THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

Citizen Claim-Making in Rural India

By GABRIELLE KRUKS-WISNER*

I. Introduction

"WHY waste your breath? *Sarkar* [the state] does nothing for us. They come at elections, they eat the votes, then they go away and we are forgotten." "We have no water, no services. . . . What can we do? God willing, we survive."[1] These are the words of men in rural Rajasthan describing the water crisis that regularly grips this semiarid region of India. But other residents living just a few kilometers away described the same crisis in very different terms: "When the water is not flowing, it is the responsibility of the sarkar. They bring the water, from God knows where, but they bring the water." It is, they said, a matter of *avaaz* (voice): "We raised our voices until they had to hear."[2] In both instances, the men speaking are from the Bheel tribe, a community noted for its marginalized status. All reside in *kaccha* (makeshift) housing in peripheral hamlets, and all labor on government worksites earning less than two dollars a day. Thus, their different stances toward the state cannot be reduced to differences in socioeconomic standing. Nor are they attributable to differences in formal bureaucratic administration, held constant within a single administrative block and district of the state of Rajasthan.

---

* For their comments on drafts of this article, I thank Rikhil Bhavnani, Melani Cammett, Patrick Heller, Rob Jenkins, Devesh Kapur, Herbert Kitschelt, Akshay Mangla, Sandip Sukhtankar, Tariq Thachil, Ashutosh Varshney, three anonymous reviewers, and participants in seminars at Brown University, the University of Pennsylvania, the 2014 American Political Science Association annual meeting, and the 2016 Annual Conference on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. For their feedback on various stages of the research, I am grateful to Adam Auerbach, Suzanne Berger, Jennifer Bussell, Thad Dunning, John Echeverri-Gent, Anirudh Krishna, Sonia Kruks, Evan Lieberman, Richard Locke, Daniel Posner, Prerna Singh, Lily Tsai, Steven Wilkinson, Ben Wisner, and Adam Ziegfeld. In India, I thank Neelima Khetan, Sanjay Lodha, and Ajay Mehta for their guidance and support. I am particularly indebted to Vivek Shukla and my research team in Rajasthan. This research was made possible by fellowships from the Fulbright Program, the National Science Foundation, the Boren Fellowship, and MIT's International Science and Technology Initiative's India Program.

The replication code for this article is available at Kruks-Wisner 2017a.

[1] Author interviews, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, Rajasthan. February 22, 2010. The names of individuals and villages have been withheld for anonymity.

[2] Author interviews, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, Rajasthan. February 24, 2010.

World Politics, 70, no. 1 (January 2018), 122–63

Copyright © 2017 Trustees of Princeton University

doi: 10.1017/S0043887117000193

These accounts highlight a puzzle in Indian politics and beyond: despite structurally similar conditions, citizens vary in their engagement with and approaches to the state. Some exercise voice, while others exit and seek private alternatives.[3] Still others remain silent, seemingly quiescent in the face of deprivation.[4] These varied patterns raise a fundamental question in the study of citizen-state relations and distributive politics: What fosters and what inhibits citizen action in pursuit of public resources? This is a salient question in settings across the Global South, where poor majorities routinely struggle to access the resources of the state.

India, the world's largest democracy and home to some of the world's deepest poverty and biggest social welfare programs, provides a revealing case in which to examine these dynamics. As Akhil Gupta notes, "One could hardly accuse the [Indian] state of inaction toward the poor: it would be difficult to imagine a more extensive set of development interventions in the fields of nutrition, health, education, housing, employment, sanitation, and so forth than those found in India."[5] But in most places the gap between policy and implementation looms large, leaving these critical resources beyond the reach of many. This article turns to the rural Indian context to ask why some citizens are more likely than others to attempt to bridge this gap by making claims on the state for social welfare goods and services. Such claim-making activity, I argue, is a product of citizens' exposure to—and hence knowledge of, expectations of, and linkages to—the state. Citizen action is in this sense both state induced and socially produced, shaped by direct encounters with public officials and by the accounts of other citizens that circulate within and beyond local communities. A person's claim-making activity thus reflects the degree to which she is constrained by social and spatial boundaries (for example, of class, ethnicity, gender, and locality) that delimit the movement of people and the flow of information and ideas. More porous boundaries, which enable greater exposure to the state, foster citizen action; more rigid boundaries, in contrast, inhibit it.

I test this theory through a study of Rajasthan, a poor and largely rural state in northwestern India.[6] Drawing on village-level interviews, I observe that those who move around the most within and beyond their local communities have greater expectations about what the state

[3] Hirschman 1970.

[4] Gaventa 1980.

[5] Gupta 2012, 23.

[6] Home to more than sixty-eight million people, Rajasthan falls in the bottom quarter of all Indian states when ranked by human development standing (Suryanarayana, Agrawal, Prabhu 2011).

should provide. They also have more and better knowledge of social services and how to claim them, as well as greater opportunities to do so. Quantitative analysis of original survey data drawn from 2,210 individuals across 105 villages confirms these patterns. Those who traverse boundaries of caste, neighborhood, and village are, all else equal, more likely to make claims on the state and to do so through broader repertoires of action than are those who are more constrained by the same boundaries. Further analysis of the correlates of claim-making highlights the persistence and consistency of exposure's catalytic effects across groups of citizens set apart by class, caste, gender, and other features. The article concludes by considering the extensions and limitations of the theory, the scope conditions of which are established by the institutional terrain—the reach, visibility, and accessibility—of the state itself.

II. Claim-Making: Concept, Context, and Measurement

I define claim-making as action—direct or mediated—through which citizens pursue access to social welfare goods and services, understood as publicly provided resources intended to protect and improve well-being and social security. Around the globe, vast numbers of citizens rely on the state for essential services in education and health care, for shelter and drinking water, and for income support and other forms of social protection. This is particularly true among the poor, who cannot vote with their feet or wallets in the same manner as the more affluent.[7] This article therefore sets out to explore whether and why citizens engage in state-targeted acts of claim-making. Claim-making of this kind encompasses some of the most ordinary acts citizens undertake in relation to the state: attending a meeting, filing an application, visiting an official, contacting a local broker, or engaging in other quotidian modes of interest articulation.

These seemingly small, everyday practices can be of critical consequence. This is particularly so in non-programmatic settings where the discretionary application of rules makes access even to legal entitlements a matter of contention.[8] Claim-making, though, does not always yield results. Many whom I met in Rajasthan remained deeply frustrated in their efforts to secure access to services. And yet large numbers, as I describe below, kept on engaging the state—acting on the expectation (or hope) that at least some of their efforts would elicit a response. Claim-making is thus both of material importance as a potential means to public resources and of intrinsic value as a set of practices through which citizens forge relationships with the state. It is, in other words, an essential element of active citizenship: the process of negotiating the rights and resources one is due in a given political society.[9]

---

[7] The result, as MacLean 2011, 1247, notes, is a "two-tiered social service system" in which the state remains central to the lives of the rural poor even as it is diminished in the lives of the more well-to-do.

[8] On programmatic versus non-programmatic politics, see Kitschelt 2000 and Stokes et al. 2013. In the Indian context, see Chandra 2004 and Ziegfeld 2016.

Rural India's Claim-Making Terrain

The scope of India's social welfare sector has increased markedly since independence, growing most dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s, a period that saw a wave of social rights legislation.[10] Real per capita expenditures by the states and central government on education and health more than doubled from the late 1970s to the mid-2000s, while spending on social security in the form of pensions and assistance for the elderly and the poor rose more than fourfold in the same period.[11] Spending accelerated in the late 2000s—the time of research for this article. In just the two years from 2006 and 2008, for example, core welfare expenditures increased by almost 25 percent.[12] These national trends are mirrored at the state level in Rajasthan. Social spending there rose from negligible levels following independence to surpass other similarly poor states by the 1980s, with even more rapid growth in the 1990s.[13] Anirudh Krishna, observing a fourteenfold increase in Rajasthani state expenditures in a fifteen-year period (1980–95), notes, "Instead of being dismantled or streamlined, state intervention in the rural sector has been intensified in the name of rural development and poverty reduction."[14]

The social welfare arms of the central and subnational state have thus become increasingly visible, especially at the local level. A constitutional amendment in 1993 established local councils (Gram Panchayats), each typically including several villages. Panchayat members are directly elected every five years by universal franchise. Seats are reserved for members of the historically marginalized Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in proportion to their share of the local population.[15] Seats are also reserved for women (at first 33 percent, and now in some states, including Rajasthan, at 50 percent). Initially described as little more than "paper tigers,"[16] the panchayats have become more deeply institutionalized over time. Although their formal fiscal autonomy remains limited, greater resources are flowing to and through these local councils. This is particularly the case since the implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), the central government's flagship employment program. Established in 2005, MGNREGS is intended to guarantee one hundred days of work per year to any rural household that requests it. Panchayat members play important roles, both formal and informal, in the administration of this program, which reaches almost US$9 billion in yearly funding (accounting for 3.6 percent of all central government spending).[17] As the administrative importance of (and opportunities for rents associated with) local office rises, panchayat elections have become more competitive.[18] Quotas for women and the SC and ST, moreover, have changed the face of the panchayat, arguably decreasing the social distance between local elected officials and their constituents.[19] The Gram Panchayat has thus emerged as a primary site for citizen-state interaction—and for claim-making.

---

[9] Indeed, the very notion of citizenship can be understood, as Tilly 1999, 2530, asserts, as a "set of mutually enforceable *claims* relating categories of persons to agents of government" (emphasis added).

[10] This included passage of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005), the Right to Education Act (2009), and the National Food Security Act (2013). On the expansion of social rights in India, see Jayal 2013.

[11] Nayar 2009, citing National Account Statistics.

[12] Kapur, Muhkopadhyay, and Subramanian 2008, 37.

[13] Singh 2015; Government of Rajasthan 2016.

[14] Krishna 2002, 43. For more on the expansion of Rajasthan's welfare sector, see Kruks-Wisner 2018.

