the time he wrote the *Protagoras*, and that he is referring to Forms in this argument, I would argue that (1.a) and (1.b) are exactly what they appear to be, self-predications. There is strong evidence that Plato regarded the Forms as self-predicative during his early and middle periods (without being aware of the damaging implications of this). And it is this view of the Forms that is the target of the 'third-man argument' in the *Parmenides* (*Parm* 131e–132b)[22]. On the other hand, it is also possible that Plato had not worked out the theory of Forms by the time he wrote the *Protagoras*. On this interpretation of Plato's development, it is quite possible that the difficulties in (1.a) and (1.b) were concealed from Plato by, as Guthrie puts it, "the habit of reifying concepts, a natural Greek tendency"[23]. According to this view, Plato means very little by the two self-predications, and certainly does not intend to stir up the heated controversy that his remarks have created. On either of these interpretations, (1.a) and (1.b) appear only as premises in one of Socrates' five (or six) arguments, and self-predication is not mentioned again. Thus I think we would be wrong to make too much of this issue here.

Having established (1.a) and (1.b), Socrates uses clearly fallacious means to derive his conclusion:

(1.c) Justice is holy and holiness is just

He offers Protagoras the choice that either holiness "is something of such nature as to be just", or it must be unjust, and either justice is "such as to be holy", or it must be unholy. The alternative to (1.c) is clearly unacceptable: "Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?" (331a9–b1). The derivation (ἆρα, 331b1) of ἄδικον from μὴ δίκαιον is clearly fallacious, as many commentators have seen[24], and Protagoras is not fooled. He objects to Socrates' crude dichotomization[25]. Whether or not Protagoras' objection is an exact criticism of Socrates' argument, it is clearly a sufficient counter. Thus, once we move away from the self-predication controversy and look at the argument as a whole, it is impossible to see it as anything but fallacious, and given the argument throughout this paper, we are justified in viewing the fallacies as intentional[26].

The second argument is also marred by fallacious reasoning. The crucial move is the contradictory-contrary fallacy seen in the last argument, while it is probable that the fallacy of equivocation is also utilized. Equivocation was, perhaps, the most common of all eristic tricks and one that Plato knew well. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus make extensive use of it, and Socrates analyzes it, in the *Euthydemus*[27].

The argument requires three premises:

(2.a) Folly is the opposite of wisdom (332a4–6)
(2.b) Folly is the opposite of temperance (332a6–c3; 332d1–e5)
(2.c) Each single thing has one opposite, not many (332c3–9)

(2.a) is granted by Protagoras without argument (332a4–6). (2.b) is established through a somewhat involved argument that is not without difficulties. The (2.b)-argument has received a good deal of attention, since Vlastos impugned its validity in his introduction to the LLA edition of the *Protagoras*[28]. To a large extent this attention is warranted, as the argument is complicated and appears to require a fallacy. However, it is probable that (2.c) is utilized in a fallacious manner as well, and so the validity of the second argument as a whole most probably does not stand or fall according to the validity of the (2.b)-argument.

I will run through the argument for (2.b) briefly. Socrates establishes the following propositions, Protagoras assenting to each:

[21] T. De Laguna, "Notes on the Theory of Ideas", *Philosophical Review*, 43 (1934), p. 451.

[22] Literature on self-predication, especially in relation to the 'third-man argument', is vast; for a partial listing, see Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, pp. 361–362; especially important is Vlastos' article, TMA. As for Pauline predication, see Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues", pp. 252–265.

[23] Guthrie, *op. cit.*, IV, 225; and see p. 223. Virtue is referred to as a πρᾶγμα at 349b3, 349b4, and 349c1, without any connection to self-predication. See also 332a5; cf. 329c–e. Sprague, for one, believes Socrates to be using the category fallacy intentionally (*op. cit.*, p. 27 n. 15).

[24] See, for example, D. Gallop, "Justice and Holiness in *Protagoras* 330–331", *Phronesis*, 6 (1961), pp. 91–92; Nestle, *op. cit.*, on 331b; Adam, *op. cit.*, on 331a; T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 4 vols., L. Magnus and C. G. Berry, trs. (London, 1901–12), II 313–4; Friedländer, *op. cit.*, II, 19. Cf. C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras*, on 330c5 and 331a9–b1.

[25] See 331b8–332a4; Protagoras certainly gets the better of this exchange, which is not at all flattering to Socrates.

[26] Cf. the different – but substantially similar – accounts of the first argument given by Gallop (*op. cit.*, pp. 91–2) and C. C. W. Taylor (*Protagoras*, pp. 108–21).

[27] See esp. 277e–278b.

[28] See Vlastos, Introduction, xxviii–xxix; D. Savan, "Socrates' Logic on the Unity of Wisdom and Temperance", in R. J. Butler, ed., *Analytical Philosophy*, Vol. II Oxford, 1965); D. Gauthier, in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 6 (1968).

(2.b1) Right and useful behavior is temperate (332a6–8)
(2.b2) By temperance people are temperate (332a8–b1)
(2.b3) Those who do not behave rightly behave foolishly and are not temperate (οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν) in so behaving (332b1–3)
(2.b4) Then (ἄρα) behaving foolishly is the opposite of behaving temperately (332b3–4)

To establish his next premise, Socrates turns to a brief induction. Three quick examples (332b4–c1), and the result is:

(2.b5) Whatever is done in a certain way is done by that kind of faculty, and whatever in an opposite way, by the opposite kind (332c1–3)

One of the examples used in the induction, closely related to (2.b2) is important:

(2.b6) Foolish behavior is due to folly and temperate behavior to temperance (332b4–6)

(2.b6) is accepted without argument, and it is one of the premises Socrates requires for his conclusion.

Socrates breaks here to establish (2.c), before returning to put his premises together. When he returns to (2.b), he establishes his conclusion through a simple syllogism. (2.b5) is the major premise, while the minor premise is a combination of (2.b4) and (2.b6). There is some repetition here, as Socrates runs through the syllogism twice (in 332d3–e1, and in 332e1–5). However, he can afford to dwell on this stage of the argument, for the questionable move has already been committed, in the derivation of (2.b4) from (2.b3), which is a clear use of the contradictory-contrary fallacy utilized in the first argument[29].

Socrates establishes (2.c) through a brief induction, consisting of three pairs of opposites (332c3–8):

(2.c1) Beautiful is the opposite of ugly
(2.c2) Good is the opposite of evil
(2.c3) Shrill in the voice (ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ) is the opposite of deep (βαρύ) (332c6–8)

In itself there need be nothing objectionable to the idea that a thing can have only one opposite, and it is not surprising that many commentators take this to be a self-evident truth[30], though it may seem

[29] See Vlastos, Introduction, xxix n. 19 (cf. Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues", pp. 244–5); Adam, *op. cit.*, p. 145; it is this inference that Savan (*op. cit.*) attempts to defend, and his argument is criticized by Gauthier (*op. cit.*). Cf. C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras,* pp. 124–5.

[30] For example, Vlastos (Introduction, xxix); Savan (*op. cit.*, p. 22); and C. C. W. Taylor (*Protagoras,* on 332c3–9).

a bit odd that Socrates proves this self-evident truth through an induction. A strong case could be made, however, that (2.c) is utilized fallaciously. It is obvious that words that can be used in more than one sense – each of which, of course, must have its own opposite – are not included among the 'things' that have only one opposite. To apply (2.c) in such cases is clearly fallacious. Given the fact that 'folly' is presented *simpliciter* as the opposite of 'wisdom' in (2.a) and of 'temperance' in (2.b), it certainly seems that 'folly' would be such a case, although, given the brevity of Plato's presentation, this would be difficult to prove[31]. In any event, in order for the second argument to go through, Socrates is committed to demonstrating that 'folly' is *not* being used equivocally. And this point is not established.

It is clear from Aristotle's discussion in the *Topics* that equivocation was a common argumentative trick[32], while one example utilized by Aristotle has some bearing on the validity of the induction through which Socrates has established (2.c):

> For example, the contrary (ἐναντίον) of 'sharp' when used of a note (τῷ ὀξεῖ ἐν φωνῇ) is 'flat' (βαρύ), when used of a material substance, it is 'dull' (ἀμβλύ) (106a12–14).

Thus, though Plato does not provide textual evidence sufficient to settle the question whether Socrates does or does not equivocate in his use of 'folly', it is at least probable that he does. Not surprisingly, a number of scholars criticize him for equivocation[33].