At the same time though, local governance is marked by limited absorptive capacity and high levels of graft. As a result, local officials often allocate resources in a discretionary rather than a rule-bound fashion.[20] The proliferation of programs and their byzantine administration, moreover, create an environment in which lines of accountability are often unclear to citizens and officials alike.[21] Many citizens thus remain frustrated in their efforts to secure access to even basic goods and services. The local terrain of the state, in sum, is both increasingly broad and increasingly uneven: it is at once present and absent, visible and elusive, and critical and capricious in the lives of the rural poor. These conditions, I argue, set the stage for claim-making by generating not only expectations, but also grievances among citizens for whom the state is "deeply implanted in the public imagination"—even as it routinely falls short on its commitments to social welfare.[22]

---

[15] The Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are groups officially designated in the Indian Constitution as disadvantaged communities that are the intended beneficiaries of a wide range of affirmative action policies, including political reservations to guarantee representation.

[16] Mathew 1994, 36.

[17] Sukhtankar 2017; Jenkins and Manor 2017.

[18] The Election Commission of Rajasthan, for example, reported an average of 6.6 candidates contesting each open panchayat president seat in 2010.

[19] Chauchard 2017.

[20] Chandra 2004.

[21] Gupta 2012.

MEASURING CLAIM-MAKING

To measure claim-making activity, I turn to data from a citizen survey that I designed and implemented in Rajasthan in 2010–11, based on a random sample of 2,210 individuals selected from 105 villages and 40 Gram Panchayats across the state.[23] Survey respondents were asked: "Have you ever personally contacted [A] for assistance related to [B]?" "A" was a list of actors and institutions through which one might make claims on the state. These included members of the Gram Panchayat, local (block and district) bureaucrats, and state and national politicians. Also included were a range of nonstate intermediaries, for example, neighborhood, village, and caste associations, nongovernmental organizations, social movements, and fixers.[24] "B" was a bundle of collective welfare services benefiting groups and localities and, separately, a bundle of selective benefits allocated to households and individuals.[25] I define the overall incidence of claim-making in binary terms equal to 1 if an individual reports undertaking any kind of state-targeted action (direct or mediated) delineated in list A for any kind of welfare goods and services (collective or selective) laid out in list B.[26]

A large majority of those surveyed (76 percent) report that they had personally engaged in state-targeted claim-making. To be clear, an act of claim-making is not necessarily equivalent to actually accessing a good or service. Indeed, claim-making often fails. And yet, most see value in their actions. More than two-thirds (68 percent) report that

---

[22] Ahuja and Chhibber 2012, 400.

[23] Supplementary material related to the citizen survey is found at Kruks-Wisner 2017b. See Appendix I for a discussion of sampling methodology. Summary statistics are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2.

[24] Note that all mediated claim-making practices are still *state-targeted*. "Fixers" were defined in the survey as "influential or knowledgeable people who know how to get things done both inside and outside the village."

[25] Collective services were defined as "amenities, facilities, and public works, such as schools, health clinics, roads, drainage, lighting, or drinking water." Selective services were defined as "welfare schemes and programs such as pensions; cash assistance, subsidies or food rations; employment on government worksites." On the distinction between such high- and low-spillover goods, see Besley, Pande, and Rao 2004.

[26] Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.3, separately reports the incidence of claim-making for collective and selective services.

TABLE 1
CLAIM-MAKING PRACTICE IN RAJASTHAN

Claim-Making Practice (State-Targeted Pursuit of Social Welfare Services)		*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*
Direct Channels		0.65	48
Gram Panchayat	elected members of village council, including president (*sarpanch*) and ward members	0.62	48
Bureaucrats	appointed administrators at block or district levels (e.g., District Collector, Block Development Officer)	0.21	41
Politicians/parties	state (MLA) or national (MP) parliamentarians and their offices	0.22	41
Mediated Channels		0.54	50
Fixers	individuals who assist others in accessing government schemes and benefits	0.17	37
Neigh. association	neighborhood-wide voluntary association (developmental and/or cultural)	0.22	41
Village association	village-wide voluntary association (developmental and/or cultural)	0.15	36
Caste association	customary body that governs social affairs of caste community	0.23	42
Intercaste association	villagewide association of leaders from different castes (traditional panchayat)	0.14	34
NGO	nongovernmental organization active in or around village	0.03	16
Social movement	social or protest movement active in or around village	0.09	28
Claim-making incidence	engagement of any of above claim-making channels	0.76	43
Claim-making repertoire	number of channels employed (0–10)	0.02 (min) 0	1.73 (max) 8

Source: Author's citizen survey in Rajasthan 2010–11 (n = 2210).

their claim-making efforts had at least some beneficial impact on their ability to secure welfare goods and services,[27] even as they were quick to acknowledge that singular acts are seldom sufficient.

Table 1 presents the mean incidence of each kind of claim-making practice, including both those that involve the direct, face-to-face contacting of officials and those mediated through nonstate actors and

---

[27] Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.4, reports respondents' perceptions of the efficacy of different claim-making practices.



FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLAIM-MAKING REPERTOIRE

institutions. Although limitations of space preclude a thorough discussion of each practice, several trends are worth noting.[28] First, a large majority (65 percent) report directly contacting public officials. This occurs primarily through the Gram Panchayat, which, notably, is the most frequent port of call for all social and economic groups.[29] Second, a majority also pursues channels mediated through an array of nonstate actors and institutions. Third, most engage in multiple practices, combining direct and mediated approaches to the state.[30] I define the claim-making repertoire as the set of all practices employed, the distribution of which is presented in Figure 1.

Strikingly, the high incidence of claim-making persists across social groups: the rich and the poor, the "upper" General Castes (GC), the middle-ranking Other Backward Classes (OBC), and the "lower" SCs and STs.[31] These patterns, as seen in Figure 2, are confirmed in multivariate

---

[28] For a fuller discussion of the specific claim-making practices employed, see Kruks-Wisner 2018.

[29] Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.5, presents differences in means for each type of claim-making practice across quintiles of landownership, caste categories, and gender.

[30] On the combination of direct and mediated practices, see Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.6.

[31] The Other Backward Classes (OBC) are non-SC and non-ST groups designated by India's states as socially disadvantaged. The General Castes (GC) are all other undesignated groups, and are typically of higher socioeconomic status. Within them, these broad categories encompass many diverse caste communities (or *jatis*).



FIGURE 2
CLAIM-MAKING INCIDENCE DISAGGREGATED

analysis (introduced in Section VII), which reveals a lack of a consistent association between claim-making incidence and a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics. There is, however, a pronounced gender gap, where women lag far behind men in rates of claim-making. Moreover, there is variation in *how* different groups engage the state, with those of lower social standing undertaking narrower repertoires of action (Figure 3). Women, the lower castes, and the poor, it appears, have less room to maneuver. Yet despite the constraints, majorities from all walks of life engage in claim-making.

These patterns are remarkable in light of long-held theories that predict limited participation among citizens of lower socioeconomic standing living in less-developed settings.[32] Rural Indian citizens—despite voting in large numbers—have long been referred to as “docile,” “passive,” “fatalistic,” and “politically accepting.”[33] The data from rural Rajasthan complicate this picture, revealing that claim-making is possible and even likely in poor and remote settings and among the lower classes and castes. And yet, at the same time, almost one-quarter of those surveyed report no claim-making activity whatsoever. This is a sobering figure in a setting where citizens rely heavily on the state for goods and services critical to their lives and livelihoods. Here again, socioeconomic status is limited in its predictive power, since non–claim makers include both richer residents (who presumably can afford to self-provide) and poorer residents (even in the face of their striking levels of deprivation). Simply knowing where a person stands in the local social structure, in sum, cannot adequately predict patterns of citizen-state engagement. The challenge is thus to understand why distinct practices emerge among individuals living under similar socioeconomic conditions.

III. Social and Spatial Exposure as a Catalyst for Claim-Making

My central argument is that citizens’ claim-making activity is a function of their exposure to information and ideas about the state, as well as their channels of access to it. The extent of this exposure reflects the strength of underlying social and spatial boundaries that delimit citizens’ mobility and connectivity. Where rigid, these boundaries limit the people, places, and narratives to which a person is exposed, and

---

[32] Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.

[33] Moore 1966; Narain 1978, cited in Singer 2007; Hardgrave and Kochanek 2008.



Figure 3
Claim-Making Repertoire Disaggregated

thus restrict the claim-making repertoire. More porous boundaries, in contrast, enable exposure beyond the immediate community and locality. This exposure serves to build citizens' knowledge of, expectations about, and linkages to the state, and thereby expands their aspirations and capabilities for state-targeted action.

Building Aspirations and Capabilities

Why would a person faced with material need *not* make claims on the state? To start, a person might simply be unaware of public resources or programs, or may not know procedurally how to seek them: where to go, whom to talk to, what forms to fill out, and so on. Even if people do possess this requisite knowledge, they may not think it is the state's responsibility to provide the resources in question. And even if they feel entitled, they may not believe that claim-making is worthwhile—particularly if they have little expectation that their voices will be heard or, worse, if they fear reprisals should they speak up.

A person must, in other words, both aspire to make claims on the state and have the capacity to do so. Claim-making aspirations reflect underlying beliefs about what the state can and should deliver, as well as about whether and how the state will respond. Claim-making thus rests upon a sense of entitlement and efficacy, both personal (indicating an individual's confidence in her ability to effect change) and political (reflecting beliefs about governmental capacity and responsiveness). Claim-making also requires a set of capabilities, that is, knowledge of the state and access to channels through which to approach officials.[34] Minimally, citizens must have information about programs and services, as well as procedural knowledge of how to pursue them. In an environment where rules are weakly enforced, people also need tacit knowledge of the state, its backdoor channels, and local power brokers. But even this knowledge of the inner workings of the state cannot enable action if citizens lack linkages to the state. To engage in claim-making, therefore, citizens must also have access (direct or mediated) to officials or other important gatekeepers.

Aspirations and capabilities do not develop among individuals in isolation but are "formed in interaction and in the thick of social life."[35]

---

[34] I employ the term "capabilities" in a narrower sense than Sen 1990, who, in his pioneering work on human development, refers to capabilities as conditions that protect and enhance human freedoms. Claim-making capabilities, as I conceptualize them here, can contribute to human capabilities in this broader Senian sense if citizens effectively demand services (for example, in health or education) that expand their ability to live full, healthy lives. By the same token, human capabilities (such as health and literacy) can enable more effective claim-making.