That (2.c) is used fallaciously is given some, albeit slight, confirmation by the conclusion of the argument. Socrates is able to force Protagoras to admit the identity of wisdom and temperance, by combining (2.a), (2.b), and (2.c). Either (2.c) must be rejected, or temperance and wisdom, the two opposites of folly, must be declared to be identical. Because Protagoras does not detect any fallacies involved in the establishment of these premises, we cannot be certain that Plato was aware of using them. But, as Friedländer says, the fact that Socrates presents the finale of the argument as an unsatisfactory situation in which one premise must be rejected – and leaves it to Protagoras to say which one – is an indication that he is toying with the Sophist,

[31] Greek usage would *allow* a non-equivocal use of 'folly' (ἀφροσύνη); see C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras,* pp. 129, 122–4.

[32] *Topics* 106a1ff.; see esp. 108a26–31.

[33] Shorey, *op. cit.*, p. 126; R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy", *Mind,* 51 (1942), p. 99; Sprague, *op. cit.*, p. 27 n. 15; J. Sullivan, "The Hedonism in Plato's *Protagoras*", *Phronesis,* 6 (1961), p. 15; Gomperz, *op. cit.*, II, 314, though Gomperz sees the equivocation as unintentional (III, 316).

giving him another chance to examine the problems associated with (2.c)[34]. But Protagoras cannot find his way out of the trap, and Socrates finishes the argument.

The fourth argument centers on the fallacy of illicit conversion. It is certain that Plato knew this move, for not only does he have Protagoras diagnose Socrates' use of it, but he gives a clear analysis of it in the *Euthyphro* (12a–c). As I said above, the fourth argument is very difficult, and my account of it is not entirely satisfactory. I am not, however, alone in having difficulties, for to my knowledge, nobody has ever given a satisfactory account of this exchange. For instance, Guthrie, who is an extremely judicious scholar, goes so far as to dismiss this exchange as impenetrably confused, perhaps requiring emendation of the text[35], and C. C. W. Taylor presents a meticulous analysis of the logic of the argument, but is unable to reach a firm conclusion as to how the argument is supposed to work[36].

In my reading of the passage, I take my cues from the dramatic action, which is as follows: (a) Socrates presents his argument, and (b) Protagoras objects. There are two parts to Protagoras' objection: (1) a diagnosis of Socrates' argument, and (2) an example of an argument (which I will refer to as the 'counter-argument') that is meant to be similar in logical structure to Socrates' but obviously absurd. Socrates makes no reply to Protagoras' objection, but instead launches into the long and detailed fifth argument. I believe that an interpretation of Socrates' argument that accords with Protagoras' diagnosis, and is therefore similar in logical structure to the counter-argument, has a strong presumption of being correct. To this extent my account is satisfactory, for, according to my view, both Socrates' argument (and Protagoras' diagnosis of it) and the counter-argument conform to the following simple paradigm:

(i) $p \rightarrow q$
(ii) $r \rightarrow q$
(iii) $q \rightarrow p$ (this is the illicit conversion of (i))
(iv) Therefore $r \rightarrow p$

[34] See 333a1–b4; Friedländer, *op. cit.*, II, 20. See C. C. W. Taylor, *Protagoras*, pp. 127–129, for an additional difficulty in the second argument.

[35] See *op. cit.*, IV, 227–31; concerning Socrates and Protagoras in this argument, he says "the two have got into a state of rare confusion" (231); Friedländer concurs (*op. cit.*, II, 28). Cf. A. J. Festugière, "Sur un passage difficile du 'Protagoras'", *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 70 (1946), esp. p. 185. For a brief discussion of some different views of this exchange, see M. O'Brien, "The Fallacy in *Protagoras* 349d–50c", *TAPA*, 92 (1961), p. 414 n. 10.

[36] *Protagoras*, pp. 150–161; and see below, n. 38.

The only contribution of step (i) is that it is converted to yield (iii). The reasoning itself is a simple hypothetical syllogism[37].

Socrates' argument requires ten propositions: six premises, the three steps in the actual reasoning, and the conclusion. These are as follows[38]:

(4.a) the courageous are bold (349e2–3)
(4.b) every part of virtue is something fine (and so courage is something fine) (349e3–8)
(4.c) men who have knowledge are bolder than men who lack it (349e8–350b1)
(4.d) men who are bold without knowledge are mad, which is a shameful state (350b1–6)
[(4.e)] hence, the state of being bold without knowledge is not a part of virtue (by 4.b and 4.d)
(4.f) the courageous are the bold (350b6–7)[39]
(4.g) those who are bold but not wise are not courageous (350c1–2)
(4.h) those who are wisest are boldest (350c2–3)
(4.i) those who are boldest are most courageous (350c3–4)
(4.j) therefore, wisdom is courage (350c4–5)

The complexity of this argument demands that certain of its steps be put into the language of formal logic. Using 'B' for '. . . is bold', 'C' for '. . . is courageous', and 'W' for '. . . is wise', what we have is as follows:

(4.a) $(x)\ (Cx \rightarrow Bx)$
(4.c) $(x)\ (Wx \rightarrow Bx)$
(4.f) $(x)\ (Cx \leftrightarrow Bx)$[40], and this implies:
$(x)\ (Bx \rightarrow Cx)$
(4.j) $(x)\ (Wx \rightarrow Cx)$

[37] Cf. Sprague, *op. cit.*, p.96.

[38] I ignore a number of the complex but unimportant formal logical difficulties in this argument; for a discussion of these, see C. C. W. Taylor's analysis, *Protagoras*, pp. 150–161.

I draw upon Taylor's formulation of the argument, though I disagree with his interpretation. Taylor dimisses the account of the argument I present below for the following reason: "it seems incredible that Plato should wish to represent Socrates as arguing in such a morally and intellectually discreditable fashion, and in being detected in such a humiliating way . . ." (p. 158; and see 160). I believe that the account of Plato's intentions given in this paper serves to weigh against Taylor's interpretation.

[39] Πῶς οὖν . . . λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι; (350b6–7).

[40] With O'Brien (*TAPA*, 1961, pp. 411–4) and Guthrie (*op. cit.*, IV, 229–230), I assume that the double use of the article τούς makes this an identity statement and hence a biconditional. Cf. Taylor, *Protagoras*, pp. 158–9.

(4.a) is established without argument, as is (4.b). (4.c) is established through a brief induction, consisting of three examples: divers, horsemen, buckler-men (349e8–350a5), generalized into all other cases (350a6). (4.d) is established without argument, and the implicit combination of (4.b) and (4.d) yields the tacit (4.e).

(4.f) is established without argument. Socrates puts it in the form of a question (actually two questions) and Protagoras assents (350 b6–7). This is the crucial move. From a logical point of view, it is the illicit conversion of (4.a) – assuming that we do not wish to emend the crucial article from the text, which would make it a mere repetition of (4.a).

Having established (4.f), Socrates launches into his syllogizing. He asserts (4.g), (4.h), and (4.i), without interruption, and concludes (4.j)[41].

The major problem in interpreting this argument concerns (4.f). O'Brien's assertion that Socrates asks it in good faith (and Protagoras assents to it wrongly, believing it to be identical to (4.a), and later repudiates this move)[42] is not tenable. For Socrates could not possibly ask in good faith the direct denial of the proposition he had established immediately before. Vlastos' interpretation is also inadequate. Vlastos holds that: (1) Socrates establishes (4.f) through an error, and (2) Protagoras is correct in protesting, but (3) Protagoras is incorrect in his diagnosis of Socrates' error, and so his protest is misdirected. Thus, "while Socrates has made a mistake, Protagoras mistakes the nature of this mistake."[43] Though this view would account for the nature of the dramatic action, it is improbable. It is difficult to conceive of a reason why Plato would want to write such an exchange; his readers would require superhuman insight to figure out what was happening. Though, as I have said, there are problems with my view of the proceedings, it does have the considerable advantage of conforming to Protagoras' diagnosis. As I see it, Socrates uses (4.f) to fool Protagoras. Through (4.f), he effects the illicit conversion of (4.a) that his argument requires. And this is the argument that conforms to the paradigm given above on page 136.

(4.a) conforms to the (i) step: (x) (Cx → Bx)
(4.c) conforms to the (ii) step (repeated in (4.h)): (x) (Wx → Bx)

[41] (4.g) is derived from (4.e), (4.b), and (4.d); (4.h) is from (4.c), and (4.i) from (4.f).
[42] See O'Brien, *TAPA,* 1961, p. 409.
[43] See Vlastos, Introduction, xxxiii–xxxiv; cf. Taylor, *Protagoras,* p. 160.