[35] Appadurai 2004, 67.

It follows that we might expect "differently placed" citizens—those set apart by class, ethnicity, gender, locality, or other cleavages—to see and engage the state differently.[36] Indeed, as Arjun Appadurai suggests, the "capacity to aspire" may not be evenly distributed; imagined possibilities of access and action are more expansive for some, while more restricted for others. For Appadurai, this is a matter of social class. Horizons of aspiration are broader for those who are "better off," and more "brittle" for the poor.[37] And yet class inequality, while powerful in shaping aggregate patterns of social exclusion, cannot account for variation in claim-making practice among similarly situated groups and individuals who, despite shared experiences of poverty, engage the state differently. Nor can it explain, on aggregate, the visibly high aspirations among the lower classes and castes in poor and remote places like rural Rajasthan.

How, then, are we to explain differences in aspirations and capabilities among similarly placed (and similarly marginalized) individuals? The answer to this puzzle, I argue, lies in an examination of the boundaries that shape the spaces in which citizens observe, encounter, and seek access to the state. There is a rich literature on boundary politics—on the ways in which people and communities define "who and what is properly included and who and what stands outside."[38] The precise nature of the social cleavages in question—whether based on class, ethnicity, religion, gender, or other characteristics—vary from context to context. All such boundaries, though, define some kind of membership and, by extension, exclusion. Spatial divisions demarcating localities can reinforce social cleavages, creating geographical or administrative entities coterminous with social identities, or can cut across them, creating mixed or fragmented localities.

The relative porousness or rigidity of these social and spatial boundaries shapes citizens' claim-making aspirations and capabilities in two ways: by influencing the flow of information and ideas about the state, and by determining the number and nature of the linkages through which citizens attempt to access the state. First, knowledge of the state is produced and absorbed within social networks. As Mark Granovetter long ago demonstrated, information is reproduced and reinforced by strong, but insular ties, for example, to close friends and family members. The flow of new information, in contrast, is facilitated by weak ties to those to whom one is only loosely connected.[39] Extending Granovetter's insight, I argue that weak ties, which are made possible by porous social and spatial boundaries, facilitate exposure not only to greater information, but also to broader narratives about public entitlement and about the efficacy of citizen action. In settings marked by broad but uneven patterns of service provision (as described in the rural Indian context in Section II), social and spatial exposure is likely to motivate claim-making. This occurs as individuals come to observe or hear about resource allocation beyond their immediate locality (noting, for example, that another neighborhood has paved roads or that there is a better water supply in another village), thereby spurring a sense of entitlement among those who are not as well served. Citizens also learn about successful and unsuccessful claim-making practices through a combination of personal experience, observation, and narrated accounts. Exposure beyond the local community thus expands the horizon of possibility, both for what the state might provide and for the actions citizens might undertake.

---

[36] Corbridge et al., 2005.

[37] Appadurai 2004, 69.

[38] Isaac 2011, 779.

Second, social and spatial boundaries delimit potential pathways to the state. Social structures of class, caste, and gender impose constraints (real and perceived) on an individual's opportunity structure, as do territorial and geographic boundaries. And yet, not all individuals are equally constrained: some regularly cross such divides in the course of their social, economic, and political lives. The more a person traverses social and spatial boundaries, the broader her sightings of and engagement with the state; she is both more likely to encounter public officials and more likely to have access to critical brokers or gatekeepers. Those with greater exposure to the state will thus be more likely to engage the state through a greater diversity of approaches.

The Limits of Exposure

These predictions, though, are probabilistic in nature. Exposure itself does not guarantee that a person will engage the state but, by generating aspirations and building capabilities, it increases the chances that one will do so. The effects of exposure on claim-making, moreover, are dependent on an underlying set of institutional and social conditions.

First, the effects of exposure are conditional on the presence and reach of the state itself. On the one hand, under conditions marked by a felt absence of the state, greater exposure could in fact inhibit claim-making by reinforcing low expectations, thereby demobilizing citizens or prompting exit in pursuit of private alternatives. On the other hand, where the state delivers in a regular and programmatic fashion, claim-making simply may not be as necessary. Many places fall between these two extremes, marked by visible but variable public performance. It is under these conditions, I argue, that exposure is most likely to spur citizen action: the state's institutional reach increases citizens' encounters with the state, while its irregularity generates a sense of grievance (and entitlement) when it does not deliver. Claim-making, in this sense, rests upon a degree of inequality in public performance and resource distribution.

---

[39] Granovetter 1973.

But pronounced *social* inequalities can dampen the effects of exposure by creating seemingly insurmountable gaps. Thus, a poor or lower-caste individual who repeatedly encounters or observes discrimination beyond the local community may find her sense of efficacy diminished rather than bolstered. The experiences of the very rich or of those in distant cities, moreover, may appear too removed to motivate action among the rural poor. Second, then, the effects of exposure are conditional on the social distance between an individual and the people and places to which she is exposed: the distance cannot be so great as to limit (instead of expand) the horizon of possibility. Claim-making is thus most likely under conditions marked by a degree of social mobility as well as inequality. These, I argue, are the conditions in much of rural India, where class and caste hierarchies—although persistent and still constraining—are shifting, generating new patterns of movement and aspiration among the lower classes and castes.[40]

IV. Boundaries and Exposure in Rural India

Perhaps the most obvious set of social cleavages in the rural Indian context revolve around caste, which is often identifiable through one's surname, clothing, or where one lives in a village. Historically, the caste system also provided the basis for division of labor, as each caste and subcaste became associated with a particular occupation, although these patterns, as we will see, are beginning to shift. Caste is also associated (albeit imperfectly) with socioeconomic standing, as high- and low-caste differentials persist across a range of indicators, including income, consumption, landownership, education, and human development status.[41] Gender barriers are also particularly pronounced. In much of rural

---

[40] See, for example, Krishna 2003; Jaffrelot 2003; Fernandes and Heller 2006; Kapur et al. 2010; Béteille 2011; Gang, Sen, and Yun 2017; Kapur, Babu, and Prasad 2014.

[41] For an overview of contemporary patterns of caste disparities, see Deshpande 2011.

India, women's mobility is limited. This is particularly so under conditions of *purdah*, which impose norms of seclusion for women and thus make barriers of caste, neighborhood, and village more pronounced.[42] Not all women, though, are equally constrained. Purdah is most prevalent and most stringently applied among the higher castes. Lower-caste women, in contrast, are more likely to participate in the workforce and so are more likely to move about within and beyond their villages.[43]

Village boundaries were established by the British Raj or by postindependence census enumeration. Within villages, neighborhoods (*mohallas*) are also important spatial and social demarcations. Although mohallas are not always officially recognized, their boundaries are apparent to most villagers, especially for lower castes and tribal areas that are often on the periphery of a village or in remote hamlets. Mohallas also delineate class differences within a village. *Pucca* (proper) homes built from durable materials are typically concentrated in the central areas where the more affluent households reside. Homes on the outskirts of villages are typically of poorer quality, made of kaccha (rough or makeshift) materials.

Over time, cleavages of caste, neighborhood, and village, as well as associated socioeconomic and gender barriers, have become more permeable, albeit slowly and unevenly. These shifts are driven by an interconnected set of structural, political, and institutional changes. First are a series of developments in the rural economy. The centrality of agriculture to rural livelihoods has begun to decline, driven by land degradation and population growth. These changes, in turn, have led to a diversification in rural occupations to include nonfarm sources of income.[44] The result is a partial decoupling of caste, occupation, and village—features that historically were tightly linked, particularly under conditions of bonded labor.[45] As Krishna notes in his study of Rajasthan, "People are no longer bound to follow the occupation of their caste. Barbers have become telephone operators, sweepers have become *patwaris* [government record keepers], and skinners and tanners have become tractor repairmen."[46] For many, these occupational changes also spur movement beyond their locality, involving either long-term or temporary migration or more quotidian forays from the village. Thus, although caste and village boundaries continue to shape the experiences of rural residents in powerful ways, they are less uniformly constraining than they once were.

---

[42] The purdah (curtain) system is so-called because women (both Hindu and Muslim) very often wear a veil that physically and symbolically secludes them from the public sphere, limiting interactions between women and men.

[43] Joshi, Kochhar, and Rao n.d.

[44] Cf. Lanjouw and Stern 1998; Krishna 2002; Kapur et al. 2010; Gang, Sen, and Yun 2017.

[45] Bonded labor was formally outlawed in 1976 and is now rare. Even so, agricultural labor remains one of the most caste- and place-bound occupations in rural India. Cf. Ramachandran 1991; Jayaraman and Lanjouw 1999.

[46] Krishna 2002, 38.

Second, increasing electoral competition has begun to alter the political salience of caste. In an effort to capture greater electoral support, parties that once ran on caste platforms are increasingly targeting multiethnic constituencies, allocating benefits along partisan rather than caste lines.[47] These same dynamics are particularly pronounced at the local level where, despite the nominally nonpartisan nature of the panchayats, ever more competitive Gram Panchayat elections are often contested along party lines.[48] As mixed-caste coalitions proliferate, so too do spaces for interaction across caste lines. Candidates seeking office, for example, may bring together members of different communities at rallies or woo them through feasts or celebrations open to all castes. Parties are also increasingly dependent on brokers from the lower castes. As Krishna observes in Rajasthan, for example, a new class of informal political leaders hailing largely from the lower castes increasingly works as brokers between parties and citizens.[49]

Third, institutional interventions to promote the participation of marginalized groups have created spaces occupied by men and women from different caste and class backgrounds. The reservation of seats in the panchayat, for example, has drawn the lower castes and women into the public sphere.[50] The panchayat is thus a critical institution, both as a channel for claim-making (as noted in Section II) and as a site where citizens encounter residents from different social backgrounds (notably, without necessarily requiring movement beyond the village). NGOs have also played a role in broadening citizens' networks of exposure, in particular through attempts to bring women, the lower castes, and other marginalized groups into the public arena. One NGO in Udaipur, for example, set up a village "citizens' forum" that brought together men and women from different class and caste backgrounds to discuss village development and service provision. Another established a cross-village network, facilitating exchange meetings among residents. A number of other NGOs specifically targeted women, bringing them to events and offering training beyond the village, sometimes as far away as the state capital.