(4.f) conforms to the (iii) step (repeated in (4.i)): (x) (Bx → Cx)
(4.j) conforms to the (iv) step, which is the conclusion: (x) (Wx → Cx)

And this is how Protagoras diagnoses Socrates' argument. The text of his objection is as follows:

> (P. 1) You do not rightly recall, Socrates, what I stated in replying to you. (P. 2) When you asked me whether courageous men are bold, I admitted it: (P. 3) I was not asked whether bold men are courageous. Had you asked me this before, I should have said – "Not all." (P. 4) And as to proving that courageous men are not bold, you have nowhere pointed out that I was wrong in my admission that they are. (P. 5) Next you show that such persons individually are bolder when they have knowledge, and bolder than others who lack it, (P. 6) and therewith you take courage and wisdom to be the same: (350c6–d5; my divisions).

In (P. 2) Protagoras admits to (4.a), but in (P. 3) he protests against the move Socrates makes in (4.f), claiming he never assented to it. Socrates used (4.f) to trick Protagoras, and it is clear that he was tricked. He did not realize the implications of the inserted article; in assenting to (4.f), he believed he was merely reaffirming his commitment to (4.a), and so, as far as he is concerned, he never accepted the conversion of (4.a). (P. 4) merely defends the admission made in (P. 2). In (P. 5), Protagoras admits to (4.c). Thus, according to Protagoras, (4.c) and (4.f), which he disowns as the illicit conversion of (4.a), are combined by Socrates to yield his conclusion, which Protagoras expresses in (P. 6). This diagnosis conforms to the paradigm as follows:

(i) In (P. 2) he acknowledges (4.a): (x) (Cx → Bx)
(ii) In (P. 5) he acknowledges (4.c): (x) (Wx → Bx)
(iii) In (P. 3) he disowns (4.f): (x) (Bx → Cx)
(iv) In (P. 6) he points out the conclusion he believes Socrates to have arrived at: (x) (Wx ↔ Cx)[44]

There are two major problems in my interpretation of Socrates' argument. The first is that whereas we would expect Socrates to prove that courage is wisdom ((x) (Cx → Wx))[45], what he in fact proves is that wisdom is courage ((x) (Wx → Cx))[46]. The second problem, which is related to the first, is that, as I see it, steps (4.b,d,g) have no business being in the argument; i.e., why did Socrates bother to

[44] That Protagoras takes this to be Socrates' conclusion is a problem that will be discussed below.
[45] See Guthrie, *op. cit.,* IV, 230; cf. Vlastos, Introduction, xxxii–xxxv.
[46] κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη; (350c4–5).

prove that some bold men are not wise and therefore not courageous? To a certain extent I am justified in dismissing these steps from any role in the argument by the fact that, as we have seen, Protagoras ignores them completely in his diagnosis of the argument.

Socrates' strategy in this argument is extremely curious. It seems that he starts off attempting to prove that courage is wisdom. Given steps (4.a) through (4.e), he has enough to deduce this conclusion[47]. But suddenly, for no apparent reason, he shifts to proving the converse of his original conclusion, wisdom is courage, through the fallacious conversion established in (4.f). The main difficulties one has in understanding this argument center around supplying a reason why Socrates would wish to pursue such a strategy. There is some plausibility in C.C.W.Taylor's suggestion that Socrates has *implicitly* proved that courage is wisdom, through the enunciation of steps (4.a) through (4.e), before he moves on to complete the biconditional by (fallaciously) proving that wisdom is courage[48]. There is, however, no textual evidence to support this interpretation of the argument.

In any event, if we suppose that there is a reason for Socrates' peculiar strategy, that his argument is designed somehow to prove that wisdom is courage and carefully crafted for this purpose, the presence of steps (4.b,d,g) can be explained according to standard eristic procedure; as Aristotle recommends in the *Topics*:

> . . . it is a good thing to prolong the argument and to introduce into it points which are of no practical good, just as those do who construct false geometrical figures; for, when the material is abundant, it is less obvious where the fallacy (ψεῦδος) lies (157a1–3).

Though I am not fully satisfied with this explanation of Socrates' behavior, my analysis of his logic is confirmed by Protagoras' counter-argument, which is identical to Socrates' argument, except for the fact that it omits the (4.b,d,g) steps. The text of the counter-argument follows directly after the diagnosis of Socrates' argument quoted above; it is as follows:

> (P. 7) proceeding in this manner you might even take strength to be wisdom. (P. 8) On this method you might begin by asking me whether the strong are powerful, and I should say 'Yes'; (P. 9) and then, whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not know how to wrestle, and whether individually they are more powerful when they have learnt than before learning, and I should say 'Yes'. (P. 10) And on my admitting these points it would be open to you to say, by the same token, that according to my admission wisdom is strength. (P. 11) But neither there nor elsewhere do I admit that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful . . . (350d5–e7; my divisions).

[47] See Taylor, *Protagoras,* pp.158, 151; Vlastos, Introduction, xxxiv–xxxv.
[48] Taylor, *Protagoras,* p.158.

This argument too conforms to the paradigm (using 'S' for '. . . is strong' and 'P' for '. . . is powerful'):

(i) In (P. 8) Protagoras accepts that the strong are powerful: (x) (Sx → Px)
(ii) In (P. 9) he agrees that those with knowledge are more powerful than those without it: (x) (Wx → Px)
(iii) In (P. 11) he disowns the necessary conversion of (i), the assertion that the powerful are strong: (x) (Px → Sx)
(iv) In (P. 10) he states that the conclusion would follow from these points: (x) (Wx → Sx)

In this argument, there is no sign of steps conforming to (4.b,d,g).

There is a serious difficulty running through the entire speech of Protagoras. It is closely related to the fact, which we have observed, that Socrates seems to begin his argument proving that courage is wisdom, but ends up proving that wisdom is courage. A similar problem crops up twice in Protagoras' speech. First, whereas Socrates proves that wisdom is courage, Protagoras misreads the nature of this accomplishment: "and therewith you take courage and wisdom to be the same (ταὐτὸν) ((x) (Cx ↔ Wx))" (350d5). This is the sole difficulty in his analysis of Socrates' argument. Second, in the counter-argument, Protagoras, like Socrates, switches his conclusion in midstream. He starts out to prove that strength is wisdom ((x) (Sx → Wx))[49], but ends up proving that wisdom is strength ((x) (Wx → Sx))[50]. These apparent errors on the part of Protagoras, taken in conjunction with the similar anomaly in the argument of Socrates and the fallacy that Socrates uses, present the reader with a curious pattern of apparent inconsistencies, each of which depends solely on the use and/or placement of the article. And what is more, these four instances occur in a context in which the fallacy of conversion is discussed, a fallacy that is most easily effected – as in Socrates' argument – through manipulation of the article. There seems to be some sort of plan at work in all this, though it is difficult to say what it is[51]. Still, regardless of how we explain these curious difficulties, the most natural

[49] τὴν ἰσχὺν . . . ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν (350d6).
[50] κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς (350e5–6).
[51] One significant advantage of Taylor's interpretation of Socrates' strategy (above, p. 140) is that it would account for the repeated confusion of implication and biconditional.

reading of the fourth argument would hold that Socrates uses an intentional fallacy, which is detected and countered by Protagoras.

The most likely explanation for the difficulties encountered in Protagoras' speech is that Plato chooses to depict Protagoras as confused[52]. Though the Sophist is a famed eristic combattant and the veteran of many an *agōn logōn*, his grasp on the philosophical issues underlying his battery of tricks is slim. Plato brings this out throughout the dialogue. (1) In 339b–d, Protagoras is depicted as not knowing the difference between 'to be' and 'to become'. In order to show Protagoras the difference, Socrates calls on the aid of Prodicus (340a–d). (2) Though Protagoras catches the fallacy in Socrates' first argument and thus might be thought to have a good grasp on the nature of the contrary-contradictory fallacy, Socrates is able to come right back at him and use the same fallacy again, this time successfully, in the second argument. (3) Similarly, in the fourth argument, though Protagoras is able to catch Socrates' fallacious move, he is far from knowing precisely how it works. The same lack of knowledge that led him to fall for the fallacy in the first place leads him to confuse similar matters in his objection to Socrates (in both his diagnosis and the counter-argument). Thus I believe that Plato cleverly enriches his depiction of this duel between Socrates and Protagoras through his use of very small detail. Through the use of such detail, incorporated into Plato's entire dramatic presentation, Protagoras' skill in contentious argument, like Gorgias' skill in rhetoric, is revealed to be not an 'art' but a 'knack'[53].