---

[47] Jaffrelot 1998; Krishna 2003; Thachil 2014.

[48] Dunning and Nilekani 2013. Gram Panchayat officials in Rajasthan, as in many other states, are prohibited from formally running on a party platform. Informally, though, many officials maintain strong ties to parties.

[49] Krishna 2002; Krishna 2003.

[50] Although the material effects of political reservations are contested (cf. Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 and Dunning and Nilekani 2013), there are important nonmaterial impacts, in particular, in creating spaces for public recognition and engagement (cf. Rao and Sanyal 2010 and Chauchard 2017).

Social relations are also beginning to shift as a consequence of these structural, political, and institutional changes. Indeed, as D. L. Sheth notes:

> [H]ouseholds within a single caste have not only been greatly differentiated in terms of their occupations, educational and income levels, and lifestyles, but these differences have led them to *align outside the caste, with different socio-economic networks and groupings in society*—categories which cannot be identified in terms of the caste system.[51]

In Rajasthan, Simon Chauchard highlights a relationship between having reserved seats for different castes in the Gram Panchayat and a decline in hostile behavior toward the lower castes.[52] This, he argues, is due to changing perceptions about the acceptability of interaction across caste lines, as well as to new understandings of the legal rights of lower-caste groups. Other research in Uttar Pradesh, a state neighboring Rajasthan, has demonstrated that changes in the rural economy, notably, the diversification of livelihoods, are associated with increased interpersonal interaction across caste lines.[53]

V. The Power of Porous Boundaries: How Exposure Builds Aspirations and Capabilities

The theory developed above predicts that more porous social and spatial boundaries, which enable greater mobility and connectivity across caste, neighborhood, and village lines, will be accompanied by a greater likelihood and broader repertoire of claim-making. Before turning to the survey data to investigate this relationship empirically, I first examine qualitative accounts from villagers in Rajasthan to illustrate how this crosscutting exposure might influence citizen action. These accounts are drawn from a diversity of villagers. Men and women from

---

[51] Sheth 1999, 2504, emphasis added.

[52] Chauchard 2017.

[53] Kapur et al. 2010. Their survey of SC residents in Uttar Pradesh reveals a decline in caste segregation at social functions, such as weddings, and increased interpersonal engagement (for example, accepting snacks).

"high" and "low" class and caste backgrounds alike reveal the powerful effects of exposure.

A brief comparison of two men in Udaipur district, both members of the same Scheduled Tribe, illustrates the ways in which differences in exposure can influence citizens' knowledge and expectations of the state. The first man resides in an isolated hamlet of a village and works locally in agriculture, and so rarely ventures farther afield. As a research team member began asking his opinion on a range of public programs and services, he responded simply:

> Seeing is believing. Do you see those things here? As far as I am concerned they don't exist. Why would I waste my breath on all that?[54]

The second man, who also lives in a small hamlet, painted a very different picture. This man is a laborer in a rock quarry located about ten kilometers away, and so he regularly travels beyond the village. He begins each day by walking to the central or "main" (*mukhya*) village to catch a bus. A heated exchange with a General Caste man, observed at a tea stall adjacent to the bus stop, highlights the impact of the ST man's exposure beyond his tribal hamlet.

> GC man: This village has everything. Roads, drinking water, schools. There is so much development!
>
> ST man: Those facilities are just for rich people. Even if you have to go to the doctor you have to wait!
>
> GC man: Just compare this village to other places and you will understand how much you have here.
>
> ST man: *I do compare!* That's how I know how many facilities there are, and how little we [in the tribal hamlet] have. You might live your whole life in some far off *basti* [hamlet] and never know what all government programs you *mukhya* [central village] people are getting here. But every day I'm coming here and seeing your riches.[55]

As revealed in this exchange, social and spatial exposure not only generates information about public services, but can also create new expectations. Much of this rests on observing services available elsewhere, which fosters a sense of comparative grievance, that is, a sense of exclusion while others benefit. A Scheduled Caste man in Udaipur expressed this combination of knowledge and anger about service delivery:

---

[54] Research team member interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 9, 2011.

[55] Conversation observed during author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2010.

> You would have to be blind not to see! There are so many schemes [governmental programs]. Over there [pointing to another neighborhood] they have CC [paved] roads, and the panchayat brought water connections to every house. Where is our road? Where is our water?[56]

These dynamics are not altogether new, but have become more pronounced since the 1990s, as social welfare budgets and programs have expanded. Krishna, for example, captured something similar in a 1999 interview in Rajasthan:

> Now people want a bus to come to their village; they are no longer willing to walk five kilometers. They want electricity to run their pumps. . . . They want schools. . . . If they have a primary school, they want a middle school . . . [then] a high school. . . . *They have seen these things* [available] *in other villages, so why not in their village?*[57]

A sense of grievance thus emerges in response not only to expanding public resources, but also to growing levels of citizen exposure to and awareness of those resources.

Grievances alone, though, will not spur action if citizens do not expect their claim-making to elicit a response. Knowledge of others who have successfully secured resources can spark hope that the state will deliver. Take, for example, an SC woman in Kota district who, like those above, refers to levels of service delivery in other villages when explaining her own claim-making intentions. Importantly, though, she references the experiences of other low-income people from her same caste community:

> We see how in other villages people are getting things. *Poor people, Meghwals* [SC] *like us.* That is how we have come to know about all the schemes that are available. . . . If [they] are getting these things, why not us?[58]

As this woman illustrates, exposure is motivating when there is local resonance; the points of comparison cannot be too far removed from one's local reality.

Claim-making also requires access to officials and intermediaries—linkages that are established and widened through greater exposure. A resident of Jodhpur district, for example, described how his contact with political parties changed when he began working as a manual laborer in the city, traveling there on a daily basis from his nearby village.

---

[56] Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 15, 2010.

[57] Interview with Congress Party activist and local labor leader, quoted in Krishna 2003, 1182, emphasis added.

[58] Author interview, Sangod block, Kota district, February 24, 2011, emphasis added.

> The city is where you meet all the political people. . . . Stay put in the village and it does not matter who you are. No one is coming to hear you. They will eat up your votes, that's it. But travel to the city and you can meet the MLA [state Member of Legislative Assembly] face to face.[59]

He went on to explain how he heard other laborers working on construction sites recount their experiences visiting the offices of the local MLA. It is relatively common in urban settings for the MLA to meet with members of the public, often during designated constituency service hours.[60] This kind of direct contact with politicians is rare in village settings. In moving beyond his village, the man gained new contacts (on urban worksites) and, through them, new information about potential claim-making practices (through parties). He later put this information to work, visiting his MLA's office to inquire about a pension for his elderly mother, the application for which had been stalled. He met in the MLA's office with an official who wrote down his complaint. Two months later, he reported, his mother's pension was approved. It is not possible to know whether this man's actions had any actual effect on the pension application. But by his own assessment, "the money came only after I went straight to the MLA. It was a matter of going straight to the top."

Other sites of exposure are more local. One of the most common, particularly for lower-caste women, is the MGNREGS worksite. As a tribal woman in Udaipur described it:

> Before in the dry season we would sit at home. Now there is 100 days of work. Everybody comes there when we are working. There is the mate, the technician, the supervisor. The higher-ups from Gogunda [block officials] also come and check on the progress. Sometimes politicians also come to show their faces.[61]

In this sense, MGNREGS provides a platform for citizen-state engagement. Officials visit worksites in the course of public outreach campaigns. For example, when attempting to inform residents about an upcoming administrative camp, a block official in Udaipur reported sending his staff to visit as many worksites as possible to spread the word.[62] Politicians also visit MGNREGS sites when campaigning or when trying to recruit people for political rallies. MGNREGS workers thus encounter a new set of political actors. The same woman in Udaipur summed this up powerfully, stating, "On the [MGNREGS] job, we are seen. At home, we are ignored." This does not, of course, ensure that officials are actually responsive to citizens' demands. But the worksites are, at the very least, spaces where citizens encounter officials who are otherwise markedly absent from the village.[63]

---

[59] Author interview, Mandor block, Jodhpur district, April 8, 2010.

[60] Bussell 2015.

[61] Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, February 2010.

[62] Author interview, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, January 2011.

Still other sources of exposure to the state occur by institutional design. Another tribal woman in Udaipur, for example, described her experiences after being elected to a Gram Panchayat seat reserved for an ST woman:

> Before I never ventured out. My life was only here [in the house], and to the fields and back again. After my election, I went every which way, to Gogunda [the block seat], to Udaipur [the district seat]. It was my business to go. The NGO-*walle* [NGO-people] and parties even organized buses to take us to Jaipur so we could learn the business of the panchayat.[64]

This woman was also the beneficiary of a training program led by a local NGO that specifically targeted women. By bringing her to training sessions, the NGO not only amplified the effects of the panchayat reservation, but also served as a source of exposure itself. In another village, a group of women associated with the local *anganwadi* (a government-run daycare center) emerged as active claim makers. These women, who primarily hailed from the upper-caste Brahmin community, stood out in contrast to other Brahmin women in the same village who were notably silent in the claim-making arena. The anganwadi provided critical links to both the panchayat and the state bureaucracy, since the women traveled regularly to participate in training organized by the Department for Women's and Children's Development. The training sessions, in the words of one participant:

> [O]pen your eyes to government procedure. They teach us there about government schemes, how to talk, and how to educate people in the village. They tell us that it is important that ladies participate, that the panchayat is there for us.[65]

In other instances, channels of access to the state are less direct. Many scholars have noted the critical role of brokers in Indian politics.[66] Brokers, though, are not uniformly present, and citizens vary in their knowledge of and access to these gatekeepers. In Rajasthan, for example, just under one-third of the survey respondents reported being aware of local fixers who assist others in accessing government officials. Accordingly, a relatively small number (17 percent) report claim-making mediated through such actors (Table 1). But where present these brokers play an important role; more than 50 percent of those who note that there are fixers in their locality report turning to them for claim-making purposes.[67] Social and spatial exposure increases the chances that a person will encounter such intermediaries, and thereby expands the claim-making opportunity structure. A woman in Udaipur, for example, explained how she came to learn about potential fixers, which informed her decision about where to turn when facing a shortage of drinking water. She explained:

---

[63] Jenkins and Manor 2017.

[64] Author observation of NGO training sessions of elected panchayat women, Gogunda block, Udaipur district, April 14, 2009. In many other instances, though, women elected to local office remain home while their husbands attend in their stead. The term *sarpanch pati* (president's husband) is regularly employed to refer to a man who informally occupies a panchayat seat in lieu of his wife.

[65] Author interview, Bargaon block, Udaipur district, December 2011.

[66] Oldenburg 1987; Manor 2000; Krishna 2002; Krishna 2011; Corbridge et al. 2005.

> I move about and meet people. I talk to people on the way, and in the fields, and in this way come to learn about who is good, who will help you. Someone will say, "so-and-so, he is *jagruk* [aware], he can get things done." And so when the water pump was broken, I knew where to turn.[68]

Taken together, these accounts illustrate how encounters beyond the immediate community and locality can build knowledge, generate expectations of service delivery, and expand channels of access to the state. Importantly, there is no single driver of exposure; individuals are set in motion by a wide-ranging and often contingent set of geographic, economic, social, and institutional factors. But once drawn beyond their local communities, they gain resources (information, ideas, contacts) that encourage aspirations for services and strengthen their capabilities for engaging in state-targeted action.

VI. Testing the Theory: Models and Results

The preceding accounts reveal how social and spatial exposure can influence whether and how citizens make claims on the state. This section employs multivariate analysis of the survey data to test the robustness of the relationship. In what follows, I introduce a series of metrics of exposure, examining the extent to which they are predictive of claim-making practice.[69] The model employed is

$$y_{ipd} = \alpha + \beta EXP_{ipd} + \gamma IND_{ipd} + \lambda HH_{ipd} + \theta PLACE_{pd} + \Omega DFE_{d} + \varepsilon_{ipd},$$

---

[67] Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.7, presents the mean incidence of each mediated claim-making practice, adjusted for the reported presence of that actor or institution in the locality.

[68] Author interview, Bargaon, Udaipur, December 16, 2010.

[69] The full specification of the model is presented in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Appendix III. Data and replication code can be found at Kruks-Wisner 2017a.

where y is the claim-making outcome of interest (incidence or repertoire, as defined in Section II) for individual i in place (village and panchayat) p and district d. β estimates the effects on claim-making associated with different measures of social and spatial exposure (*EXP*), described below. *IND* represents a vector of individual-level controls related to socioeconomic status, caste, gender, level of education, media exposure, and partisanship. Household controls (*HH*) include family size and ages, occupations (including MGNREGS employment), and measures of household wealth, including landownership and an index comprising durable goods, livestock, and the materials with which a home is constructed. *PLACE* represents village and Gram Panchayat controls, including measures of local development, demographic features related to the village population and caste composition, distance to a town, location of the panchayat headquarters, and whether the seat of panchayat president (*sarpanch*) is reserved for members of the SC, ST, or women. All models include district fixed effects (*DFE*). Standard errors (ξ) are clustered at the village level.

MEASURING EXPOSURE

As noted in Section IV, there are many drivers of exposure—structural, political, and institutional—that vary across localities and among individuals.[70] In an effort to capture this variation, I employ four separate indicators of exposure, summarized in Table 2. There is no single, encompassing metric, and these indicators do not comprise an exhaustive list. Instead, they capture different forms of economic and interpersonal engagement that span both social and spatial boundaries. Together, these indicators allow us to begin to empirically examine the relationship of exposure to claim-making.

First, respondents were asked about the extent to which their occupational networks extend across caste lines, that is, whether they work mostly with people from their own caste communities (*jatis*) or with people from others.[71] Rural occupations, as noted, were historically caste-bound. Mixed-caste workplaces therefore represent a key arena for exposure across caste lines. To the extent that caste and occupation were also traditionally linked to place, mixed-caste employment also suggests a degree of spatial mobility beyond the mohalla or the village.

---

[70] Panchayat, village, and individual-level correlates of exposure are examined in the next section.

[71] It was left to the respondents to decide what constituted the boundary of their own caste community (*jati samudaay*). This question thus has the potential to capture interactions both across broad categorical caste divisions (SC, ST, OBC, and GC) and across caste or even subcaste lines within those categories. But it does not tell us anything about the relative strength or porousness of *particular* caste boundaries.

TABLE 2
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND SPATIAL EXPOSURE

Indicators of Exposure	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Engagement in mixed-caste workplace or occupation	0.81	0.39	0	1
Migration beyond village (household)	0.22	0.41	0	1
Social engagement beyond neighborhood	0.68	0.47	0	1
Participation in mixed-caste cultural group	0.14	0.34	0	1
Index of exposure[a]	1.85	0.91	0	4
Village land-to-labor ratio (proxy for exposure)[b]	1.52	1.21	0.08	10.12

Source: Author's citizen survey in Rajasthan 2010–11, (n = 2210).

[a] Index of exposure is a composite of the binary measures above.

[b] Land-to-labor ratio is hectares of cultivable land relative to adult working population in a village. Drawn from the 2001 Census of India (Primary Abstract and Village Directory).

This form of crosscutting exposure is very common; more than 80 percent of those surveyed report that they "work side by side with people from other caste communities."

Second, to capture the spatial dimensions of exposure more directly, respondents were asked about migration. Slightly under one-quarter (22 percent) report that they or a member of their household lives and works outside of the village for more than thirty days a year. The survey data, however, do not allow us to distinguish between long-term and more temporary migration. The survey also fails to capture more frequent and local forms of movement beyond the village and back, including daily or weekly travel for work—a practice referred to as "up-down" and reported by almost half of all residents.[72] These data limitations are discussed below.

The third metric of exposure attempts to capture social engagement across caste lines by asking about participation in cultural groups, defined as voluntary membership in music, film, sports, youth, or other organizations. Formal voluntary associations of this sort are thin on the ground: only 15 percent report membership in any such organization.

---

[72] Up-down movement of this kind is captured in an additional rapid survey (n = 240) carried out in two selected districts of Rajasthan. In this sample, 28 percent reported travel in search of work, while an additional 18 percent reported economic activities outside of the village.

Of those who do participate in such groups, the vast majority—90 percent—report that they are mixed-caste in nature, thus creating spaces for crosscutting encounters.

Scholars of India have been quick to note the limits of models of formal associationalism in settings where voluntary organizations are few and far between.[73] It is with this in mind that a fourth measure of exposure seeks to shed light on more informal, but also more common, forms of interpersonal engagement by asking respondents to report the frequency with which they "meet or sit with people from different neighborhoods." This question was followed by examples intended to anchor the notion of "sitting" with others, which included visits to people's homes, playing cards or other games, performing *kirtan* (collective worship), or gathering for *puja* (religious ceremonies). Since most villages are internally divided into mohallas that are organized along caste and class lines, these types of engagement provide occasions for social as well as spatial exposure within the village. More than two-thirds (68 percent) report these kinds of activities across neighborhood lines.

As should be clear, one source of exposure does not preclude another. I therefore introduce an index comprising the number of sources of exposure that an individual reports (each assessed in binary terms). On average, respondents report just under two of the four enumerated sources. Last, the village land-to-labor ratio (discussed below) reflects demographic and geographic factors that influence the likelihood that an individual will travel beyond his or her locality in search of employment—thus offering a plausibly exogenous proxy for exposure.

MAIN RESULTS: THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON CLAIM-MAKING

The analysis reveals that social and spatial exposure is associated with, all else equal, a greater incidence of claim-making and with a broader repertoire of claim-making practices (Table 3).[74] The sizes of these effects are shown in Figures 4 and 5. A one-unit increase in the index of exposure is associated with a 10 percent increase in the likelihood that a person will make claims on the state. This reflects a 16 percent increase associated with socializing across neighborhood lines and with working in mixed-caste settings, as well as an 11 percent increase associated with participation in mixed-caste cultural groups. Migration has only a small effect (increasing the likelihood of claim-making by just 2 percent) that is not statistically significant at conventional lev-

---

[73] Chhibber 1999; Krishna 2002.

[74] Results for the different kinds of claim-making practice are presented in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.10.

TABLE 3
SOCIAL AND SPATIAL EXPOSURE AND CLAIM-MAKING[a]

Indicators of Exposure	*Claim-Making Incidence (μ= 0.756)*	*Claim-Making Repertoire (μ= 1.999)*
Social engagement beyond neighborhood	.120***	.550***
	(.025)	(.094)
Observations	1966	1966
R^2	(pseudo) 0.211	0.294
Participation in mixed-caste cultural group	.086***	.400***
	(.027)	(.13)
Observations	1966	1966
R^2	(pseudo) 0.201	0.282
Engagement in mixed-caste workplace	.120***	.330***
	(.032)	(.096)
Observations	2045	2045
R^2	(pseudo) 0.202	0.276
Migration beyond village (household)	.015	.083
	(.022)	(.092)
Observations	1966	1966
R^2	(pseudo) 0.197	0.277
Index of social and spatial exposure	.075***	.310***
	(.012)	(.047)
Observations	1966	1966
R^2	(pseudo) 0.218	0.296

*$p<0.10$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$; robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are shown in parentheses

[a] Results for claim-making incidence are from probit models, reporting marginal effects. Results for claim-making repertoire are from ordinary least squares models (OLS), reporting the coefficients. Sample means are shown in parentheses at the top of the columns. All models include individual, household, village, and panchayat controls, with district fixed effects.

els.[75] Similar patterns emerge when examining the effects of exposure on the breadth of the claim-making repertoire. A one-unit increase in the index of exposure is associated with a 15 percent broadening of the

---

[75] This likely reflects data limitations. The survey captures migration at the household level, whereas claim-making is measured at the individual level. The survey also fails to distinguish between short-term and long-term patterns of movement, which may have contradictory effects (where long-term migration represents a form of exit) that are simply washed out in the data, thus yielding a null result of migration.