---

[52] Cf. Taylor, *Protagoras,* pp. 157–158.

[53] ἐμπειρία (*Grg* 462c): οὐκ . . . τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή (463b3–4).

Conclusions in the *Meno*

by Kathleen V. Wilkes (Oxford)

I

At 86c7 Meno reiterates the question with which he had opened the dialogue: can ἀρετή be taught? With the renewal of this query the *Meno* takes a most puzzling turn. There are at least five oddities in the ensuing chunk of dialogue; these merit close examination.

The first oddity comes with the introduction of the two 'hypotheses'[1], (a) that ἀρετή is ἐπιστήμη (87c5), and (b), that ἀρετή is ἀγαθόν (87d3). What is odd here is not the fact that, for the first time in Plato's writings, we find him using the so-called 'Hypothetical Method'; he had to begin sometime. It is rather the content of the hypotheses themselves that is curious. Hypothesis (a) is noteworthy because we know that it expresses Socrates' own view, the view that ἀρετή is ἐπιστήμη or φρόνησις. Hypothesis (b) is no less interesting. It seems more like a tautology than something we would call 'hypothetical'; no Greek would dream of denying it, even if he were an 'amoralist' like Callicles or Thrasymachus; all would agree that ἀρετή was ἀγαθόν, even if they disagreed about what did, and what did not, count as falling within the scope of the term ἀρετή[2].

---

[1] Although 'hypothesis' can be an unsatisfactory translation of ὑπόθεσις (see n. 2), I shall follow the convention used by most commentators and retain it as a translation. Hence the scare-quotes used here will not be repeated.

[2] To call (b) an 'hypothesis' is therefore misleading; it has puzzled many that a truism like (b) is 'hypothesized'. R. S. Bluck, in his edition *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 88, gets round the problem by arguing that it is *not* a truism, and *can* be called an 'hypothesis', because ἀγαθόν is intended in the sense of ὠφέλιμον, and 'ἀρετή is ὠφέλιμον' is a genuine hypothesis. But this explanation will not suffice, as there is a separate move from 'ἀρετή is ἀγαθόν' to 'ἀρετή is ὠφέλιμον' at 87e 1–2, a move for which Meno's agreement is asked and secured, and whose validity it was open to him to deny. The problem, however, is not a real one. As R. Robinson points out (*Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford, 1953), ch. VII), the term 'ὑπόθεσις' can, and often does, mean simply 'premiss', 'proposition', or 'something laid down' (to serve as a basis for further inquiry); as such a tautology, or even a falsehood, would serve quite as well as a genuine 'hypothesis'. Possibly, too, Socrates is using these 'hypotheses' to play a role analogous to the two sketches he drew

0003-9101/79/0612-0002$2.00

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE

Begründet von Ludwig Stein,
fortgeführt von Paul Wilpert und Hans Wagner

In Verbindung mit Charles H. Kahn, Philadelphia

und unter ständiger Mitwirkung von Jaakko Hintikka, Helsinki/Stanford Univ., Ludwig Landgrebe, Köln, G. E. L. Owen, Cambridge, Josef Schmucker, Regensburg, Wolfgang Stegmüller, München, Jules Vuillemin, Paris, Wolfgang Wieland, Freiburg, Margaret D. Wilson, Princeton, Richard Wollheim, London, Albert Zimmermann, Köln

herausgegeben von
KARL-HEINZ ILTING

61. BAND 1979 HEFT 2

WALTER DE GRUYTER · BERLIN · NEW YORK

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS DES II. HEFTES

I. Aufsätze

II. Rezensionen

(Fortsetzung 3. Umschlagseite)

Das *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* erscheint jährlich in drei Heften. Der Umfang des ganzen Jahrganges beträgt 320 Seiten. Der Jahrgang kostet 74,– DM (bzw. $ 46.25 $-price is subject to change without further notice). Die Abnahme des ersten Heftes verpflichtet zur Abnahme des ganzen Jahrganges.