FIGURE 4
EXPOSURE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CLAIM-MAKING



FIGURE 5
EXPOSURE AND REPERTOIRE BREADTH

strategies employed. Socializing across neighborhood lines increases the breadth of practices by 27 percent; participating in a mixed-caste work setting, by 17 percent; and engagement in a mixed-caste cultural group, by 20 percent. Migration is also positively correlated with a 4 percent broadening of repertoire, although again not at statistically significant levels.

These findings broadly support the theory that those who traverse social and spatial boundaries will be more active claim makers who employ a broader array of strategies than those who operate in more constrained spheres. The causal nature of these relationships, though, remains unclear. Does exposure drive claim-making, or could claim-making activities themselves be a source of exposure? To the extent that claim-making draws individuals into the public sphere, the same activity could also shape the degree to which they encounter new people and places. Moreover, the state itself shapes exposure, for example, through political reservations that create mixed public spaces in the Gram Panchayats or through investments in infrastructure that increase connectivity. It is thus impossible to fully disentangle the causes and effects of claim-making and exposure.

In the short run, however, the measures of exposure employed are driven by factors that are largely antecedent to individual acts of claim-making. The decisions to join a cultural group or to socialize in other neighborhoods, for example, are more likely to be driven by cultural and religious considerations than by the pursuit of public resources.[76] Similarly, decisions about where and with whom to work largely reflect factors unrelated (again in the short term) to state-targeted citizen action, such as the availability of cultivable land, the productivity of agriculture, and employment opportunities beyond the village.[77]

To make stronger causal (as opposed to simply temporal) inferences, an exogenous measure of exposure is required. The village land-to-labor ratio, calculated as the total cultivable land over the village agricultural workforce, is one such variable—albeit one that should be cautiously employed. This ratio is a product of demographic and environmental factors, such as population growth (as successive generations divide plots of land) and land degradation (resulting in increasingly marginal plots of land), which cannot be attributed to citizen claim-making in a

---

[76] On the effects of "nonpolitical" institutions on participation, cf. Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001.

[77] A clear exception is if citizens are making claims on the state for employment, for example, through MGNREGS—a possibility controlled for in the models.

TABLE 4
VILLAGE LAND-TO-LABOR RATIO AND CLAIM-MAKING[a]

	Claim-Making Incidence (μ= 0.756)	*Claim-Making Repertoire (μ= 1.999)*	*Index of Exposure (μ= 1.848)*
Village land-to-labor ratio	–0.061***	–0.152***	–0.040**
(hectares/pop.)	(0.015)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Observations	2045	2045	1966
R^2	(pseudo) 0.208	0.273	0.247

*p 0.10, **p 0.05, ***p 0.01; robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are shown in parentheses

[a] Results for claim-making incidence are from a probit model, reporting marginal effects. Results for claim-making repertoire and the index of exposure are from OLS models, reporting the coefficients. Sample means are shown in parentheses at the top of the columns. All models include individual, household, village, and panchayat controls, with district fixed effects.

proximate sense.[78] The land-to-labor ratio reflects the likelihood that a person driven by land scarcity will seek new economic opportunities in the village and beyond. As such, it serves as a proxy for social and spatial exposure (reflected in Table 4 in a strongly significant relationship with the index of exposure).

Where land is scarce relative to labor, residents will be propelled into new economic sectors. With this increase in exposure, the theory predicts that those residents ought to be more likely to engage in claim-making and to employ more diverse practices. Where land is more readily available, the reverse ought to be true. These predictions are in fact borne out: a one-unit increase in the land-to-labor ratio (that is, an additional hectare of cultivable land per agricultural worker) is associated with an 8 percent drop in likelihood of engaging in claim-making, as well as with an 8 percent contraction of the claim-making repertoire (Table 4).[79]

VII. WHO MAKES CLAIMS? THE CORRELATES OF CLAIM-MAKING AND EXPOSURE

The main results described above point to a positive association between citizen claim-making and exposure beyond the immediate community and locality. But are certain kinds of people more likely to traverse social and spatial boundaries, and are those same people also more prone to make claims on the state? To explore this, I examine the socioeconomic correlates of both claim-making and exposure, introduced as control variables in the analysis above.[80] Wealth appears to have a nonlinear effect on claim-making: neither the richest nor the poorest out claims the other, while those in the middle are the most likely to make claims. This is shown in Table 5, where the household wealth index is positively correlated with the incidence of claim-making, but where the squared term of the same index is negatively correlated.[81] Although these results should be interpreted with caution, they may reflect the aspirations of upwardly mobile individuals who have come to expect higher levels and quality of services than the very poor, but who have fewer resources to allocate to private self-provisioning than the very rich. There is, however, no significant effect of household wealth observed on the breadth of the claim-making repertoire.

---

[78] An individual's claim-making practice cannot directly alter the availability of land or population growth, nor can it influence the underlying structure of the rural labor market. Again, a possible exception is demands for employment at MGNREGS worksites, for which the models control. In the longer term though, the relationship may be confounded by the state's role in land distribution or in land conservation or degradation.

[79] A one-unit increase represents movement from the 30th to the 75th percentile in the distribution of the land-to-labor ratio.

The survey data do not capture variance in claim-making practice across specific caste communities and so do not speak to the power of particular caste boundaries. But the data do point to the continued salience of caste standing—assessed by the broad categories of ST, SC, OBC, and GC—in shaping (and, for those with lower standing, restricting) citizens' approaches to the state. The SC and ST, for example, employ repertoires that are 22 and 29 percent narrower, respectively, than those of the GC. Importantly, though, those from the lower castes and tribes remain overall just as likely to make claims as the upper castes; there is no significant effect of caste category on the incidence of claim-making.

But could it be that the effects of socioeconomic status on claim-making run through social and spatial exposure, if people from different backgrounds are differently exposed? Analysis of the correlates of exposure suggests that this is largely not the case (Table 6). Neither village literacy rates nor distance to a town, used respectively as proxies for local development and urbanization, are significantly asso-

---

[80] Models and full results are presented in Kruks-Wisner 2017b. Tables A.8 and A.9 present individual, household, village, and Gram Panchayat correlates of claim-making, while Tables A.11 and A.12 present the same variables as correlates of social and spatial exposure. In both analyses, the effects of the independent variables are jointly assessed in models that include the full set of controls, described above.

[81] Similar patterns are observed for landownership. Those in the fourth quintile of landownership are also more likely to engage in claim-making than those in the fifth ($p = 0.032$), whereas those with the least land (Q1) do not differ significantly from those with the most (Q5) (Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.9).

TABLE 5
CORRELATES OF CLAIM-MAKING (SELECTED)[a]

	Claim-Making Incidence (μ= 0.756)	*Claim-Making Repertoire (μ= 1.999)*
Wealth index	0.029**	0.050
(household)	(0.014)	(0.067)
Wealth index - squared	−0.003***	−0.005
(household)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.065	−0.572**
(compared to GC)	(0.073)	(0.263)
Scheduled Caste	−0.065	−0.441**
(compared to GC)	−(0.065)	(0.192)
Other Backward Class	−0.049	−0.247
(compared to GC)	(0.051)	(0.188)
Female	−0.223***	−1.096***
(compared to male)	(0.064)	(0.214)
Distance to town	−0.001	−0.004
(village)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Literacy rate	−0.006	−0.157
(village)	(0.192)	(0.812)
Newspaper readership	0.033***	0.179***
(frequency)	(0.012)	(0.047)
Social	−0.002	0.076
(in own neighborhood)	(0.043)	(0.176)
Partisanship	− (0.012)	0.248***
(self identification)	(0.023)	(0.084)
Observations	1966	1966
R^2		0.296
Pseudo R^2	0.218	

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are shown in parentheses

[a] Results for claim-making incidence are from probit models, reporting marginal effects. Results for claim-making repertoire are from OLS models, reporting the coefficients. Sample means are shown in parentheses at the top of the columns. All models include individual, household, village, and panchayat controls, with district fixed effects.

ciated with residents' level of exposure—assessed by the index. There is a small, positive association between the indices of household wealth and of exposure, but no significant relationship between landownership and level of exposure.[82] Caste category is also limited in its predictive power. Members of the SC on average score lower than the GC on the index of exposure, reflecting the fact that the SC are less likely to socialize across neighborhood lines. The ST and OBC, though, do not

---

[82] Results in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.12.

Table 6
Correlates of Exposure (Selected)[a]

	X-NH Social (*μ= 0.680*)	*X-Caste Cultural Group* (*μ= 0.138*)	*X-Caste Work* (*μ= 0.810*)	*Migration (HH)* (*μ= 0.220*)	*Index of Exposure* (*μ= 1.848*)
Wealth index	0.027	0.027***	0.004	0.026*	0.063*
(household)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.034)
Wealth index - squared	–0.003	–0.001*	0.001	–0.001	–0.002
(household)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Scheduled Tribe	–0.013	0.017	0.057	–0.037	–0.047
(compared to GC)	(0.076)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.124)
Scheduled Caste	–0.119*	0.007	0.053	–0.051	–0.162*
(compared to GC)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.095)
Other Backward Class	–0.042	0.024	0.081**	–0.081*	–0.074
(compared to GC)	(0.055)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.089)
Female	–0.335***	–0.089***	–0.116***	–0.066	–0.662***
(compared to male)	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.115)
Distance to town	0.000	0.001	0.001*	0.001	0.003
(village)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Literacy rate	0.040	–0.184**	–0.039	0.021	–0.104
(village)	(0.148)	(0.075)	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.252)
Newspaper readership	0.005	0.022***	–0.015	–0.027**	0.009
(frequency)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.027)
Social	0.266***	–0.027	0.094**	–0.040	0.293***
(in own neighborhood)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.095)
Partisanship	0.123***	0.007	0.075***	0.033	0.226***
(self identification)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.044)
Observations	1966	1966	1966	2045	1966
R^2					0.247
Pseudo R2	0.151	0.269	0.137	0.142	

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are shown in parentheses

[a] Results for dichotomous variables (cross-neighborhood social engagement, mixed-caste cultural group, mixed-caste work, and migration are from probit models, reporting marginal effects. Results for the index of exposure are from OLS, reporting the coefficients. Sample means are shown in parentheses at the top of the columns. All models include individual, household, village, and panchayat controls, with district fixed effects.

diverge significantly from the GC on any indicator of exposure. Again, this analysis does not capture differences across particular caste communities, but does broadly underscore the fact that people from across the socioeconomic spectrum, including those from both the lower and the upper castes, exhibit similar propensities to engage across social and spatial boundaries.

But does social and spatial exposure affect all people the same way?

One could imagine, for example, that the poor and lower castes, which traditionally have been excluded from the state and its resources, might be more likely to engage in claim-making once exposed to them than their richer, upper-caste counterparts. Alternatively, higher-status groups might be better positioned to leverage the resources generated by exposure. Exposure, in other words, could have a differential impact on differently situated groups. I find that this not the case. Interacting exposure (assessed in terms of the index) with a range of individual socioeconomic and ascriptive characteristics produces a set of null results.[83] Exposure, in other words, is uniform in its effects—similarly catalytic for all kinds of people.

Gender, as we should expect, has a powerful effect on both claim-making and exposure. Women pursue a repertoire of practices that is 55 percent narrower than that of men and are overall 29 percent less likely to make claims (Table 5). Women are also less exposed across all dimensions (with the exception of migration, which is measured at the household level). This is reflected in exposure index scores that are, on average, more than one-third lower than men's (Table 6). Importantly, though, exposure affects women and men in the same way, reflected in a lack of a differential effect on women's and men's claim-making incidence and repertoire.[84] The claim-making gender gap can thus be attributed to differences in levels of exposure, but not to any difference in how men and women respond to exposure.

What of education, which itself may be a source of exposure and which is also often and indicator of socioeconomic standing? At first glance, the relationship to claim-making appears to be weak. Neither village literacy rates nor individual level of education are significantly associated with either the incidence or repertoire of state-targeted citizen action. But these null results reflect the confounding effects of the inclusion of newspaper readership in the analysis, which covaries with educational attainment and is positively associated with claim-making. Once newspaper readership is dropped from the analysis, there is in fact a positive effect of education on claim-making incidence, although only at the secondary level.[85] This result is difficult to interpret. It could suggest a threshold level of literacy, knowledge, and skill building required for claim-making that cannot be obtained through primary education alone. It could also plausibly reflect an effect of exposure, since secondary education often requires travel beyond the village and since the classroom (at this higher level) is also often the site of interaction among students from different caste backgrounds.[86] There is, in addition, a positive correlation between education beyond the primary level and the index of exposure—again after dropping newspaper readership.[87] All levels of education, though, are associated with small, but significant, increases in the breadth of the claim-making repertoire.[88]

---

[83] Results presented in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.13. These models assess the effects of a series of interaction terms on claim-making. These include the index of wealth, dummy variables for the SC, ST, OBC, and for women—each interacted with the index of exposure. None of these interaction terms is significantly correlated with either claim-making incidence or repertoire.

[84] The interaction term for gender and the index of exposure is not significantly correlated (positively or negatively) with claim-making incidence or repertoire. Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.13.

[85] Results (not shown) are calculated from an alternative model that drops newspaper readership. In this model, attending secondary school is associated with a 7 percent increase in the likelihood of claim-making ($p = 0.016$), whereas primary and higher levels have no significant effect.

Finally, could there be differences in both exposure and claim-making that are attributable to features of one's personality that shape the propensity for social as well as political action? Considering this possibility, respondents were asked about their social engagement with people within their *own* neighborhoods. As we should expect, the tendency to socialize carries beyond the locality; the more social people are within their own mohalla, the greater is their exposure beyond the local community (Table 6). And yet there is no significant effect of this intragroup engagement on claim-making incidence or repertoire (Table 5). This suggests that although a person's social proclivities do indeed shape exposure, it is engagement beyond the community and locality and not a person's social tendencies per se, that drives claim-making.

Claim-making, however, does not occur in a political vacuum, and we therefore must also ask how partisan networks come into play. Although self-identifying with a political party does not significantly alter the overall likelihood of claim-making, it is associated with a significant broadening of the repertoire (Table 5).[89] At the same time, partisan identification is associated with higher levels of exposure (Table

---

[86] This is particularly likely as access to education expands among India's rural lower castes (cf. Krishna 2003).

[87] Results are significant for both secondary school (p = 0.079) and higher (tertiary) education (p = 0.008).

[88] Attending primary school is associated with a 4.6 percent broadening of the repertoire (p = 0.092), while attending secondary school and attending higher levels are both associated with a 2 percent expansion (p = 0.042 and p = 0.049, respectively).

[89] Partisan identification is measured in terms of self-identifying as a member of any party, compared with those who report no such affiliation. In a separate analysis, I examine the effects by specific party: Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—the two major parties in Rajasthan. Identifying as a member of the BJP (the opposition party at the state and national levels at the time of research) is associated with a *lesser* likelihood of engaging in claim-making, while there is no significant effect for identification with the Congress (which was in office at the time of research). Identification with *both* the Congress and the BJP, though, is significantly associated with a broadening of the claim-making repertoire. Results in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.9.

6).[90] The effects of partisan networks on patterns of citizen-state engagement thus constitute an important control in the analysis, as well as important area for future research.

VIII. Conclusion: Extensions and Limitations

Looking beyond the voting booth, this article has examined a critical, but understudied arena of citizen-state relations, asking who makes claims on the state for social welfare, and why. The frequent, but varied ways in which citizens engage in claim-making reflect the state's deeper local penetration and, simultaneously, the increasing porousness of social and spatial boundaries. The state, through decentralization and a proliferation of social welfare programs, has become more visible while citizens have become more mobile, leading to a greater frequency and intensity of citizen-state encounters. Under these conditions, I have argued, social and spatial exposure fosters claim-making. Those who traverse boundaries of community and locality are more likely to make claims on the state and to do so through a broader array of practices than are those for whom such boundaries remain more rigid.

A single-state study hinders the ability to systematically test the broader applicability of the theory and findings. But it does suggest something about the conditions under which claim-making may be most and least likely. In Rajasthan, as I have shown, the institutional terrain for social welfare provision is growing, but is marked by unequal and erratic allocation of public resources. It is this combination of visible but irregular public performance that makes Rajasthan a likely environment for claim-making, galvanizing action among those who perceive that they are being left behind. The state's social welfare apparatus is similarly uneven in many other parts of rural India, as is the case in other developing democracies with pronounced gaps between the rhetoric and reality of social rights.[91] If the theory of claim-making developed in this article is correct, we should therefore expect to see widespread effects of social and spatial exposure on claim-making under these similarly broad but uneven state conditions.

While the topic remains understudied, there is mounting evidence of a nexus between exposure and citizen action elsewhere in India. One body of work, for example, examines the social and political consequences of exposure-enhancing changes to the rural Indian economy. Vinay Gidwani and K. Sivaramakrishnan note the emergence of a "rural cosmopolitanism" where "movements in geographic space" transmit "not just sensibilities and ideas, but also the materials and techniques that enable the transformation of social space in multiple worlds."[92] Devesh Kapur and Jeffrey Witsoe similarly stress the importance of social and economic remittances from rural-urban migration, where the flow of "cognitive and symbolic resources" alters existing social relations, exposes people to new practices, and changes their expectations.[93] Research on women's empowerment has also highlighted the importance of exposure beyond one's household and immediate community. Studies in settings across India have shown that women's engagement in the public sphere (in particular through labor-market participation) is both mobility and capability enhancing.[94] Rachel Brulé, for example, demonstrates that women who travel beyond their villages for work are more likely to think that they are able to hold local officials to account than are women who remain more constrained by local boundaries.[95] In the rural setting, MGNREGS may be particularly important in this regard, as the program employs a disproportionate number of women, drawing many of them out of the home for the first time. Similarly, self-help and microfinance groups have been shown to increase women's capacity for effective collective action.[96] Quotas in local government also draw women into the public sphere, thereby altering their political knowledge and capabilities.[97] Despite these and other efforts, though, women's mobility remains highly constrained. Gender lines are among the most rigid and most slowly changing of social boundaries in rural India. This is particularly true in rural Rajasthan,[98] where we have seen that women's claim-making (and welfare) lags significantly behind men's.

---

[90] Similar patterns hold for those who identify with both the Congress and the BJP, all of whom score significantly higher than nonpartisans on the index of exposure. Results in Kruks-Wisner 2017b, Table A.12.

[91] In Brazil and South Africa, for example, efforts to legislate social rights have given rise to expansive new sets of programs, the spoils of which are both highly visible and highly unequal. For comparative analysis of social welfare and citizen-state relations in India, South Africa, and Brazil, see Heller 2001 and Heller 2013.

Within India, though, state-level differences in commitment to and capacity for social welfare provision alter the terrain for citizen action. As Patrick Heller notes, the "institutional surface area" of the state in some places is so narrow that citizens are hard put to find it, let alone to make claims on the state.[99] Where large numbers of citizens are routinely stymied in their efforts to extract resources, social and spatial exposure is unlikely to motivate claim-making. Instead, exposure could prompt a very different set of responses, including withdrawal from the state, as citizens seek private alternatives. At the extreme, this could lead to outright rejection of and rebellion against the state—dynamics that are visible in the 14 to 25 percent of India's districts that are affected by Maoist-inspired Naxalite insurgencies. At the other extreme, in states that demonstrate high levels of commitment to and capacity for social development, such as Kerala or Tamil Nadu,[100] citizen action is likely to take more institutionalized forms through channels such as mass parties, social movements, and high-capacity local governance bodies—all of which serve to aggregate and amplify individual acts of claim-making. Rajasthan is an intermediate case, which like other places marked by variable state capacity and performance, stands at a crossroads. There is the potential both for a virtuous cycle of voice and responsiveness and for a vicious cycle of lack of accountability and citizen withdrawal. How these dynamics unfold in the long term is dependent on whether and how claim-making is institutionalized, as well as on whether and how the state responds. Exploring this interplay between citizen and state action (and inaction) is thus a critical agenda for further research.

---

[92] Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003, 339.

[93] Kapur and Witsoe 2011, 4.