Anschrift der Redaktionen: **Achtung:** Neue **deutsche** Redaktion:

Prof. Dr. K.-H. Ilting, Universität des Saarlandes, Fachrichtung 5.1 Philosophie, 6600 Saarbrücken

Prof. Dr. Charles H. Kahn, Dept. of Philosophy CN, University of Pennsylvania, 305 Logan Hall, Philadelphia 19174

Manuskripte und auf den Inhalt der Zeitschrift bezügliche Mitteilungen aus den **USA** und **Kanada** werden an die dafür zuständige Redaktion in **Philadelphia,** aus **allen übrigen Ländern** an die Redaktion in **Saarbrücken** erbeten.

Herausgeber und Verleger ersuchen dringend darum, die Manuskripte in Maschinenschrift einseitig beschrieben und in druckfertigem Zustand einzusenden. Für unverlangt eingehende Manuskripte, deren Rücksendung im Falle der Ablehnung erwünscht wird, ist das erforderliche Rückporto beizulegen.
Die Mitarbeiter erhalten von ihren Beiträgen 50 Sonderdrucke mit den Seitenzahlen der Zeitschrift kostenlos; die Verfasser von Rezensionen erhalten 10 kostenlose Sonderdrucke. Weitere Sonderdrucke können gegen Bezahlung bezogen werden, wenn sie rechtzeitig vor dem Druck des Heftes bestellt werden. Alle Bestellungen und sonstige Anfragen, die Sonderdrucke betreffen, sind unmittelbar an den Verlag zu richten.

Es wird gebeten, von unverlangter Einsendung von Besprechungsexemplaren abzusehen.

Distributors for USA and Canada:
Walter de Gruyter Inc.
New York · Berlin
200 Saw Mill River Road
Hawsthorne, N.Y. 10532
Price per year US $ 46.25

Distributors for Japan:
Maruzen Company, Ltd.
Subscription Department
6 Tori-Nichome
Nihonbashi, Tokyo/Japan

($-price is subject to change without further notice)

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft

Printed in Germany

ISSN 0003-9101
Archiv-Nr. 3 10 900289 7
Satz und Druck: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 30
Bindearbeiten: Berliner Buchbindekunst Thomas Fuhrmann KG, Berlin 36

Diesem Heft liegen zwei Prospekte des Verlages Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, bei. Wir bitten um Beachtung.

Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the *Protagoras**

by George Klosko (West Lafayette, Indiana)

The problem of Plato's deliberate use of fallacies is one that has been obscured rather than clarified by many modern interpreters. In considering the possibility that Plato intentionally puts fallacious arguments into the mouth of his Socrates, too often scholars allow moralistic considerations to influence their judgments[1]. And so, from the outset, we must insist that the argument that "Plato would never show the righteous Socrates resorting to low verbal trickery" is at best ahistorical, and the question of intentional fallacy, like all other questions in Platonic scholarship, must be settled upon the basis of the evidence alone.

The argument of this paper is an attempt to establish one particular literary convention according to which Plato uses intentional fallacies. The thesis that will be pursued here is that a number of the dialogues make strong allusions to eristic disputation, and that these allusions must be borne in mind in interpreting these works. Eristic disputation, of course, involves the use of fallacious arguments as one of its common features[2]; and so the argument of this paper is, briefly, that certain dialogues depict Socrates engaged in more or less formal eristic competition with various sophists and that, in these contexts, not only Socrates' opponents but Socrates himself is depicted as using fallacious arguments without compunction.

* I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Mr. Kevin McTighe and Professors Charles H. Kahn and Richard Patterton for their valuable criticisms and suggestions.

[1] Cf. G. Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the *Protagoras*", in *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, 1973), p. 223 and n. 5; cf. the remarks of R. K. Sprague, *Plato's Use of Fallacy* (London, 1962), p. 81; also cf. below, n. 38.

[2] Language used in a number of the dialogues – and in various works of Aristotle as well – suggests that there is little or no distinction between informal contentious argument and more or less formal eristic competition, in regard to the routine use of fallacious arguments. Rather, the important distinction seems to be between arguing 'dialectically' (διαλεγόμενος) and arguing 'contentiously' (ἀγωνιζόμενος). See the following passages: *Tht* 167e–168a (esp. 167e4–5), 164cd; *Meno* 75cd; *Rep* 454a, 539c; *Tim* 88a; *Phlb* 17a; Aristotle's *Topics* 159a26–32, 161a23–24; *SE* 182b33–35. Many more passages, especially from Aristotle, could be cited here to confirm this general distinction.

0003-9101/79/0612-0001$2.00