[94] Cf. Chhibber 2002; Drèze and Sen 2002.

[95] Brulé 2016. She writes (p. 914): "[E]xtra-village mobility provides women with significant capacity to increase their perceived political voice and reverse traditional social inequalities in certain circumstances."

[96] Cf. Singh and Cready 2015; Sanyal 2014.

[97] Cf. Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Pande 2015.

[98] Joshi 2008; Singh 2015.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000193.

References

Ahuja, Amit, and Pradeep Chhibber. 2012. "Why the Poor Vote in India: 'If I Don't Vote, I Am Dead to the State.'" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 47, no. 4: 389–410. doi: 10.1007/s12116-012-9115-6.

Appadurai, Arjun. 2004. "The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition." In Vijaydendra Rao and Michael Walton, eds., *Culture and Public Action.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press: 59–84.

Banerjee, Abhijit. 2004. "Who Is Getting the Public Goods in India? Some Evidence and Some Speculation." In Kaushik Basu, ed., *India's Emerging Economy: Performance and Prospects in the 1990s and Beyond.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bénit-Gbaffou, Claire Oldfield, and Sophie Oldfield. 2011. "Accessing the State:

---

[99] Heller 2009, 126.

[100] Singh 2015.

Everyday Practices and Politics in Cities of the South." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46, no. 5: 445–52. doi:10.1177/0021909611403703.

Besley, Timothy, Rohini Pande, Lupin Rahman, and Vijayendra Rao. 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, no. 2–3: 416–26. doi: 10.1162/154247604323068104.

Béteille, André. 2011. "Caste and the Citizen." *Science and Culture* 77, no. 3–4: 83–90. At scienceandculture-isna.org/mar_apr_11/01%20Andre%20Beteille.pdf.

Brulé, Rachel. 2016. "Accountability in Rural India: Local Government and Social Equality." *Asian Survey* 55, no. 5: 909–41. doi: 10.1525/as.2015.55.5.909.

Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bussell, Jennifer. 2015. *Clients or Constituents? Citizens, Intermediaries, and Distributive Politics in India*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72, no. 5: 1409–43. doi: 10.1162/154247604323068104.

Chauchard, Simon. 2017. *Why Representation Matters: The Meaning of Ethnic Quotas in Rural India.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chhibber, Pradeep K. 1999. *Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.

———. 2002. "Why Are Some Women Politically Active? The Household, Public Space, and Political Participation in India." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43, no. 3–5: 409–29. doi: 10.1177/002071520204300310.

Corbridge, Stuart, Glyn Williams, Manoj Srivastava, and René Véron. 2005. *Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Deshpande, Ashwini. 2011. *The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in Contemporary India.* New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. 2002. *India: Development and Participation*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

———. 2013. *An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Dunning, Thad, and Janhavi Nilekani. 2013. "Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1: 35–56. doi: 10.1017/S0003055412000573.

Fernandes, Leela, and Patrick Heller. 2006. "Hegemonic Aspirations: New Middle Class Politics and India's Democracy in Comparative Perspective." *Critical Asian Studies* 38, no. 4: 495–522. doi: 10.1080/14672710601073028.

Gang, Ira N., Kunal Sen, and Myeong-Su Yun. 2017. "Is Caste Destiny? Occupational Diversification among Dalits in Rural India." *European Journal of Development Research* 29, no. 2: 476–92. doi: 10.1057/s41287-016-0011-1.

Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.

Gidwani, Vinay, and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2003. "Circular Migration and Rural Cosmopolitanism in India." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 37, no. 1–2: 339–67. doi: 10.1177/006996670303700114.

Government of Rajasthan. 2016. *Rajasthan Economic Review 2015–16*. Jaipur, India: Directorate of Economics and Statistics.

Granovetter, Mark. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6: 1360–80. doi: 10.1086/225469.

Gupta, Akhil. 2012. *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Hardgrave, Robert L., and Stanley A. Kochanek. 2008. *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*. Belmont, Calif.: Thomson Wadsworth.

Harriss, J. 2005. "Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor: Findings from Research in Delhi." *Economic and Political Weekly* 40, no. 11: 1041–54. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416334.

Heller, Patrick. 2001. "Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre." *Politics and Society* 29, no. 1: 131–63. doi: 10.1177/0032329201029001006.

———. 2009. "Democratic Deepening in India and South Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 44, no. 1: 123–49. doi: 10.1177/0021909608098679.

———. 2013. *Challenges and Opportunities: Civil Society in a Globalizing World.* New York, N.Y.: United Nations Development Programme.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Houtzager, Peter P., and Arnab K. Acharya. 2011. "Associations, Active Citizenship, and the Quality of Democracy in Brazil and Mexico." *Theory and Society* 40, no. 1: 1–36. doi: 10.1007/s11186-010-9128-y.

Isaac, Jeffrey C. 2011. "Boundaries." *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 4: 779–82. doi: 10.1017/S1537592711004051.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1998. "The Bahujan Samaj Party in North India: No Longer Just a Dalit Party?" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 18, no. 1: 35–51. doi: 10.1215/1089201X-18-1-35.

———. 2003. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India*. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Jayal, Niraja Gopal. 2013. *Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jayaraman, Rajshri, and Peter Lanjouw. 1999. "The Evolution of Poverty and Inequality in Indian Villages." *World Bank Research Observer* 14, no. 1: 1–30. At www.jstor.org/stable/3986536.

Jenkins, Rob, and James Manor. 2017. *Politics and the Right to Work: India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Joshi, Hemlatta. 2008. *Human Development Index Rajasthan: Spatio-Temporal and Gender Appraisal at Panchayat Samiti/Block Level, 1991–2001.* Delhi, India: Concept Publishing Company.

Joshi, Shareen, Nishtha Kochhar, and Vijayendra Rao. n.d. "Does Caste Still Matter? Empowerment and Inequality in Three States of India." Manuscript.

Kapur, Devesh, D. Shyam Babu, and Chandra Bhan Prasad. 2014. *Defying the Odds: The Rise of Dalit Entrepreneurs*. New Delhi, India: Random House India.

Kapur, Devesh, Partha Mukhopadhyay, and Arvind Subramanian. 2008. "The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the Poor." *Economic and Political Weekly,* 43, no. 15: 37–43. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277336.

Kapur, Devesh, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, and D. Shyam Babu. 2010. "Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era." *Economic and Political Weekly* 45, no. 35: 39–49. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/25742020.

Kapur, Devesh, and Jeffrey Witsoe. 2011. "Spatial Mobility and Political Change in India: A Case Study of Migration from Rural Bihar." Manuscript. Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6–7: 845–79. doi: 10.1177/001041400003300607.

Krishna, Anirudh. 2002. *Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy*. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

———. 2003. "What Is Happening to Caste? A View from Some North Indian Villages." *Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 4: 1171–93. doi: 10.2307/3591763.

———. 2011. "Gaining Access to Public Services and the Democratic State in India: Institutions in the Middle. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46, no. 1: 98-117. doi: 10.1007/s12116-010-9080-x.

Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle. 2017a. "Replication Data for: "The Pursuit of Social Welfare: Citizen Claim-Making in Rural India." Harvard Dataverse, V1. doi: 10.7910/DVN/VL6E3Q.

———. 2017b. Supplementary material for "The Pursuit of Social Welfare: Citizen Claim-Making in Rural India." At https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000193.

———. Forthcoming. *Claiming the State: Active Citizenship and Social Welfare in Rural India.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Lanjouw, Peter, and Nicholas Stern, eds. 1998. *Economic Development in Palanpur over Five Decades*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.* New York, N.Y.: Free Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1: 69–105. doi: 10.2307/1951731.

MacLean, Lauren M. 2011. "State Retrenchment and the Exercise of Citizenship in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 9: 1238–66. doi: 10.1177/0010414010374704.

Manor, James. 2000. "Small-Time Political Fixers in India's States: Towel over Armpit." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 5: 816–35. doi: 10.2307/3021178.

Mathew, George. 1994. *Panchayati Raj: From Legislation to Movement.* Delhi, India: Concept Publishing Company.

Milbrath, Lester W., and M. Lal Goel. 1977. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally & Co.

Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press.

Nayar, Baldev Raj. 2009. *The Myth of the Shrinking State: Globalization and the State in India*. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

Oldenburg, Philip. 1987. "Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case." *World Politics* 39, no. 4 (July): 508–35. doi: 10.2307/2010290.

Pande, Rohini. 2015. "In Indian Villages, the Power of a Powerful Woman." *New York Times*. January 14.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January): 155–83. doi: 10.1353/wp.1997.0004.

Ramachandran, V. K. 1991. *Wage Labour and Unfreedom in Agriculture: An Indian Case Study*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Rao, Vijayendra, and Paromita Sanyal. 2010. "Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 629, no. 1: 146–72. doi: 10.1177/0002716209357402.

Sanyal, Paromita. 2014. *Credit to Capabilities: A Sociological Study of Microcredit Groups in India*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1990. "Development as Capability Expansion." In K. Griffin and J. Knight, eds., *Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sheth, D. L. 1999. "Secularisation of Caste and Making of New Middle Class." *Economic and Political Weekly* 34, no. 34/35: 2502–10. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/4408346.

Singer, Wendy. 2007. *'A Constituency Suitable for Ladies' and Other Social Histories of Indian Elections*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Singh, Prerna. 2015. *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Singh, Swati, and Cynthia Cready. 2015. "Microloans and Women's Freedom of Physical Mobility: Evidence from India." *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 14, no. 3: 333–55. doi: 10.1163/15691497-12341349.

Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Sukhtankar, Sandip. 2017. "India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: What Do We Really Know about the World's Largest Workfare Program?" *Brookings-NCAER India Policy Forum* 13: 238–86.

Suryanarayana, M. H., Ankush Agrawal, and K. Seeta Prabhu. 2011. *Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index for India's States.* New Delhi, India: United Nations Development Programme.

Thachil, Tariq. 2014. *Elite Parties, Poor Voters: How Social Services Win Votes in India*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1999. "Conclusion: Why Worry about Citizenship?" In Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States.* New York, N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ziegfeld, Adam. 2016. *Why Regional Parties? Clientelism, Elites, and the Indian Party System*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.